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ABSTRACT

Handling Police Conduct
in an Ethical Way
by
Daniel Patrick Barry
Dr. Craig Walton
Professor of Ethics and Policy Studies
University of Nevada. Las Vegas
Police misconduct has always been a serious problem in America. Historically,
reform efforts have failed due to an organizational culture that is resistant to change. Past
reforms have been aimed at individual incidents, disregarding underlying organizational
problems. Improving public perception has been the goal of past reforms, as opposed to
improving organizational soundness.
Reform efforts need to be directed at enhancing police organizational culture.
These changes will improve workplace ethos, allowing virtuous conduct to flourish.
Advancing this organizational culture will encourage police officers to act in a manner
consistent with the high trust we vest in this vocation.
Justice. Truthfulness and Good Loyalty have been defined by the great
philosophers throughout history and should all be incorporated into the decision-making
process o f police leaders. Six proposals are offered to achieve the needed change in the
organizational culture of police departments.
iii

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT............................................................................................................................iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.......................................................................................................iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS................................................................................................ vii
CHAPTER 1 POLICE MISCONDUCT - AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ...................1
European Influence on American Policing .................................................................. 4
Early American Policing ................................................................................................7
l92Ôs ............................................................................................................................. Il
1930s ..............................................................................................................................12
1940-1960 ................................................................................................................. 14
1970- 1980 ................................................................................................................... 17
1990-p rese n t................................................................................................................. 17
Conclusion.....................................................................................................................22
Summary .......................................................................................................................24
CHAPTER 2 COMBATING THE CODE OF SILEN CE................................................26
The Police C u ltu re........................................................................................................27
Why The Code o f Silence Continues...........................................................................34
Present Response to the Code of Silence.....................................................................35
Truthlulness.................................................................................................................. 38
Loyalty vs. Truthfulness ............................................................................................. 43
C onclusion.....................................................................................................................49
Summary .......................................................................................................................52
CHAPTER 3 CITIZEN REVIEW BOARDS ...................................................................54
Recent Developments ..................................................................................................57
Absence of Quality ......................................................................................................60
Removing Managerial Accountability.........................................................................63
Addressing Systemic Problem s................................................................................... 66
Verification .................................................................................................................. 68
Social C h o ice................................................................................................................ 70
Conclusion.....................................................................................................................76
S u m m ary.......................................................................................................................80

IV

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

CHAPTER 4 STEPPING STONES FOR IMPROVEM ENT..........................................82
First Step (Ethics T raining)..........................................................................................88
A Case H istory...............................................................................................................89
Second Step (Misconduct Prevention).........................................................................92
Third Step (Rewarding Virtuous Conduct) .................................................................95
Fourth Step (Zero Tolerance For Untruthfulness)...................................................... 98
Fifth Step (Empower The Internal Affairs Bureau).................................................... 99
Sixth Step (Disciplinary M atrix )................................................................................101
Bureau Commander's Role Using the Disciplinary Matrix ....................................104
Category “A” V iolation...................................................................................... 105
Category "B” V iolation...................................................................................... 105
Category "C” V iolation...................................................................................... 105
Category “D” V iolation.................................................................................... 106
Supervisor's Role Using Disciplinary M atrix ........................................................... 106
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 108
Summary ......................................................................................................................110
Disciplinary Matrix .....................................................................................................116
APPENDICES......................................................................................................................122
Oath o f Office ............................................................................................................. 122
Code o f Ethics ............................................................................................................. 124
Garrity ..........................................................................................................................126
Police Officers Bill of Rights...................................................................................... 128
BIBLIO GRAPHY............................................................................................................... 145
VITA .....................................................................................................................................147

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Preparing this thesis has been an enjoyable experience for me. In this adventure.
I have had the pleasure of leaming from some outstanding people. Dr. Craig Walton and
Dr. Alan Zundel have instructed me over the past three years. Both served on my thesis
committee and gave me valuable advise. Dr. William Thompson was the third member of
my committee and he also was very helpful.
I have been a member o f the greatest police department in America for the past
twenty years, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. Sheriff Jerry Keller and
Undersheriff Dick Winget have provided great support to me and the other members of
Metro. Under the Sheriff s leadership, people are encouraged to seek innovations and
utilize new strategies.
Above all I want to thank my wife Allison and our four children (Rosie. Caitlyn.
Patrick and Elizabeth). On many occasions, while preparing this thesis, they have had to
‘walk on tight ropes' while I was working on a chapter. Without their love and support
this thesis would not have been completed.

VI

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 1

POLICE MISCONDUCT - AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Police play an important role in the maintenance of our democratic society. This
role compels police officers to maintain high ethical standards of conduct. Police must
protect the rights of citizens, yet are charged with restricting the rights of suspects in the
furtherance of society's good. Police routinely detain, search, arrest citizens, and lawfully
use physical force (including deadly force) when situations dictate. Additionally, the
testimony o f an officer weighs heavily in the deliberations made by jurors when
determining the guilt, or innocence, of a defendant in a court oflaw.
Maintaining public trust requires that police misconduct be dealt within an
ethical way. Police officers are required to take an oath of office (App.l ) and adhere to a
code o f ethics (App.2) before entering the profession. Officers are sworn to maintain high
ethical standards and protect society as a condition of their employment. The majority of
citizens in the United States understand the importance of police in the maintenance of
public order and enforcing laws. Most people are willing to grant increased authority to
police in order to live in a safe community. Police misconduct serves to undermine this
reciprocal relationship.
The problem o f police misconduct has existed since from the beginning of law
enforcement in America. Recently, several high profile cases, locally and nationally.

1
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have brought this topic to the forefront of academic discourse. Reviewing the history of
police misconduct in our country affords us the opportunity to comprehend how deeply
the problem is rooted. Also, recommendations for improvement can be based on
experience.
The challenges facing police reformers of today are similar to the trials faced by
their predecessors. It is important to examine how we arrived in our present situation
before we can navigate to an improved state. In short, if we do not learn from our past
mistakes, we are destined to repeat them.
This chapter will show past efforts directed at reducing police misconduct have
failed. Police executives have historically used the 'rotten apple' defense in an attempt to
separate their departments from the wayward officer(s). This 'rotten apple' defense has
allowed police executives to shift blame away from their departments, thereby not
confronting underlying systemic problems. The rotten apple' defense has resulted in
high rates o f misconduct recidivism in many police departments.
Responses to misconduct have recurrently been 'quick fixes' aimed at
tomorrow's press release, as opposed to morally sound departmental improvements.
Moral soundness needs to be the benchmark used by police leaders in deciding
disciplinary decisions, not expediency or public opinion. Police executives must engage
in quality deliberation when confronting disciplinary decisions.
Throughout the history o f American policing numerous commissions have been
created to address misconduct. These commissions have not been successfiil at reducing
misconduct. Most commissions have lacked the authority to ensure their findings were
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actually implemented. In fact, as seen in New York City, as one commission ends
another is created to address a new scandal.
Police reformers o f the 1930s fought to remove political involvement from the
police. While this reduced corruption, it created a significant challenge for police
executives. Without political oversight, who would govern the police chief s decisions?
The reformers created civil service boards to fill this abyss. Unfortunately, these boards
are often untrained and undermine the maintenance of good personnel management.
Police chiefs often base decisions on placating civil service, as opposed to moral
soundness.
The organizational culture existing within most police departments needs to be
examined. Without curing the organizational problems, little can be improved in the
handling o f police misconduct. Misconduct needs to be addressed from both a legal and
an ethical frame. Police misconduct has historically been adjudicated from only the legal
frame. Little (if any) consideration is given to moral soundness.
By ’moral soundness,' I will mean an organization that is conducive to virtuous
conduct. Employees in this type o f organization are encouraged to act morally - here
meaning the three virtues o f truthfulness, justice and good loyalty. ’Moral unsoimdness'
by contrast, will represent an organization where virtues are not viewed as important. In
this type o f organization, decisions are made for expediency, conformity or convenience,
as opposed to moral soundness.
This thesis argues that systemic changes are needed to address police
misconduct in an ethical way. Incorporating ethical accountability into the decision
making process will improve police agencies. Police executives need to weigh
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disciplinary decisions by asking tliemselves two important questions: Is this legally
correct? And more importantly, is this decision ethically sound? If the answer to both of
these is affirmative, they are heading in the right direction.
This first chapter explores police misconduct since the inception of policing in
America. Chapter Two examines the code of silence' in policing and the existing
organizational culture. This chapter identifies the need for systemic changes before
positive reform can occur. The Third Chapter takes a closer look at civilian review
boards and explains how these boards only placate the public, failing to address systemic
problems. Chapter Four lays out a path for police leaders to follow. This path is a series
o f six steps aimed at improving the organizational culture. All recommendations are both
legally and morally sound serving to handle police misconduct in an ethical way. These
six steps serve to provide for a morally healthy work place.

European Influence on American Policing
The roots o f American policing can be traced to the English system of law
enforcement. In discussing police misconduct, we need to look at both France and
England to understand the depth of this problem. Police reformers of eighteenth century
France and England faced challenges similar to those modem police executives
encounter. The challenges of hiring morally sound people and providing morally sound
workplaces are the most obvious.
The earliest state employed police can be found in France. Police misconduct
was a serious problem dating back as far as the 17th century. The problems that occurred
back in the 1600's, still confront police executives.
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Despite several attempts at reform, the Renaissance police of Paris were often
said to be in a league with thieves. By the eighteenth century the mid-management
job o f a police inspector had become so corruptibly profitable that it was sold for
twice the price of the head police administrator's office. And on the eve of the
French Revolution, the police spent all their time off from political spying in
sharing the profits of a large, illegal vice operation.'
During the Napoleon Restoration of the French Monarchy, corruption became
less widespread in uniformed police. However, the Sûreté (detective unit) was created on
the belief that "only a thief can catch a thief." This resulted in the employment o f thieves
as detectives. Predictably, misconduct remained a serious problem in France. The 'secret
police' were responsible for many atrocities, including murder, rape and other felonies.
They routinely falsely imprisoned people without justification.
In 1893. Louis Lepine became head of police administrators in France and made
some improvements. He ensured that all detectives came from the uniform police. This
ended the hiring of thieves as detectives, reducing some of the police corruption plaguing
France. However, problems persisted in the area o f enforcement of vice-related
laws.(Sherman41)
Prior to 1829. England primarily relied on citizens to protect themselves. The
great separation between the classes resulted in frequent conflict on the streets. The
wealthy could afford to pay for their own private security, but the same could not be said
for the poor. Crime and violence were the norms on the streets of England.
From Norman times, the English position of a parish constable was to be
performed by all citizens in rotation, a year at a time, in addition to one's regular
occupation. As the statutory duties of the constables increased, wealthier citizens

'Lawrence W. Sherman, Police Corruption-A Sociological Perspective. (Garden
City, NewYork: Anchor Press, Doubleday, 1974), 41. Subsequent references to this work
will be cited in the text parenthetically as, e.g. (Sherman 41)
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paid poorer ones to perform tliis onerous task in their stead. By the fifteentli
century a permanent group of inept and dishonest substitutes filled the ranks of
parish constables. More ambitious workingmen sought out the position of a high
constable for even greater illicit profits. (Sherman 42)
The majority of people were poor and lived in constant fear. It was the
responsibility of all males between the ages of 16 and 60 to enforce the law as they saw
fit. Population shifts due to industrialization, migration and urbanization, resulted in
rioting being commonplace. When turmoil grew too great military intervention was used.
The military was hated by the majority o f citizens because o f their brutish tactics in order
maintenance. The Crown of England realized that something needed to be done to ensure
domestic tranquility without risking a coup d'etat.
The idea o f having a civil police force to deal with domestic tranquility was the
reasoning behind the English reformers. By establishing a police force, the Crown could
eradicate much public scorn and provide tranquility in the streets. In 1829. Sir Robert
Peel created the London Metropolitan Police Department. The mission of the London
Metropolitan Police was to "keep peace by peaceful means."American Policing has its roots in nineteenth century England. Our forefathers
knew o f the atrocities committed by corrupt French police and did not want that in our
country. The English had created a system of policing which provided domestic
tranquility without military intervention. Our forefathers sought to achieve this; however,
they feared the creation o f a federal police force.

-William Geller, Local Government Police Management 3rd ed. (U.S.A.
Municipal Management, 1991), p.3. Subsequent references to this work will be cited in
text parenthetically as, e.g. (Geller 3)
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Early American Policing
Early police departments in the United States resembled their English
counterparts. The quasi-military foundation of American policing can be seen in
contemporary policing. The wearing of identifiable uniforms, adherence to a formal
chain o f command, legally sanctioned use of force and isolation from the public are just
some o f the similarities between the military and police.
Despite affinities with England's police, there were profound differences.
England's police were created by national reformation; this was not the case in the United
States. Local, instead of federal, government created American policing. Allowing local
governments independence in creating their own police allowed for communities to have
law enforcement that fit their own political needs. "Of all the factors that have shaped
police departments in the United States, local political control and authorization have
been pivotal." (Geller 3)
Local control served as a breeding ground for police misconduct in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Local political control afforded police the
opportunity to better serve citizens by being responsive to local needs, however, this also
increased police misconduct. In the nineteenth century the majority of police
departments in the United States reflected the conditions surrounding local governments.
In many cities, the police became an important element in the corrupt political machinery.
Officers were hired and promoted solely on the basis of political loyalties and payoffs.
Police departments were free from any national oversight which served to fuel the fires of
misconduct.
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During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when the big city
administrator was largely the province of'leaders of urban tribal politics, the ward
bosses.' police districts in most large cities were adjuncts of the political machines
and were packed with cronies of the ward bosses. In tribute, police loyalty 'turned
out the vote.' Financial corruption and inequitable, discriminatory, inefficient, and
brutal policing thrived.!Geller 4)
Corruption and scandals were commonplace in many police departments in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These early departments were so corrupt that
even getting promoted to a higher rank, or a 'perk' assignment, required paying off
superior officers.
An example o f the pervasiveness o f police misconduct in the nineteenth century
can be seen in the city o f Boston. The salary officers received was insignificant,
compared to the profits derived from payoffs. Corruption was systemic, allowing the
practice to continue without any form of deterrence.
The cops are paid off. They call it the 'imion wage.' The patrolman gets five
dollars a month for every store on his beat that sells numbers. The plainclothesmen
get the same, but they can go anywhere in Comerville. They divide up the territory
between themselves. They get on different payrolls, and they divide up the graft,
but even so a plainclothesman can make more than a patrolman. The Sergeant gets
ten dollars (on every store). The men in the cruising car get two-fifty each. Some
men sell themselves cheap. Of course, they got a lot of territory to cover. (Sherman
109)
As early as the 1870s and 80s. reformers began seeking remedies to address
police misconduct. The great abuses of police powers were attributed to the fact that
local politicians were using police to achieve their own agendas. Early reformers sought
to ensure that police service was judged on performance, as opposed to political loyalties.
In 1877 Joel B. Erhardt, a Republican police commissioner and member of the
fashionable Union League Club, protested to Tammany leader John Kelly an
assessment on members o f the police department for a Tammany Hall campaign
fund. Erhardt wrote for public consiunption - his letter to Kelly was published in
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the Times - and he used all the arguments about the necessity tor judging policemen
by the quality of service rather than their political connections.! Sherman 48)
Early reform efforts identified the dangers of strong political control over the
police. Their efforts resulted in the formation of the Lexow Committee in 1894. This
committee was created to measure the level of corruption within the New York Police
Department. This investigation revealed many police officers were getting rich by
selective enforcement o f vice crimes. The committee discovered that police misconduct
was difficult to measure, because of unwillingness of victims to come forward and
witnesses to testify honestly. Also, all ranks throughout the department were involved in
corruption.
The Lexow investigation of 1894. an inquiry into the New York City Police
Department conducted under the auspices of the Republican majority in the state
legislature which was designed to embarrass the Democratic organization in New
York City, showed $300.00 to be the accepted figure for an appointment as a
patrolman; promotions to higher ranks required correspondingly higher payments.
Therefore, from the rookie's first involvement with the department he was made
aware of the systemic and pervasive impact of political influence and bribery.
(Sherman 48)
The Lexow Committee confirmed that officers were being payed off by selective
enforcement of vice related crimes, such as prostitution, gambling and illegal alcohol
sales. Saloons that did not pay bribes to the police soon realized that strict enforcement of
the law could cost them money. These payoffs were received by all ranks.
The Lexow Committee revealed precinct captains had set prices that houses of
prostitution had to pay. Depending on the number of prostitutes and clients, payoffs
would vary from $25 to $500 per month. Captains would have 'bagmen* who would
collect the money. 'Bagmen* were patrolmen or detectives who collected the payments
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from the businesses. The bagmen were usually transferred with the captain to new
assignments.
The findings of the Lexow investigation resulted in the election of a reform
mayor in New York City. William Strong. Mayor Strong selected Theodore Roosevelt as
Police Commissioner to clean up this troubled department. However, his efforts were
unsuccessful because police corruption had become too widespread.
When examining nineteenth century police reform efforts from a utilitarian
viewpoint reasons for failure become obvious. Police corruption served to benefit
everyone involved. The suspects did not mind paying a fee to the police to avoid
prosecution. Graft money allowed criminal enterprises to flourish, making payoffs a wise
business investment for criminals. The policemen receiving the money benefitted
financially.
The general public was content, in that the majority of criminal activity was
isolated to a small geographical area. .Also, to the average citizen, knowing police were
for sale, made his/her own transgressions legally forgivable. Knowing that a small
deposit in the Desk Sergeant's piggy bank may erase a criminal act was another reason for
citizens to be indifferent about police reform.
The police reformers o f yesteryear had to overcome obstacles similar to those
confronting modem reformers. An apathetic public, difficulty in gaining information and
reluctance of witnesses to testify, are some of these similarities.
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1920s
The ratification of the Prohibition Amendment, resulted in escalating police
corruption during the 1920s. Making alcohol illegal, provided another source of revenue
for corrupt officers. During this decade the reputation of the police had submerged to a
low point. While this was certainly a sad time for law enforcement, it also served to
facilitate positive reform.
The closeness of the police to communities and to politicians has also led to
corruption, especially in inner-cities where police have been charged with enforcing
laws that have been enacted by conservative rural-dominated legislatures, but that
found little support in the hurly-burly of urban life. In such places, it became the
job of locally controlled police to protect illegal businesses - most notably,
gambling and prostitution from disruptions caused by other law enforcement
agencies and by untidy clientele who might scare off paying customers.
This trend reached a peak during Prohibition, when official corruption became
the standard operating procedure of many American police departments. By the
time Prohibition ended, however, the United States was deep in the Great
Depression, and a constricted job market made policing an attractive career option
to well-educated people who in better times would have gone into more traditional
white collar and professional work. In many cases, this new breed was repulsed by
old school corruption and sought to turn policing into a respectable undertaking."^
This was a decade highlighted by tremendous corruption and very low public
trust in American policing. However, positive changes were seen when more qualified
candidates applied for positions as police officers. This resulted in improving the
public’s opinion o f police officers. Police work was beginning to be seen as a respectable
career, as opposed to "a group of thugs with badges."

^Roger G. Dunham and Geoffrey P. Albert, Critical Issues in Policing 3rd ed,
(Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press Inc.: 1997), p. 195. Subsequent references to
this work will be cited in the text parenthetically as, e.g. (Dunham 195)
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1930s
The 1930s was a decade in which reform was made. The higher caliber of
people entering the profession served to remove some of the political influence that had
been so dominant. The leading police reformers during this decade were August Vollmer
and O.W. Wilson. Their main contributions were removing local political control and
shifting the police mission to law enforcement. This period of change is known as the
Scientific Management period.
In his assessment, Vollmer emphasized the application of'scientific' principles
to organization deployment of personnel, criminal investigation and crime
prevention. This emphasis on science and objectivity can be found in several
dimensions of the reforms of the 1930s: police were selected and promoted on the
basis o f such objective criteria as psychological tests and personnel rating schemes:
and Police departments were to be evaluated on the basis of such scientific,
objective measures as crime, arrests and clearance statistics.!Geller 5)
The federal government began assisting local departments. The Federal Bureau
of Investigation served to help local departments by maintaining crime statistics from
crime reports and supporting technical advances (i.e.. radios, finger prints).
The Federal Bureau oflnvestigation played several roles in the diffusion of
new thinking about police. Its public relations campaign disseminated a vision of
policing. It administered the Uniform Crime Reports. In 1930 it created its own
laboratory. And in 1935 it created the National Police Academy, where generations
of police leaders would be trained. (Geller 8)
Police were now being thought o f as "crime fighters" instead o f "political
bullies." This shift increased the level of confidence citizens had in police departments.
The direction o f American policing moved away from the whims o f local politicians
toward protecting society. "When the crime-related functions of the police were accented
and political authorization was rejected, the character of U.S. Policing during the next
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half century was set: police aspired to be scientific crime fighters organized and
administered according to objective principles." (Geller 7)
During this period of time, civil service boards were created to govern police
personnel management. These boards were created to remove politicians from hiring,
promoting and firing officers as a form of political pay back. Civil service resulted in
restrictions being placed on police administrators in the area of personnel management.
O.W. Wilson anticipated problems with civil service reducing the autonomy of
the police chief in managing his/her personnel. By having an outside board with authority
over personnel selection, promotions and punishments, the police chiefs' power
diminished.
He opposed the creation of civilian review boards, since police leadership
should be accountable for all officer's actions. He was concerned with punishing
officers who used excessive force. As Gazell states in his excellent biographical
article (1974:373). Chief Wilson was worried about what is sometimes called
lawlessness in law enforcement.’ He considered this to be a definite police
management problem that should be handled internally.'*
The removal of politics from police departments and the creation of civil service
protection created a major challenge for police administrators. Reduced political
involvement resulted in less corruption. However, civil service boards limited the police
chiefs' power to handle internal problems. The chief was responsible for the conduct o f
his officers, yet lacked power to ensure their decisions were implemented.
The challenges faced in the 1930s are still with us, almost 70 years later. This
system also allows police managers to deflect blame onto the civil service boards, instead

■•Edward Thibault, Lawrence M. Lynch and R. Bruce Mcbribe, Proactive Police
Management 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliff, New Jersey: Prentice Hall), p. 16. Subsequent
references to this work will be cited in the text parenthetically as, e.g. (Thibault 16) The
references to Niederhoffer, Reiser, Gazell will be cited in the Bibliography.
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of taking responsibility. Police executives need to make ethically sound decisions
without concerning themselves about the whims of civil service. Since decisions made
by police management need to be approved by civil service boards, police executives
often base decisions on appeasing civil service boards as opposed to moral soundness.

1940- 1960
During the 1940s through the 60s. most police departments continued on their
mission as 'crime fighters'. Police departments viewed themselves as professional
organizations that resisted outside interference. This sort of thinking was seen in the
television show 'Dragnet.' The only input that most officers sought from the public was.
as Jack Webb often said, "just the facts Ma’am.”
The thinking was that since only police were experts in fighting crime. 'Why get
others involved?' This attitude enhanced police isolationism from the public. "Indeed,
with rare exception police defined themselves as professional organizations that should
be kept out of the purview of citizens, academics, researchers and other persons with an
interest in police. Police business was just that: police business." (Geller 9)
The 1960's served as a wake up call to many Americans, concerning police
misconduct. The many demonstrations and riots during this decade showed police
response as being brutal. Racial confrontations. Viemam protests and the rioting in
Chicago during the Democratic National Convention (1968), showed police reaction as
being fiawed. The public saw these fiascos in their living rooms, on their television sets.
The image o f police as professional crime fighters was replaced with that of ‘keystone
cops.’
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Washington D.C. responded to the country's concern over police misconduct by
forming several national commissions. These commissions sent the message to all police
departments that the federal government was willing to intervene with conduct of officers
within their jurisdictions. The days of local autonomy concerning police misconduct
were over.
One measure of the turmoil in U.S. cities and the controversy surrounding
police practices in the 1960's and early 1970's was the proliferation of blue-ribbon
commissions during that period. Five national commissions were formed to
examine various aspects o f police services and the criminal justice process and
make recommendations for reform.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, which published its report in 1967 and 1968. was influenced by urban racial
turmoil. Among the outgrowths of its work were the Safe Streets Act o f 1968 and
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which provided significant
funding for police related programs.
The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (popularly known as
the Kerner Commission) was similarly inspired by the riots and other disorders in
many U.S. cities in the summer of 1967. Its report examined patterns of disorder
and prescribed responses by the federal government, the criminal justice system and
local governments.
The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence was
established after the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy in
1968. Its report. To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquility, was
published in 1969.
The President's Commission on Campus Unrest was established following
student deaths related to protests at Kent State and Jackson State universities in
1970.
The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals
issued six reports in 1973 in an attempt to develop standards and recommendations
for police crime control efforts.
In addition to the work of these national commissions, the American Bar
Association in 1973 published Standards Relating to the Urban Police Function,
the end product o f a lengthy standard setting effort that began in 1963.
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The voluminous reports of these commissions contain insights that continue to
have direct relevance to contemporary police concerns. Many o f the most
important recommendations in the commission reports can be seen, in retrospect, to
be the seeds o f important strategic, technological and operational initiatives that
will command the attention o f policing into the twenty-first century. (Geller 14)
The case of Frank Serpico demonstrated to the nation that misconduct was
accepted behavior within the largest police department in our country, the New York City
Police Department (NYPD). In this case Serpico had to go outside the department
seeking justice. This case demonstrated corruption became accepted behavior within the
NYPD. and almost proved fatal to a morally sound officer. In this case Serpico was set
up by fellow officers and nearly killed. He had to prematurely retire from "New York's
Finest" to save his own life.
As a result of the efforts of Frank Serpico. the Knapp Commission was formed
to investigate the NYPD. Their findings horrified the entire nation. The corruption
within the NYPD had become so systemic that honest officers feared coming to work.
This fear was not about the hoodlums on the streets, but stemmed of possible retaliation
they may encounter from corrupt coworkers.
The corruption in the system was able to thrive not only because of the abuses
of high-ranking officials, but also because the police demanded loyalty from their
peers. Honest officers learned to turn away if they were to survive on the force.
They could avoid becoming involved, but they were forbidden to interfere with a
partner’s corrupt activities. 'Never hurt, another cop' was a by word of the force. In
one social science study of police, officers were asked whether they would peijure
themselves to protect their partners - a question to which many respondents were so
hostile that they refused to cooperate further with the researcher. O f those who did
reply, the majority affirmed that they would rather peijure themselves than expose a
fellow officer.^

’Myron Perez Glazier and Perina Glazier, The Whistle Blowers. (U.S.A.; Basic
Books Inc. 1988) p.54. Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the text
parenthetically as, e.g. (Glazier 54)
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As a result o f the Knapp Commission's findings, many policies and procedures
were changed throughout the nation. The code of silence was identified as being a major
factor influencing police misconduct. Due to all the negative attention received during
the 1960’s. police departments needed to restore public trust.

1970- 1980
During the 70s and 80s, most American police departments welcomed academic
researchers with open arms. Universities conducted various studies aimed at improving
the police service. This resulted in a renaissance of the police profession. Many of these
studies were funded by the federal government.
TV shows and movies glamorized police work, playing an important role in the
popularity o f law enforcement. Near the end of the 80s, Community Oriented Policing
(COP) was developed. In this style of policing, officers work with the citizens in their
communities to solve problems. Focus shifted irom arrest and conviction to crime
prevention and community involvement. COP was seen by police executives as the
program that would guarantee public support forever. The police profession was on top
of the world' heading into the 1990's. Police departments had rediscovered Sir Robert
Peel's mission statement. Keep peace by peaceful means.

1990- present
On March 3, 1991, Los Angeles Police officers arrested a suspect after a lengthy
pursuit. The arresting officers had to use force to arrest Rodney King, Unfortunately for
the officers involved, the arrest was videotaped. This single car stop resulted in
damaging the public's trust in police nationwide. For months this video was played in
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most houses across America. People did not care that it occurred in Los Angeles, it may
as well have been in their own neighborhood.
The Rodney King beating serv'ed as a major setback to all the improvements
Community Oriented Policing had made. As a result of the subsequent riots, the
relationship between the police and citizens was as low as it had been since the 60s. The
Christopher Commission was created to investigate the LAPD after the King incident.
This commission reported the majority of misconduct within the LAPD went unreported.
The code of silence within the LAPD was a powerful force at all ranks. Another
contributing factor was identified as supervisors not holding subordinates accountable."
.A scandal even more deplorable than the Serpico case occurred in 1993. History
repeated itself in New York City when both uniform and plain clothes officers were
committing numerous felonies (while on duty). Officers were identified selling narcotics
and committing robberies while in uniform. The Mollen Commission was created to
investigate the New York City Police Department. The largest department in our country
certainly had not improved in 30 years.
The New York City Police Department stands out as the quintessential
illustration that past response to misconduct has not been effective. At the conclusion of
the Knapp Commission, the NYPD promised they had cleaned ‘their own house.' They
vowed they put away all the 'criminals in blue,' insisting misconduct was not systemic.
Police officials claimed only isolated individual officers were engaged in misconduct.

"Edwin J. Defltre, Character and Cons. Ethics in Policing, 2nd ed.. (Washington
D C,: The AEI Press, 1994) p.234. Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the
text parenthetically as, e.g. (Deltre 234)
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Again, during in 90s during the Mollen Commission. NYPD denied any systemic
problems. The 'rogue cops'justification was used to explain this scandal
The Mollen Commission certainly did not accept the 'rogue cops'
rationalization offered by NYPD's Top Brass. In fact, the commission's report said
police departments are incompetent when dealing with misconduct. The shock is
not that there are corrupt police officers, but that too often police departments are
incompetent when it comes to investigating corruption.^
Another finding was that the misconduct was more outrageous than misconduct
committed previously by police. In the past, most corrupt officers would get paid for
'looking the other way' or 'selective enforcement o f vice laws.' The Mollen Commission
identified officers as active participants in criminal acts.
The Mollen Commission report on the NYPD suggests that there are
significant differences in the nature of corruption in the 1990's. The reports suggest
that a new character of police corruption exists. The pattern o f 20 years ago
consisted o f the so-called minor' corruption, such as the taking of bribes for the
purpose o f allowing gamblers, prostitutes, and others to avoid the law and escape
arrest. This was a mutually beneficial accommodation between the police officer
and the criminal. Today, however, while corruption still accommodates the officer,
it is different in nature. The modem corrupt officer is paid not only to turn a "blind
eye" to criminal activity but to work hand-in-hand with the criminal to actively
facilitate criminal activities. In New York City, the officers became drug dealers
and helped to operate large drug rings.
The Mollen Commission also found corruption had achieved new levels of
organization. In the past, there was tacit approval through the ranks. Today,
however, the corruption includes "crews" of police officers who protect and assist
each others' criminal activities. Today's corrupt officers do not simply bump into
opportunities, but rather aggressively seek opportimities. Similarly, methods for
evading detection have achieved new levels, including ways to receive payoffs to
avoid internal investigators. (Gaffigan 85)
Integrity problems within the New York City Police Department resurfaced in a
1995 incident. In this case, an officer (James Pitti) was convicted o f Felonious Assault
’Stephen Gaffigan, “Police Integrity-Public Service With Honor,” National
Institute o f Justice, p.32 (January, 1997). Subsequent references to this work will be cited
in the text parenthetically as. e.g. (Gaffigan 32)
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and subsequently terminated from the NYPD. His partner (Frank Bolusi) alleged at the
criminal trial that he did not see nor hear anything because he was writing in his
notebook. Judge Ronald J. Aiello, of the State of New York Supreme Court, ridiculed
Bolusi's astounding ignorance of the incident. Yet. Officer Bolusi was never disciplined
by the NYPD . and remains on active duty.*
On August 9. 1997. another abhorrent scandal rocked the NYPD. An individual
was arrested on assorted misdemeanor charges and transported to the 70th Precinct in
Brooklyn. During the booking process, the arrestee (Mr. Abner Louima) was taken into a
restroom and savagely beaten. In this restroom, several officers shoved a stick up his anus
and tried to shove it in his mouth. Mr. Louima was seriously injured and transported to a
local hospital.
The investigation of this case was hindered by the fact that only two officers
came forward to give statements. Investigators assigned to this case granted departmental
immunity to nearly one hundred officers.
Three weeks after city officials said they had cracked the so-called blue wall of
silence in the investigation of the 70th Precinct torture case, investigators say that
only two officers have provided valuable information and that they have learned
virtually nothing from the scores of other officers who have been granted limited
immunity from prosecution.
'It's all, 1 don't know.' '1 wasn't there.' a senior investigator said yesterday in
describing the interviews conducted with almost 100 officers, nearly a third of
those assigned to the 70th Precinct.
In the week after the August 9th attack on Abner Louima, who prosecutors say
was brutalized with a stick in the bathroom o f the Brooklvn station house, two
“Joel Berger, "See No Evil Officers Should Pav." The New York Times. (August
24,1997) p.l3(L) col 3. Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the text
parenthetically as, e.g. (Berger 8/24/97, p.l3(L) col 3)
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officers stepped forward with information. The accounts of Eric Turetzy and Mark
Schofield contributed to the indictments of four officers. Since then, no other
officers have been charged. '
In this case, the exact number of fellow officers who wimessed anything or had
corroborative information is unknown. Investigators anticipated at least 12 additional
officers coming forward. Several additional officers working that night were suspended
for obstructing the investigation.
In the case of Abner Louima, Mayor Giuliani and Commissioner Safir have
taken some steps in the right direction. One hopes that the suspensions of the 70“’
Precinct desk sergeant and other officers who must have known that something was
awry represents a new attitude toward these matters by the Mayor and his Police
Department.
These individuals should be brought up on departmental charges and if found
guilty, dismissed from the force. More important, the Mayor must order the
department to handle all brutality cases in the same manner, as recommended by
his own commission last year. Only then will a strong message be sent. Anything
less will condone the return of the Blue Wall of Silence. (Berger 8/24/97 pE 13)
New Orleans is infamous for having the most corrupt police department in the
United States. A very low salary range, an inadequate promotional system, a lack of
public trust, an inept disciplinary process and a long-standing history of corruption, are
among the most common reasons given to explain New Orleans' poor showing. Chief
Richard Pennington, the newest chief of New Orleans Police was recently appointed to
see if he could clean up this department.
Only days after his arrival, Pennington learned that in recent years the
department has behaved less like a police force than a loose confederation of
gangsters terrorizing sections of the city. 'The Federal Bureau o f Investigation
informed the chief that it had wiretapped one of his officers, Len Davis, and he
allegedly ordered the killing o f Kim Groves, a 32-year-old mother o f three who
filed a police brutality complaint against him.

’Dan Barry, "Little Help From Officers in Torture Case Inquiry: Only Two
Officers Have Given Information," The New York Times. (September 5, 1997) A(l) col 5
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Even more chilling was that the FBI said it happened to overhear the murder
plot while conducting a drug sting, later described as the biggest case of police
corruption in New Orleans history. Davis's lawyer did not respond to requests for
comment. But prosecutors charge that Davis and 10 other officers used their police
positions to guard more than 286 pounds of cocaine that FBI agents posing as
dealers had stashed in an abandoned warehouse, according to court papers. By the
time the agents managed to decode Davis's street slang and police jargon, it was too
late. Kim Groves was shot in the head while standing in front o f her house.
Pennington barely had time to recover from that shock when a 24-year-old
patrol woman named Antoinette Frank and an accomplice executed two members
o f a Vietnamese family who owned the restaurant Frank was robbing and also
killed a fellow officer moonlighting as a security guard. Quickly convicted and
sentenced to death in September. Frank was the fourth New Orleans Police
Department officer charged in connection with a murder in one year and among the
more than 50 cops arrested for felonies, including bank robbery and rape since
1993. Says Pennington, who visited the triple-murder scene that night, 'it was kind
o f mind-blowing.""
Obviously, Chief Pennington has a very difficult assignment ahead of him. The
challenge he faces is to change the entire organizational culture. This includes all areas
o f the department. Personnel, Internal Affairs, Patrol and Detectives. The entire
organizational culture needs to be overhauled before positive change occurs. To Chief
Pennington's credit, he admits misconduct is systemic, not attempting to blame some
'rotten apples' (which many other chiefs have done).

Conclusion
Misconduct has been a problem since the inception of American policing. This
is a major challenge facing all modem police executives, just as it was for their
predecessors. Previous methods employed to address police misconduct have failed.

'"Paul Keegag,"The Thiimest Blue Line, “The New York Times Magazine.
(March 31,1996) p.32 col I
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These reform efforts have sought to minimize incidents and organizational culpability, as
opposed to addressing systemic problems.
Typically, police misconduct o f yesteryear was centered around the police
turning a blind eye toward vice related crimes. As seen during the Le.xow Committee,
cops got rich by not taking enforcement action. Recently, as seen in the cities of New
Orleans. Philadelphia and New York, some police officers are actually committing felony
crimes while on-duty. The need to address police misconduct from an ethical frame has
never been greater.
Historically, police executives have sought to distance themselves from
misconduct as a form o f political survival. Rather than addressing the true causal factors,
they seek quick fixes. Quick fixes serve as a catalyst for police misconduct, encouraging
only a narrow investigative focus, as opposed to exploring systemic problems.
Many challenges are facing police executives as we head into the twenty-first
century: powerful police unions, budget restrictions, an increasingly litigious-minded
society and an overly zealous media are some of the contemporary concerns. The
problem of misconduct is nothing new for police executives. This chapter has shown that
historically, police have done a very poor job handling this challenge.
The time to effect this change is 'now,' not after the next major scandal.
Ensuring high standards o f ethical conduct needs to be a perpetual aspiration for all police
executives. Police executives should seek to improve their departments by implementing
ethical changes in the disciplinary process which will improve public service by ensuring
a healthy work environment.
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Summary
Misconduct has been a chronic problem since the beginning of American
policing. Police executives have consistently sought to distance themselves and their
departments from the wayward employee(s). To achieve this objective, executives have
failed to address underlying systemic problems within their agencies. This resulted in
high rates o f misconduct recidivism in many police departments across our country.
Misconduct should not be viewed as a humiliation for police departments. It is
the manner in which misconduct is handled that often results in departmental shame.
Police executives who handle misconduct in an ethical manner realize, this challenge is
an opportunity to improve their departments.
Police misconduct has not radically changed since the nineteenth century. Many
o f the generalities that existed in the 1800's, are still true today:
1.

Vice enforcement is an area that attracts corruption.

2.

Police response to misconduct has typically been to blame some 'rotten apples'.
They have failed to address underlying systemic problems.

3.

Police reformers have been hindered by an unwillingness o f police executives to
admit organizational problems.

4.

Low income areas experience a higher percentage o f police misconduct, than do
affluent neighborhoods.

5.

The public is apathetic toward police misconduct, until the conduct becomes
outrageous.

6.

Personnel practices (hiring, transfers, promotions and disciplinary process) within
the agency are important factors in determining the level o f misconduct.

7.

There is a correlation between a lack of supervisory accountability and
police misconduct.
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8.

Investigation into misconduct is extremely difficult due to a strong 'code of
silence' that permeates all levels of the department.
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CHAPTER 2

COMBATING THE CODE OF SILENCE
Across America, police provide certain basic services - protecting life and
property, preserving the peace, prevention of criminality and the apprehension of criminal
suspects. Despite these basic tenets all departments have their own individual
characteristics. The size of the agency, the organizational structure, community norms
and local demographics are some o f the variables that impact police departments.
The organizational culture existing in most police departments is similar. Any
attempt to improve the disciplinary process without considering this culture would be
fruitless. This chapter will examine how this culture impacts police misconduct. Without
modifying organizational culture, positive change will be stifled. As seen in Chapter One,
historically police reformers have gallantly sought to make positive change, only to meet
failure. Many o f these failures can be attributed to the existing police culture.
From the day officers join a police department, imtil the day they retire, they
are members o f a “brotherhood.” This “brotherhood” plays an important role in the way
officers see themselves and the world around them. This chapter will shed some light on
tlte powerful impact this “brotherhood” has in the area of police misconduct.
Misconduct is difficult to investigate due to officers' lack of honesty in
testifying about the conduct of fellow officers. This dishonesty is often viewed by
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executive officers as acceptable, because “nobody wants to rat on a fellow officer." As
seen in the cities o f New York and New Orleans, this sometimes even includes criminal
acts. This code of silence results in police misconduct becoming accepted behavior within
police departments.
Officers are educated early in their career o f the importance of loyalty to fellow
officers. Loyalty to their community, the oath of office and the code of ethics are not
emphasized as much as is loyalty to fellow officers. By contrast, officers must be taught
that loyalty, to be virtuous, needs to be directed at the proper end. W2ten officers place
loyalty to each other over the community, police misconduct flourishes. The virtues of
“loyalty" and “truthfulness" need to be examined in addressing this subject. Misplaced
loyalty is a major factor in continued police misconduct. Police culture allows misplaced
loyalty to flourish, rationalizing it as part o f the “brotherhood."
Police executives need to ensure that truthfulness is paramount within their
departments. Only when a zero tolerance approach is taken towards lying, will the code
o f silence be reduced. Untruthfulness is incompatible with the police role, code of ethics
and their oath o f office. By meting out light discipline for sustained cases of
untruthfulness, police executives are condoning lying.

The Police Culture
When a person becomes a police officer they are required to successfully
complete the academy and field training program. During the academy and field training,
they learn about many subjects including criminal law, defensive tactics, verbal judo and
other important subjects. The most important subject learned during this training process
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is how to survive in the police culture. No written examinations is ever taken on this
subject, however to succeed professionally this knowledge is imperative.
In the police profession this culture has a very strong influence on the behavior
o f officers. Physical manifestations of the culture can easily be identified. Weapons,
uniforms, insignias of rank, report forms and identifiable police vehicles are some of the
more common artifacts of the police culture. More difficult to identify, yet much more
powerful, is the effect this culture has on individual behavior.
The workplace culture is the sum of the beliefs and values held in common by
those within the organization, serving to formally and informally communicate
what is expected."
These values and beliefs become indoctrinated in the minds of new officers,
remaining an important factor throughout the officer's career. New officers soon fail to
remember many concepts taught in the academy: however they will never lose sight of
their police culture. This culture is pervasive throughout the agency, ensuring that these
values are entrenched in the minds of all wearing a badge.
The culture of a society exerts very strong influences on people, but it must be
realized that there are vast differences among cultures of various societies, and what
is acceptable in one may not be acceptable in another. In some societies community
bathing is the custom. Such behavior is considered nonstandard in our society and
is subject to legal as well as moral sanction.
Culture largely influences job motivation and work habits. To undertake a
study of any aspect o f human behavior without attempting to understand the culture
in which it operates is similar in effect to studying fish without realizing that fish
live in water. To the extent that culture influences work habits, it is responsible for
both good and bad performance.

"Wayne Bennett and Karen Hess, Management and Supervision in Law
Enforcement 2"“ ed., (Minneapolis/St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1996), p.308.
'-William B. Melnicoe and Jan C, Mennig, Elements of Police Supervision 2"“ ed.,
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1978), p.53.
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To explore police misconduct without addressing police culture, is not doing
the subject justice. Without considering the impact this culture has on individual behavior
an accurate portrayal of misconduct can not be seen. This culture is often detrimental to
the character o f police officers.
People entering into the police profession are becoming part of a unique
vocational subculture. "A group of specialists recognized by society, as well as by
themselves, who possess an identifiable complex of common culture, values,
commimication devices (argot or other symbols), techniques, and appropriate behavior
patterns."'^
Police officers have developed an argot that is not comprehensible to most
outsiders. Terms such as “he's in pocket”, “ you're getting too close to the kitchen" and
"make the subject roll”, may not be understood by a civilian, however in the police world
they are easily understood. The first is asking if he is in possession of the narcotics. The
second cautions a person that their behavior may get him/her in trouble. The last is
requesting that the officer use investigative techniques to have the suspect admit his/her
guilt and identify his/her partner(s).
Another form of police argot can be seen in the use of the phonetic alphabet, and
the 400 or 10 codes. These are used by all officers to communicate on their radios. Since
only fellow officers understand these terms, they are cryptic. This allows officers to
commimicate with each other in a public setting, without citizens understanding.

'^Edward A. Thibault, Proactive Police Management 2"“ ed., (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1990) p.29. Subsequent references to this work will be cited in
text parenthetically as, eg. (Thibault 29)
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An important part o f an officer's career occurs when they leave the training
setting and become assigned to a "real squad." This is the time when the new officer
learns what it really means to be "a cop.' After graduating from the academy, and
completing the field training program, the new officer is ready to learn how the job
needs to be done.' This requires "The acquisition by initiatives o f the body of esoteric
knowledge and the appropriate behavior patterns before the novices are accepted by the
initiated." (Thibault 31 )
The police academy teaches new officers important skills needed to be
successful in the furtherance of their career. Marksmanship, defensive tactics, basic
investigative techniques, federal laws and state penal codes, are important subjects
included in the curriculum o f police academies. Acceptance o f the police role is the most
important item taught, although this subject does not have a formal lesson plan. "The
objective of the police academy, over and above teaching basic knowledge and skills, is
to instill into the recruit an acceptance of the police role model. This means an acceptance
o f both the formal and informal codes and discipline making up a police officer. "
(Thibault 31 )
Throughout an officer's career it has often been shown that their behavior
changes. These changes are sometimes very obvious and in other cases they may be more
subtle. Usually people closest to the officer will notice the changes, well before the
officer realizes that he or she has changed. Tragically, this change, if gone untreated may
lead to alcoholism, multiple marriages, misconduct or suicide,
Arthur NiederhofFer, in his classical work Behind the Shield, shows the stages
o f cynicism as the police recruit moves from the idealistic role models o f the police
academy to the streets (1969:104). The first stage is titled pseudo-cynicism, which
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is at the training school/recruit level and is an attitude that "barely conceals the
idealism and commitment beneath the surface." The second stage, romantic
cynicism, comes within the first five years of an officer’s career. The third stage,
aggressive cynicism, is evident at the ten 10-year mark where "resentment and
hostility become obvious." At this stage. Niederhoffer talks about a subculture of
cynicism. The end of the police officer's career is what Niederhoffer calls resigned
cynicism, when an officer accepts the flaws of the system. (Thibault 31 )
In examining the police subculture s influence on police misconduct, it is
important to view what is valued in this culture. The police "brotherhood" does not have
any jurisdictional boundaries. This brotherhood applies equally to officers working in a
small 3 officer agency, or a large department with thousands of employees. "When most
citizens are slopped for a traffic infraction, they expect a traffic citation. When police
officers are stopped, they do not expect a traffic ticket, they expect to be let go because of
professional courtesy. When professional courtesy does not occur, it is a story carried
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and can lead to a feud between police officers in two
different jurisdictions."(Thibault 34)
Conformity is an essential part of this "brotherhood." To fully claim
membership an officer often needs to act differently than their own personal values
dictate. An officer acting consistent with his/her own personal values, outside group
norms, runs the risk o f being labeled as a "problem child."
An example o f this would be a new officer writing a parking ticket to a
restaurant owner. This owner has always allowed officers to dine in his restaurant free of
charge. In the past, officers have always overlooked his parking transgressions. The new
officer issued the owner a citation because he felt it was "the right thing to do/ As a result
o f tlte citation, the owner now requires all officers to pay full price for their meals. The
new officer's reputation within the "brotherhood’ has suffered a major blow.
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Conformity is necessary in the accomplishing the police mission. Police
responding to a tactical situation must act in unison. Handling a large scale disturbance
requires all officers act as a team. If officers acted on their own accord, the police
response would be ineffective. Society requires a police response that maintains peace
and is neutral as to the issue at hand.
There is a great deal o f pressure for conformity among police officers. Reiser
(1974; 158) considers peer influence to be 'one of the most profound pressures
operating in police organizations.’ He continues on and shows how it functions: Tt
bolsters and supports the individual officer’s esteem and confidence, which then
allows him to tolerate higher levels of anger, hostility and abuse from external
sources.' This department psychologist for the Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD) has pointed out an important factor concerning peer pressure: that it can be
a positive force in the life o f an individual police officer. One o f the most profound
statements that any police officer can make is that he (or she) is never alone once
having become a sworn officer. On the job, the call for "officer in trouble’ will
mean that officers in and outside the immediate vicinity will normally drop what
they are doing and rush to that officer’s aid. even from a distance. Reiser (1974:
158) stresses the cost of this group support and that is a "loss o f autonomy in the
area o f values and attitudes.’ It seems that group values become shared while there
is a great deal of rationalization created to support conformity to the police
group.(Thibault 33)
This loss of autonomy can be catastrophic for both the individual officer and the
organization. Officers view themselves as isolated from the general public. Many reasons
are offered to justify police isolationism. Unique shifts, high levels o f stress, the
confidential nature of investigations, and being asked to do favors, are the most common
justifications offered to explain the social isolation of police.
These justifications, if valid, would cause social isolationism in other
professions which share similar traits. Many professions require people to work imusual
hours. Pilots, casino workers, truck drivers and farmers are other occupations where
unusual hours are the norm. Additionally if the unusual hours caused social isolation, we
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would see this isolation cease when the officer was transferred to day shift. But this is not
the case. Detectives and supervisors work primarily day shifts with weekends off. yet still
remain isolated from the general public.
Police work is a stressful profession. Confronting dangerous situations with
potential of using deadly force creates a high level of stress. Stress is also present in the
lives of flight controllers, pilots, doctors and soldiers. If this isolationism was caused by
stress, we would expect to see the same behavior in these other professions.
Officers are required to maintain confidential information as part o f their job.
However, this is the case in many professions. Nurses, doctors, teachers, pastors, priests
and counselors, are only some of the professions that require confidentiality. If this were
a valid reason we would see these other professions experience a similar level of isolation
from the general population.
Being asked by others to do favors is certainly not unique to law enforcement.
Electricians, carpenters, restaurant owners and hotel workers are also requested to do
favors for others. These reasons are invalid, only serving to legitimize the power of the
police brotherhood.
Tf 1 tell them that I am a cop.' they’ll want to give me a hard time about some
traffic ticket they got. Next will come some bull concerning police corruption and
then they'll hold me personally responsible for some court letting some killer loose
on the streets. What do you want me to do, spoil these parties for myself and my
wife? It's really better if you stick to your own.’ And stick to their own. they do.
There are police bars, police picnics, and police poker parties. From these and other
social activities dominated by fellow officers and their family, police officers create
a feeling that each one of them is part o f the blue mmonry.(Thibault 35)
Police conformity and isolation tfom the general public serve to perpetuate the
code o f silence in law enforcement. Conformity and isolation need to be reduced before
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progress can be made in reducing police misconduct. When officers view themselves as
separated from the public, they can rationalize lying to protect other officers.

Why The Code of Silence Continues
The code of silence can be defined as police officers lying to protect other
officers. As seen in Chapter One. police reformers have been hindered by this code since
the beginning of American policing. The police culture which encourages conformity and
isolation serves as a fertile breeding ground for the code of silence to flourish.
Maintaining organizational integrity is a major challenge facing police
executives. New technologies, coupled with good old fashion police work, have served to
benefit law enforcement in catching more criminals. New computer systems, scientific
advances, video and electronic devices are just some of the advances in fighting crime.
The one area that has greatly lagged behind is the handling of police misconduct.
The code of silence is legitimized in the police culture by the premise 'a good
cop never rats on another cop.’ The movie Serpico was based on the code of silence in
action. The reality shown in this movie was that cops are willing to be blind to acts
committed by fellow officers. Also, officers often willingly put their life on the line for
each other, unless the other officer is a whistle blower.
The majority of law enforcement administrators will minimize the impact which
this code o f silence has on police misconduct. By admitting a high correlation, the
administrator acknowledges deep rooted organizational problems. History has shown that
most administrators deny organizational problems, until evidence is discovered by an
outside investigating body.
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From a utilitarian framework the code of silence benefits both officers and
police executives. Officers benefits by escaping from punishment for misconduct they
commits. Police executives benefit by allowing the majority of misconduct to go
unreported. This gives the perception to the citizenry that the chief is running a well
disciplined department.

Present Response to the Code o f Silence
The code of silence is not tangible. We can not touch, see or smell it. Like a
toxic gas it injuries without any warning. This allows police executives to deny its
existence, pretending to be surprised when it surfaces. Even after the code is identified,
some administrators will use the rotten apple" excuse in attempting to minimize systemic
problems.
When police misconduct surfaces, many administrators attempt to remove the
department from public scorn by blaming the incident on some rogue cops." Their
position will be that "certain rotten apples' acted on their own and they will be dealt with
to the fullest extent of the law. This position denies the existence of any systemic code of
silence, often resulting in political survival for the administrator.
The "rotten apple" theme is best seen as an impression management or
"normalization o f deviance" technique rather than an explanation of corrupt police
behavior. The initial reaction to police administrators, applying the label "rotten
apple’ or "rogue cop’ to publicly expose officers, is an attempt to "normalize" or
invent plausible excuses and explanations for deviant conduct. Even those who
used this technique often recognize the futility o f this political rhetoric.'"*

'^Thomas Barker and David Carter, Police Deviance 2"“ ed.. (Cincinnati, OH.:
Anderson Publishing Company, 1990) p.46.
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This 'rotten apple' strategy (or excuse) has been used by law enforcement
agencies for a very long time. The appeal of this is the agency is able to distance itself
from the incident. The public is satisfied the guilty officer(s) is being prosecuted, and
soon forgets about others who may have been involved in misconduct.
The current response of police administrators to police misconduct has many
similarities with responses in tactical situations. Officers are trained throughout their
careers to take certain steps when handling a tactical incident. The following steps are
included in standard operating procedures in handling tactical situations:
1.

Sterilize the critical area to as small an area as possible. This is done by establishing
a secure inner perimeter.

2.

Establish a command post a safe distance away from the critical area. The command
post must be free from outside interference.

3.

.Assign a Public Information Officer to handle the media.

4.

When situation turns tactical, the response will be swift and decisive.

5.

When suspect is taken into custody, he/she will be transported to jail as soon as
practical.

6.

A press release will be issued by the Public Information Officer concerning the
incident.
Concerning misconduct, administrators attempt to limit the target o f the

investigation to as few as possible. This is where the rotten apple' or "rogue cop' excuse
will be used to minimize the target. This shifts blame away from systemic problems.
Police Executives will typically assign a special investigator (s). This
investigators) will ensure that confidentiality is maintained. The investigator(s) will brief
the police executives who can then coordinate press releases tfirough the Public
Information Officer.
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When the case is sustained, corrective action will be aimed at the target
officers) only, without seeking remedies to improve the organization. Facts uncovered
during the investigation will in most cases be kept from the public, citing confidentiality.
At the termination of the investigation, a press release will normally be given, placing the
department in the best possible light.
To effectively deal with the code of silence, police executives need to address
misconduct from a normative frame, as opposed to 'quick fixes.' Police executives must
seek cures for the underlying problems, as opposed to only surface issues. Presently,
administrators only deal with symptoms (individual incidents), as opposed to curing the
disease (underlying organizational problem).
A weapon used to reduce the code of silence is offering of immunity from
prosecution for witness officers. Police officers have qualified immunity during internal
investigations. In Garrity v. Slate o f New Jersey, <V7S.Ct. 616 (1967), it was held that
statements given as part of an internal investigations were not voluntary and are therefore
inadmissible in state criminal proceedings. The Court stated that since officers risk
termination if they refuse to answer questions, these statements are coerced.
The qualified immunity afforded officers under Garrity (Appendix 3) does not
protect officers in any civil or federal actions. The federal trial of the officers convicted in
the Rodney King incident is an example of the federal system using statements given
under Garrity to obtain a conviction.
The immunity given under Garrity is only for the individual officer, not other
officers who are incriminated. As an example. Officer X says he witnessed Officer Y
taking a bribe from a drug dealer. During the interview. Officer X confesses that he also

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

38

beat the drug dealer. Under Garrity. Officer X’s statement can be used against Y for the
bribery, however it can not be used against X for the beating.
Garrity immunity is a very weak protection for police officers. It is often
referred to as a guise used by internal affairs to negate protections o f the 5th Amendment
(Self Incrimination). Often, officers will complain "other citizens have the right to invoke
their 5“’ Amendment in any criminal proceeding, but we can't." Police officers risk
termination if they invoke the 5“’ during a Garrity interview. Since Garrity interviews can
be used in federal criminal proceedings, it follows that coerced statements can be used
against police officers criminally.

Truthfulness
The code of silence is synonymous with, "lying to protect fellow officers." This
makes the challenge for police executives simple: Have officers stop lying. Truthfulness
is the virtue toward which reform efforts need to be directed in reducing the code of
silence.
The violation of 'untruthfulness' is very difficult to prove. The investigator must
prove from sources (physical evidence, other witnesses.) the officer lied. The difficulty in
proving these cases against witness officers makes its use infrequent.
Since imtruthfulness is difficult to prove, officers will often gamble that he/she
can be deceptive and escape disciplinary action. If successful, both the witness officer and
the accused employee will avoid punishment. Even in cases where advanced techniques
are used, including polygraphs, officers often escape punishment when they lie.
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Police unions serve to ensure the code ofsilence remains a major obstacle t'or
internai investigators to battle. These unions have become very involved in the
disciplinary process. In many states an officer can not be interviewed concerning
misconduct unless a union representative is present. Safeguards afforded to employees
include both the targeted employee and witness officers.
Unions gain influence in the disciplinary process at the bargaining table during
contract negotiations, and also by exerting political clout as lobbyists. During contract
talks, departments are often willing to give more influence in disciplinary matters as
opposed to salary increases. Well-meaning police executives see this as being fiscally
responsible, but in reality it erodes managerial responsibility. The concessions made at
tlte bargaining table concerning the disciplinary process often result in long term
detrimental effects (law suits, higher legal fees, reduction in public trust).
Political clout comes in campaign endorsements. To have the support of the
local police union is a valuable asset to aspiring politicians. This results in unions seeking
to enact legislation which hinders police administrators tfom handling misconduct. When
unions are successful in changing laws, they do not have to concern themselves with
contracts.
In Nevada, the “Police Officer Bill of Rights,” is NRS. 453 (Appendix 4).
Officers are secured certain protections during internal investigations which serve as a
catalysis for the code of silence. An officer may not be interviewed until he/she receives
written notice of the complaint, and is given reasonable time to have representation. This
allows for officers involved to meet and review the documentation before any interviews
are conducted.
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Police officers cannot be ordered to take a polygraph examination until the
complainant has first taken and passed one. This is extremely difficult to accomplish
when the complainant is less than an upstanding citizen. People who are drug addicts or
have criminal histories are poor candidates for polygraphs. Officers can not be ordered to
take polygraphs unless they are targets of the investigation.
A basic tenet in our criminal justice system is "the punishment should lit the
crime." This is the reason why we have felonies, gross misdemeanors and misdemeanors
that serve to categorize criminal acts. The severity of the crime will determine which
category it falls under.
In the case of Driving While Intoxicated, a misdemeanor crime became a felony
crime because of public outrage. DWI was always a misdemeanor, until the public
demanded the third conviction should be treated as a felony. The Nevada Legislature
changed the penalty as a result of public demand.
The charge of Domestic Violence is another example of a law changing in
response to public outcry. This law was changed in 1984. and again in 1994. mandating
more severe penalties. The goal o f increased penalties is to serve as a deterrent, reducing
the number o f offenses committed. Many other examples can be used to illustrate changes
in punishment caused by public outcr\\
The underlying logic is that rational people weigh the severity of the punishment
and the probability of being apprehended versus the benefits derived from committing the
act. An example of this can be seen in the case of speeding. A motorist knows driving at
60 mph (in a 35 mph zone) results in getting home 5 minutes earlier. If he/she gets a
ticket, he/she will have to pay a substantial fine and faces an increased insurance
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premium. Also, weighing in the decision whether or not to speed is if the road is heavily
patrolled. Hopefully, most rational people weigh the risks and the benefits, then decide to
observe the speed limit. The same rationale needs to be applied to truthfhlness. Since
untruthfulness is difficult to prove, the pimishment should be consistent and strong to
serve as a deterrent.
Yet. this is not the case. Corrective actions range from extremely light to
termination for sustained violations of untruthfulness. Rationalization for the wide
disparity in discipline center on the circumstances in which the lie was t^ld. Typically, if
an officer lies to protect a fellow officer, without benefitting himself, the pimishment will
be light. When the officer alters reports, conceals evidence or conspires with others, the
punishment is more severe.
Using the motorist analogy, if a person sees two motor officers sitting on a
comer and continues to speed, he/she is not being rational. This is the reasoning behind
visible deterrence. People will not commit a crime when detection is certain. DWI
checkpoints, posted radar enforcement zones and video recorders, are commonly used to
encourage people to obey traffic laws.
Truthfulness can also be fostered within a police agency. By treating all cases of
untruthfulness with consistency and certainty, administrators will be sending a clear
message to employees that lying is not acceptable conduct. Police executives must be
consistent in dealing with untruthfulness. To minimize the importance of honesty by
implying it is acceptable in some cases, sends a dangerous message to officers. A zero
tolerance approach to lying needs to be the message sent to all officers.
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While incidents o f misconduct serve to temporally damage the reputation of the
department, damage caused by ‘cover-ups' is immeasurable. Police departments are
judged more by their response to misconduct than by the incidents themselves. The
public realizes that an agency with thousands of employees will have a certain amount of
misconduct. However, when the public sees the misconduct is covered up. damage will
be devastating.
When incidents o f brutality, misconduct or racism occur, the chief s
immediate reaction to these incidents will have a great impact on whether the
incident will be repeated in the future. A chief that seems more concerned with
protecting the department’s image than with identifying and disciplining the
wrongdoer can send the message that getting caught is a worse sin than the
underlying misconduct. In contrast, a willingness to publically and thoroughly
examine even the most embarrassing and damaging incident will demonstrate to
both the public and the officers a serious commitment to avoiding the same
mistakes in the future.'^
To reduce the code of silence, honesty must be required of officers at all times.
When punishment for this violation is minor, the implication is that the department does
not hold honesty as an important virtue. This is a dangerous message to send.
The code of silence continues to flourish because executives are aiming at the
wrong target. Instead o f directing reform efforts at truthfulness, they have focused on
public image. Police administrators have sought to minimize negative publicity, instead
of seeking the truth. Police administrators need to strive for truthfulness, as opposed to
encouraging officers to close ranks.

‘^Edwin Delattre, Character and Cops. Ethics in Policing. (Washington D C.: The
A.E.I. Press. 1994), p.234.
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Loyalty vs. Trutlifulness
Police Officers have a duty to be truthful at all times. The importance of this can
be seen in the weight given to an officer’s testimony in court. Also, in the area of public
safety, citizens need to have confidence that police are being truthful. Imagine if during a
natural disaster, police were telling residents to stay in their homes instead of evacuating
while a tornado was heading their way. Society would not stand for this type of police
action, and rightfully so.
Loyalty, it has been shown, is highly valued in law enforcement. But the virtues
of loyalty and the duty to tell the truth are paradoxical when addressing police
misconduct. This paradigm is pivotal concerning the code of silence.
Addressing this paradigm requires us to explore the virtue of loyalty. When an
officer has knowledge o f another officer's misconduct, an internal battle begins. Should
the officer give greater weight to loyalty for a fellow officer, or toward his/her duty to be
truthful? Should the virtue o f loyalty be superior to truthfulness? It is my argument that
the duty to be truthful must outweigh personal loyalty in these situations.
Misguided loyalty serves to undermine the code o f ethics officers swear to
uphold. When an officer lies, he/she betrays public trust. Police executives excusing
wimess officers who lie to cover others, are in fact serving as a catalyst for the code of
silence. This is the reason why the code of silence continues to flourish in law
enforcement without serious opposition from police executives.
Because the police subculture requires that its members be loyal and
trustworthy, officers feel obligated to cover up a fellow officer’s brutal acts, petty
thefts, extortionate behavior, abuse of power, and other illegalities. The overriding
sense o f empathy and cooperation displayed in the police subculture is not
restricted to highly volatile situations, but is sometimes carried over to simple
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courtesies extended to off-duty officers, such as not issuing another officer a traffic
citation. Every officer tacitly agrees to uphold the secrecy code in order to claim
solidarity rights to the unit or agency to which he belongs.'"
When exploring the problem of misguided loyalty, we need to first look at the
virtue o f loyalty. Loyalty is essential in a "good community.” This is especially true in
police work. The difficulty o f the job itself, coupled with the inherent dangers, makes
loyalty between officers crucial. Officers are required to take enforcement action which
alienates them from the public. Sometimes, the only support group an officer has is
fellow cops. Loyalty is important for the officer’s own self image. Most police officers
think o f themselves in terms of what other police officers think of them, as opposed to the
general public.
Loyalty is important in the maintenance of our society. In the family unit, we see
parents working many hours outside the home to provide food on the table and a roof
over their family’s head. They work in the house to ensure it is clean and maintained.
With the time left they care for their children and facilitate outside activities (i.e.. Little
League. PTA. Scouting). Children realize, early in life, the importance of loyalty. If
parents were not loyal to their children, they would care more about their own personal
pleasures and would be less concerned about the welfare of their children.
We see the importance of loyalty to our country. We celebrate national holidays
to honor the great Americans who fought and sacrificed for freedom. We stand to honor
our country, reciting the Pledge of Allegiance before school begins, or the first pitch is

'"Stan K. Shemock, The Effects o f Patrol Officer’s Defensiveness Toward The
Outside World on Their Ethical Orientation. (Criminal Justice Ethics: Summer/Fall
1990), p.25
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thrown. While studying histor\% we see tlie important role o f loyalty in defense of the
great "Red. White and Blue."
Loyalty was essential in the development of Christianity. Children raised in
religious households learn that loyalty to God will lead to eternal salvation. Jesus Christ
was loyal to God and never compromised. His loyalty lead to his crucifixion, serving as
the cornerstone o f Christianity. Early Christians were loyal to Christ, often resulting in
their own deaths.
Loyalty has an emotional basis that requires community support, as do all
appropriate dispositions. Knowledge of moral principles does not guarantee loyalty,
or morally good actions in general; one needs, among other things, the right
attitude. Nor do work rules and evaluation systems guarantee that an organization is
a good one in which the commons will be preserved against narrow self-interest;
one needs a sound corporate culture.
Corporate culture performs the crucial function of feeding emotions that affect
the employees' desires and beliefs. Even where affection is lacking, rituals and
symbols can help generate the kind o f loyalty that causes employees to act in ways
that benefit the organization; this can be true even if. owing to the difficulties of
distributing compensation appropriately, there is no certainty that the employees
will get paid for it. The loyal employee may further the organization's interests
because it feels right to do so. or out of a conviction that it is the right thing to do.
or a combination of the two. If it happens generally, then the probability of
compensation for such action is increased. (This is one of those situations, crucial
to certain religions, in which one's good works are rewarded if and only if one does
not perform them in order to receive the reward.) Are Japanese workers relatively
loyal because they believe the company will share its profits with them, or do they
just want to be loyal to the company? Either motive strengthens the other.'’
Loyalty is important in shaping our self image. When a person is being loyal,
they feel a strong sense of'righteousness.' Soldiers returning home, missionaries who
have served God and dads coaching their children’s soccer team, all have accomplished
something that has improved their self image.
’’Edwin M. Hartman. Organizational Ethics and The Good Life. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 173.
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The antitheses is also true. When we do something contrary to our loyalties, we
feel acute pain. We think less of ourselves, because we acted in contrast with our
loyalties. The prisoner of war who gives up information after being tortured, the
missionary who denies his allegiance to God to avoid arrest, or the dad who quits
coaching because he's overworked at the office, all share a major blow to their self
image.
In law enforcement, we can see how difficult it is for one officer to implicate
another officer in misconduct. An officer who has been loyal to other officers all
throughout his career, suddenly finds himself in a position where his testimony can result
in a fellow officer being fired or sent to prison. The internal conflicts that are taking place
are many. Should he tell the truth and disregard his loyalty to fellow officers? By doing
this, is he serving honesty to be virtuous, or is he just protecting his own interest? If he
does lie to cover for the other officer, can the case be sustained? The best course may be
to deny any knowledge of the incident, and make others prove it. By doing this he can
salvage his own self-worth. "I'd never rat on another cop.”
Even though personal loyalty is deeply embedded in the ideology of
organizational behavior, it tends to parcel out the soul' of workers by subverting
their professional responsibility. Demands for personal loyalty tend to eschew
employee accoimtability in public agencies by forcing upon them an unnatural
relationship which the organization neither requires nor needs. If either was the
case, one would expect it to be noted in the agency's book of rules and regulations.
But rarely is this so. It behooves us, therefore, to investigate: (a) how things came
to he this way, and (b) why workers seem willing to endure and at times appreciate
such a fiendish demand. In response to these questions, we can speculate only that
for some it may provide a more clearly defined source of guidance than the vague
and conflicting interpretations o f moral order; that for others, it may alleviate the
strain of a haimting organizational subculture; and that for yet others, it may offer
the opportunity to enhance their power since they may reckon that it is easier to

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47

manipulate the administrative outcomes by cleverly playing the organization's pool
of personal loyalties.'”
The role loyalty plays in both organizational and individual behavior is
paramount. For the organization, it allows tlie mission to be accomplished in a predictable
manner. The individual employee feels an improved sense of self worth.
The core sense of loyalty" is that it is an obligation in every person's sense of
being Ihstorically rooted in a set of defining familial, institutional, and national
relationships.' Thus, 'in acting loyally, the self acts in harmony with its personal
history. One recognizes who one is. Actions of standing by one's friends, family or
nation reveal that identity. The self sees in its action precisely what history requires
it to do.'*’
When an officer decides to 'break the code' and gives incriminating testimony
against a fellow officer, he alienates himself from the ' brotherhood. 'Other officers will
not view his/her coming forward as a sign of integrity. In most cases, he or she will be
seen as 'a rat.'The loyalty that all other officers had for the whistle blower will be
replaced with rancor. The whistle blower needs to find an assignment where backup is
not necessary.
Police administrators may publically commend the person who breaks the code
of silence in a press release, but reality is that 'top brass' disdain whistle blowers. Most
administrators worked their way up from the rank of police officer. These administrators

'”Sam S. Souryal and Brian W. Mckay, Personal Lovaltv to Superiors in Public
Service. (Criminal Justice Ethics. Summer/ Fall, 1996) p.47. Subsequent references to
this work will be cited in the text parenthetically as eg. (Souryal 47)

'"Haim Marantz. Lovaltv and Identitv: Reflections On and About a Theme in
Fletcher's Lovaltv. (Criminal Justice Ethics: Winter/ Spring 1993) p.63.
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remember how they viewed 'snitches' back then, and their opinion has not changed. The
whistle blower has. in fact, committed career suicide.
Police officers pride tliemselves for being part of a select group. Their
identification within this 'culture' is very important to their own self image. Loyalty in
the police culture is a cornerstone. This is the reason why breaking the code, is a very
dramatic event in an officer's life.
The code of silence needs to be viewed as misplaced or corrupted loyalty.
Loyalty can be very dangerous when people base uTongflil moral actions (or inactions)
upon it. When police officers act solely out of loyalty, they often violate the virtue of
duty and their oath to the law.
In the organizational setting, it appears defensible to suggest that: (a) the
primary obligation o f workers is to the ideals of public service and (b) the values of
public interest and those of private interest are basically incompatible. If these two
assumptions are plausible, it should follow that the conduct o f government would
be fundamentally flawed were the object of workers' loyalty to a particular
"person, " or were loyalty to be directed toward the personal interest of any worker
or group of workers. Though critics may trivialize the difference and, we dare say.
the danger o f replacing loyalty "to the ideal” with loyalty to "the instrument.” one
should consider the dire consequences o f being loyal to the doctor instead o f the
medical science or to the judge instead of the law. Our contention is that if the
primary loyalty o f the employees is to be identified in personal terms, public
service will lose a whole dimension of what is necessar>' in making it
legitimate.”(Souryal 45)
When an officer lies to protect another officer, they are placing loyalty to the
person (instrument) superior to loyalty to the community (ideal). As public servants,
these officers are violating public trust, by engaging in the code of silence.
Loyalty should never be the decisive factor for determining moral decisions.
While loyalty can be a virtue, when misplaced, it becomes detrimental to public good.
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Decisions concerning police misconduct need to be based on a logic which is supportive
of the virtues oftruthlulness. good loyalty and justice.
Although courage is most often thought of in the physical sense, it is equally
important in making virtuous decisions. Officers who lie to protect tliemselves or fellow
officers, are in fact cowards. They lack the courage to do the morally right thing .... tell
the trutli!

Conclusion
Law Enforcement is not the only profession with a powerful code of silence.
What makes this code unique in law enforcement is the fact administrators deny its
existence. This code creates serious problems in the handling of police misconduct. .A.s
shown in this chapter the code of silence is embedded in the organizational culture,
making change difficult. Police leaders can improve their departments by acknowledging
the existence of the code of silence, and handling misconduct from within an ethical
frame.
We have seen that police culture encourages conformity among all officers.
While conformity is an asset improving operational efficiency, it also can be detrimental
to the well-being o f officers. When officers act contrary to their own values, succumbing
to group desires, they are being self-destructive. In modifying this culture, an objective
has to be establishing an atmosphere where both individuality and teamwork are valued.
Isolation from the public is the second challenge needing to be addressed. The
police culture fosters an attitude that police officers are apart from, as opposed to. a part
o f the community. When this is the case, officers can rationalize thinking o f citizens as
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less important than fellow officers. Another objective for leaders in improving this police
culture needs to focus on reducing police isolationism.
In meeting both these objectives, leaders must set the example. Only when
supervisors hold themselves accountable can they expect the same of others. Cultivating
an atmosphere that rewards individual creativity and the virtues o f good loyalty,
truthfulness and justice, will go a long way in minimizing the corrupting influences.
Community Oriented Policing (COP) is fueled by empowering the role of officers. To be
successful in COP, creativity is essential. Police leaders can positively change the police
culture, thereby lessening the code of silence by focusing on these responsibilities:
1.

Develop a career development program for all officers. This program will encourage
officers to fully utilize their God given attributes. To address police conformity,
officers need to be recognized for their own initiatives. This is the cornerstone of
Community Oriented Policing. Officers need to be able to satisfy their own career
needs by attending training in specialized areas. Police executives need to enrich the
careers o f subordinate officers by career counseling. When officers are encouraged
to attend training, orchestrate directed patrols and teach others, they have an
increased level of job satisfaction. Officers need to be rewarded for virtuous
conduct.

2.

Provide etliics training for all officers, throughout their careers. This training needs
to include the virtue o f loyalty. This virtue is often misunderstood, leading to
misconduct going unreported.

3.

Encourage officers to participate in community functions, both on and off duty.
Coaching, tutoring and participating on town boards, are only a few of activities
which will reduce isolation. Officers who participate in community functions should
be recognized by the department.

4.

Ensure officers know lying will not be tolerated by the administration. All sustained
cases o f untruthfulness should receive strong discipline. Officers need to know that
dishonesty will not be accepted. By only assessing light discipline for
untruthfulness, administrators are condoning the code of silence. The chief o f the
agency needs to take a zero tolerance approach to lying. When officers realize the
department is serious about honesty, the code of silence will be greatly reduced.
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5.

Officers need to be trained in the importance of truthfulness. While most officers
recall they took an oath of office before graduating from the academy, few truly
understand its importance. Likewise, most officers know a code of ethics exists,
however few know what it means. Classes need to be given tfiroughout an officer's
career ensuring these important documents are not forgotten. Case studies on
officers who have tarnished their badges need to be included in this training. Instead
of keeping past misconduct a secret, these can serve as valuable lessons for other
officers. This training needs to be a part of an officer’s entire career, not just a class
in the training academy.

6.

Ensure that management rights are not negotiated away. Police executives should
never negotiate away managerial rights and responsibilities as part of the negotiation
process. By doing this they are ensuring officers realize that misconduct is a serious
priority of the administrator.

7.

Hold supervisors accountable for the acts o f their subordinates. Supervisors who are
aware of misconduct and fail to take appropriate action need to be held accountable.
Conversely, those who do this duty need to be praised and recognized.
In modem police service, leaders must do more than articulate right behavior.;
they must exhibit right behavior. The leader must ensure that the agency’s values
and principles are articulated, and he or she should include input from the
department's stakeholders. The leader then must provide follow through and ensure
that the values and principles are expressed, communicated, and reinforced
throughout all aspects of the department’s operations, administration, and service.
The leader must reward positive behavior and move swiftly to address
wrongdoings. Leaders should enlist others, internally and externally, to solve
integrity concerns. The goal of every police leader should be to create an
atmosphere o f a total and comprehensive "us” that includes the community, rather
that an "us against them” attitude.
Leadership in a police department is not bound or defined by rank. Those in
executive positions have an obligation to develop supervisors' capabilities and
compel them to assume a greater role in maintaining integrity. Integrity issues
should not be relinquished to a central unit or authority until all alternatives to deal
with them within the smallest unit have been exhausted. In this regard, the first-line
supervisor assumes a key leadership role in ensuring that employees adhere to high
standards o f professional behavior and ferreting out those who violate these
standards.-”

-“Stephen J. Gaffigan, Police Inteeritv. Public Service With Honor. (Washington
D.C.; The National Institute o f Justice: January 1997) p.47.
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Summary
Police culture is similar throughout all police departments in America. In this
culture, isolation from the public and conformity are considered an important elements.
The argument has been made that isolation and conformity serve to increase police
misconduct, by allowing the code o f silence to flourish.
The police culture is often at odds with the law enforcement code of ethics and
the oath o f office, because it encourages misguided loyalty and is detrimental to the
community's welfare. Positive reform must modify the existing culture by ensuring the
virtues of truthfulness, justice and good loyalty. This will require a change in the manner
police executives address misconduct.
Most police executives have historically blamed misconduct on rotten apples'
as opposed to admitting systemic problems. Executives seek to minimize negative
publicity for their departments, instead of seeking morally sound solutions. They deny the
existence o f a code o f silence, because admitting it would expose systemic problems.
With the code o f silence, executives are able to minimize negative publicity, by using the
rotten apple' excuse. The present response to police misconduct allows the code of
silence to flourish.
Reform efforts must be directed at the virtues of truthfulness and loyalty. The
code o f silence is, in reality, a form of misguided loyalty. For loyalty to be virtuous, it
must be directed at the proper end, the community not the individual. By ensuring
truthfulness is required of all officers, administrators will reduce the code of silence.
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One contemporary police reform effort is discussed in Chapter Tliree, Citizen
Review Boards. The argument will be made that these boards actually serve to address
only surface problems, and are counterproductive to true reform.
One of the major stumbling blocks has been identified as 'police isolationism.'
Another stumbling block is the proposed panacea for police misconduct. Citizen Review
Boards. While these boards may seem innocuous at first glance, they serve to increase
police isolationism. They also reduce supervisory accountability, thereby serving to cause
additional damage to an already broken system.
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CHAPTER 3

CITIZEN REVIEW BOARDS
Citizen involvement is an important factor in any well managed police agency.
In fact, civilian input in areas such as budget management, affirmative action, media
relations and other programs have been in place for many years. However, police
misconduct has historically been handled with minimal (if any) citizen involvement. This
chapter will examine a new trend in American policing, the formation of citizen review
boards.
To better understand the impact these boards have on law enforcement, it is
important to differentiate between the four categories of citizen review. Knowing these
distinctions allows for a more accurate interpretation of their value as instruments of
police reform.
The power and composition o f citizen review boards vary greatly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The current trend is to reduce involvement of police leaders in
the decision making process. Four general classifications are utilized in determining
under what classification a citizen review board should be categorized. However, in
reality, most boards are a hybrid o f different classifications.
Class One Citizen Review Boards have been established in the majority of the
larger cities. This type of board is dominated by civilians with little (if any) involvement
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o f police leadership in the process. Citizens conduct their own investigations of cases and
decide upon the appropriate discipline. The size, subpoena power, appeal processes and
funding vary from city to city.
In 1997. the Nevada Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 39. This allowed all
counties in the state of Nevada to form citizen review boards to administer external
control over police agencies. Both the Las Vegas City Council and the Clark County
Commission have passed ordinances creating a Class One Citizen Review Board to
oversee the complaint process of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
(LVMPD). These two ordinances will establish one board since the LVMPD has
jurisdiction in both the city and county. The LVMPD’s Citizen Review Board is
scheduled to start in January of 2000.
LVMPD’s Citizen Review Board board will consist of twenty-five citizens.
Five members will investigate and adjudicate each incident. This board will make
recommendations to the Sheriff as to the appropriate discipline. The board will also have
subpoena power. Although this is being classified as a Class One Board, it has
characteristics o f the other classifications. This board will consider cases which have
already been investigated by the Internal Affairs Bureau. Officers will have the option to
appeal any discipline administered. The board will recommend discipline to the Sheri IT,
although they can not impose it. This resolution was developed through a series of
negotiations between diverse organizations. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department. American Civil Liberties Union. National Association for the Advancement
o f Colored People and the Police Protective Association all participated in the creation of
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this resolution. The final product is a board which all parties can live with, as opposed to
one that ethically deals with police misconduct.
The second classification (Class Two) has both commissioned officers and
civilians involved in the process. This allows for citizen participation without excluding
the expertise o f law enforcement. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department has had
a Class Two Citizen Review Board in place to investigate use of force complaints since
1992. Commissioned officers conduct investigations and then explain their findings to a
combined panel of officers and citizens. The citizens are able to ask questions and review
all reports. This board decides whether the incident is justified or not. In cases found not
justified, the board recommends appropriate disciplinary action to the Sheriff.
The third classification (Class Three) is designed to serve as an appeal process
for citizens who are not satisfied with the resolution of their complaint. These deal with
incidents only after the police department have completed their investigations. The citizen
can request the case be reconsidered, however the department may refuse. This is the
weakest form of citizen review board.
The final classification. Class Four Boards, are in place in the cities o f San Jose
and Seattle. These boards serve as an audit process for the police department. They also
conduct surveys to ensure citizens are being treated fairly. They make recommendations
to the chief on how to improve the complaint process.
The differences between Class One Boards and the other three classes needs to
be emphasized. While Classes Two. Three and Four Boards serve as review bodies
concerning the complaint process, only Class One Boards remove this responsibility from
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the police. Civilian review of disciplinary decisions is healthy, however taking this
function away from police leaders is dangerous for the organizational culture.
In tlie past twenty years. Class One Citizen Review Boards have blossomed
throughout our country. The majority o f these boards have been formed in response to
public outrage over incidents o f police misconduct. This chapter will examine these type
boards and their impact on the law enforcement community.
My central argument will be that Class One Citizen Review Boards are
ineffective at addressing police misconduct, since they fail to address underlying systemic
organizational problems. These boards remove accountability from police management,
shifting it to a citizen panel. These citizens lack the time and expertise required to
adequately investigate and adjudicate the number of complaints received.
Police misconduct is best handled through the internal processes within police
agencies. Effectively addressing police misconduct requires police supervisors to be held
accountable. Police departments have the necessary resources, expertise and personnel to
investigate and adjudicate misconduct complaints. Class Two, Three or Four Citizen
Review Boards serve to enhance internal investigative processes, not weaken them like
Class One Boards. Only by confronting misconduct at an institutional level will
successftil strides be made.

Recent Developments
Nationally, the number o f Class One Citizen Review Boards has skyrocketed. In
1980. only 13 review boards existed in our coimtry. By 1995, the number o f review
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boards grew to 66 (400% increase).-' This growth is due mainly to high profile incidents
that have outraged the public. Incidents such as those including Rodney King and Mark
Fuhrman have tarnished the image of police departments nationwide. The recent
popularity of these boards can be attributed, in part, to the realization that existing
complaint processes have been ineffective. Also, most of tliese boards were created when
public confidence was extremely low.
These boards are portrayed as a way for citizens to take control over their police
departments. Many politicians have gained office on the platform of police reform,
portraying Class One Citizen Review Boards as valuable weapons in reducing police
misconduct. Unfortunately, these boards are often established without considering their
history.
Citizen review is both a national and international phenomenon. The majority
of the big cities have adopted it, and the medium sized and small cities are
increasingly adopting it, as well. As already mentioned, citizen review is almost
universal in English speaking countries.
No analyst has offered a conclusive explanation for the recent spread of citizen
review. The concept was first proposed in 1935. and it was implemented in a few
cities in the 1940’s and 1950*s. The procedures New York City and Philadelphia
adopted were abolished in the 1960’s. however. One factor contributing to the
recent growth o f citizen review has been the increase in African-American political
activity, resulting in the election of mayors and city counsel members who consider
police misconduct a major issue. It should be noted, however, that many small
cities with very small minority populations have also adopted citizen review.

’’Sandra McLaughlin and Donald Reed,'Review o f Complaints of Alleged
Officer Misconduct,” (staff study completed for Sheriff Jerry Keller on the impact of
external and internal review on the LVMPD), Office o f Budget and Management,
January 28. 1997. p.2. Subsequent references to this work will be cited parenthetically in
the text as e.g., (McLaughlin 2)
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Opposition from police chiefs has declined significantly, as they increasingly
recognize the importance of responding effectively to citizen complaints.”
The words "citizen review” create the impression that citizens will be in control
o f these proceedings. The political appeal o f this title makes it very popular among
elected officials. Often these boards are implemented with little examination of the past.
Police misconduct is a serious problem in our country requiring sound ethical solutions,
not just attractive buzz words. The time has come for police leadership to examine their
department from a moral frame. This chapter will examine the Class One Citizen Review
Board's impact on American policing from a moral frame of reference. To increase
public confidence, agencies must seek sound moral solutions for misconduct, not just
"window dressing solutions."
The Police Review Board should never have been the central issue: Police
Review Boards are only symptomatic of a much more serious matter, i.e. the loss of
confidence by the public in some police forces. It is the loss of confidence which is
the central issue in the controversy. (Walker 5)
Citizen involvement is very important to good policing. However, the real
question is. "are Class One Boards beneficial in dealing with police misconduct?"
Although seemingly contradictory, it is possible to advocate strong citizen involvement
with the police and yet be opposed to Class One Citizen Review Boards. With these four
separate classifications, it has become obvious why much confusion exists when
discussing the merits o f these boards (even among police officers).
Proponents o f Class One Review Boards have successftilly grouped all four
classifications together. Opponents of these boards have not made distinctions clear

” Samuel Walker and Betsy Wright, Citizen Review Resource Manual. (Omaha.
NE.: Police Executive Research Forum, 1995), p.5. Subsequent references to this work
will be cited parenthetically in the text as e.g.. (Walker 5)
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between the levels of citizen review, enabling the "all or nothing" argument to be
advanced.
With few exceptions, the present civilian oversight boards have not come
about through a logically thought-out process or through an evolution of other
types of control. Almost all have sprung up abruptly and often with little planning.
Almost every board has come into existence as the aftermath of a law
enforcement incident, often involving white officers and minority suspects.
Whether it was the Dr. Herbert Odom incident in Chicago; the beating death of
Arthur McDuffie in Dade County. Florida; the death of a black motorist in Prince
George’s County. Maryland; or the suicide of Michael Taylor while in police
custody in Indianapolis, highly publicized and emotionally -charged incidents of
alleged police misconduct have usually been the motivating factor behind the
creation of civilian oversight boards in America.
These boards are usually just a knee-jerk reaction to some racial incident.'
John C. Ruckelshaus. the national Fraternal Order of Police attorney for eight years
said Because o f this, you seldom get a fair, balanced board, and so usually they
end up creating more problems than they solve.’”
Public outrage over police misconduct has been a catalyst in the formation of the
majority o f these boards. These review boards are most often created after a major
misconduct incident has occurred and the effected police department is in a very
precarious position. They certainly cannot say change is not needed. The public is
demanding quick and decisive action and the creation of review boards can mean political
survival for a police chief. With this in mind, some police chiefs support these boards, not
for the department's good, but as a form of political survival.

Absence of Quality
Given the environment in which most Class One Review Boards are created, it is
not surprising the majority of these boards have not succeeded. They lack solid
’’Robert Snow. "Civilian Oversight: Plus or Minus, "Law and Order Magazine.
December 1992, p.52.
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foundations needed for this difficult task. These boards are empaneled without proper
attention given to their mission. Conducting misconduct investigations requires a high
level of expertise. Some investigations require many man-hours to complete. Having a
panel o f citizens who lack the necessar>' experience and resources responsible for
completing investigations, is foolish.
While the intent of civilian oversight is usually to improve on tlie old system
of internal police department internal investigation and control, a system that some
citizens may feel is biased against complainants, this is not always what occurs
once a citizen review board is formed. Studies have foimd that civilian boards do
not investigate complaints against officers as zealously as do many internal affair
units. Also many boards cannot compel testimony, cannot punish, and take too
lightly the withholding or distortion of evidence and testimony.
"Our biggest problems are that our civilians don't have the time to do in-depth
investigations.' Joan Engert of the Portland. OR. Police Internal Auditing
Committee said. "Because of this, the board is not seeming to meet the public’s
expectation of what it should be doing.'
An even more serious problem suffered by many boards, particularly those
that conduct their own investigations, is the lack of training, experience, and insight
of the investigators. " These people haven't been in the trenches,' Leo T. Blackwell,
a former police officer and now a police union attorney, said. " They just don't
know what to look for. A police department is much better equipped at being able
to identity the signs of a bad officer.'”
Having civilians investigate the actions of police officers can be compared with
an ‘"armchair quarterback” officiating an NFL game. While the person sitting in the chair
may think he or she can do a better job, in reality, he or she does not even know the rules.
The players in this game would soon become trustrated and the quality of play is destined
to suffer. The same is true o f police work, when integrity takes a back seat to political
gain.

” Thomas Barker and David Carter, Police Deviance 2"” ed.. Cincinnatti OH, West
Publishing Company, p.374
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The board members lack experience and resources necessary to complete
thorough investigations. Of the substantiated cases, many are destined to be overturned
during the appeal process because police unions are very powerful. This results in many
safeguards for police officers. In Nevada. Chapter 289 of the Nevada Revised Statutes
(Appendix 4) is commonly referred to as the 'Police Officers Bill of Rights." Attorneys
are usually provided for the accused officer at all levels of the proceeding. An
investigator who is not fully knowledgeable of NRS 289 is at a great disadvantage.
Investigating alleged police malpractice requires a great deal of skill. In order
to be effective, the investigator ( a sergeant, an internal affair’s officer or police
manager ) must be specifically trained for the task and given constant guidance
and administrative support. Since the internal investigation process must be swift,
certain, fair and lawful, only the most competent employees should be trained to
conduct personnel investigations. Few police departments provide any. let alone
sufficient, training for those involved in personnel complaint investigations. The
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals
considered this problem and recommended that:
'Every police agency immediately should insure that internal discipline
complaint investigations are performed with the greatest possible skill. The
investigative effort expended on all internal discipline complaints should be at least
equal to the effort expended in the investigation of felony crimes where a suspect is
known.'”
Investigating police misconduct is an extremely difficult process, requiring
many skills. A few of the basics needed includes knowledge of contracts, applicable laws,
and the ability to assess weight of evidence. To place any person into this position
without the skills and experience is not wise.

” Harry W. More and Fred Wegener. Effective Police Supervision. (Cincinnati.
OH.: Anderson Publishing Company, 1990) p.318. Subsequent references to this work
will be cited parenthetically in the text as e.g. (More 318)
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Swiftness is an essential element in maintaining proper discipline. In
Washington. D.C.. the Citizen Complaint Review Board has 950 cases pending. Some of
these cases are more than four years old and still have not been heard. The majority of
internal affairs bureaus complete the entire investigation within 30 days. (.McLaughlin 6)
Most boards are not only fair and impartial, but actually tend to be easier on
accused officers than internal department processes are. Professor Perez, Skyline
College, said in a Chicago Tribune article. ‘ civilian systems find the police
innocent of wrong doing most of the time . . . civilian systems have historically
given the accused officer more procedural safeguards than have internal systems ..
civilian review mechanisms are in fact easier on the beat cop than are internal
systems.’ (McLaughlin 6)
Lack of thoroughness when conducting investigations will be detrimental to the
entire community. Allowing unfit officers to remain on the department is a dangerous
practice. History has proven that misconduct, when not addressed early, becomes more
entrenched. A basic axiom in personnel management is that misconduct grows if left
undetected. Cities such as New York, New Orleans and Philadelphia, are examples of this
idea in action.

Removing Managerial Accountability
Leadership requires managers to be accountable for the actions o f their
subordinates. When an outside panel is given this role, supervisory responsibility
diminishes. Supervisors are allowed to "hide their heads in the sand.” This absence of
accountability serves to erode organizational integrity. In Chapter Two it was shown how
the code of silence’ flourishes in this type of environment.
Typically, police chiefs seek to remove themselves (and their department) from
the misconduct incident for reasons of political survival. The chief will insist the incident
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was an isolated event which does not constitute organizational problems. The targeted
officers will then be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. By creating this
separation, the chief attains a reputation of being "hard-nosed on misconduct." Many
chiefs will use the term "rotten apple" when commenting on the accused officer.
If successful in creating this distance, the chief can actually turn misconduct
into a political gain. People perceive "The chief cannot be held accountable for the
actions of all his or her officers, but at least he or she takes tough action when confronted
with it." This distorted public perception causes the focus to be on the individual actors,
as opposed to the organization as a whole. This removal of accountability is detrimental
to police reform.
Class One Citizen Review Boards allow police leaders to be less accountable to
the community. As seen in Chapter One of this thesis, certain factors are typically present
in departments with high levels of misconduct. An absence of supervisory accountability
has been listed as one o f these factors. Reducing supervisory accountability is contrary to
reform efforts. By moving the complaint process away from supervisors can blame the
review board for not adjudicating cases properly, as opposed to taking responsibility.
If alleged wrongdoing is verified, police tend to defend the reputation of tlieir
agency by characterizing the wrongdoing as an isolated phenomenon not
representative o f their operations. This traditional response has contributed, perhaps
unwittingly, to a prevalent attitude within police departments that wrongdoing is
exclusively the responsibility of the wrongdoers; that the agency itself is exempt
from any responsibility for the misconduct. It follows that, while sergeants,
lieutenants, captains and higher ranking officers are held to strict accoimt for
investigating wrongdoing, they are rarely held to account for having failed to
prevent the misconduct in the first place or for having failed to uncover it on their
own. Thus, preoccupied with defending themselves in the community, police
administrators in many jurisdictions have forfeited one o f the oldest and potentially
most effective means for achieving conformity with legislative and administrative
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promulgations - the simple process of creating through traditional administrative
devices an agency-wide sense of responsibility for the prevention of misconduct.

Accepting the responsibility for achieving conformity requires, specifically,
that an administrator inoculate an administrative philosophy that holds supervisory
officers responsible for the actions of their subordinates. Enough pressure should be
exerted on a precinct commander, for example, to result in his viewing an overly
aggressive police officer who is constantly offending citizens as a major
administrative problem, rather than - as is often the case - an extremely valuable
employee who frequently gets in trouble. Each captain, each lieutenant, and each
sergeant should be made to feel as responsible for an officer's conduct in relating to
citizens as they do for assuring that an officer reports to work on time. This would
make the task of controlling police conduct far more manageable than it is today.
(Barker 46)
This lack of this organizational responsibility allows supervisors to turn the
other way' when confronted with misconduct. They thereby save face with their officers
for not having to perform the difficult task of disciplining their subordinates.
Only when the chief makes every manager and supervisor answerable for the
misconduct of his or her subordinates can a department with serious corruption be
reformed. (Barker 47)
When the chain of command is not involved in the decision making process,
they carmot be held accountable. History has demonstrated that supervisory
accountability is crucial when dealing with misconduct. As seen in Chapter Two of this
thesis, past reform commissions (Knapp, Mollen and Christopher) have identified
increased supervisory accountability as the major ingredient needed to reduce police
misconduct. But in Class One Citizen Review Boards, supervisory accountability is
reduced. In an argument to support Class One Review Boards, a premise must be that
supervisors do not need to be accountable for the conduct of their subordinates. Since
supervisors need to be held accoimtable. Class One Review Boards are not consistent
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with a healthy work environment. Taking accountability, a vital management tool, away
from police management is dancing with disaster for the future of law enforcement.

Addressing Systemic Problems
The problem o f police misconduct cannot be effectively handled on a case by
case basis. Class One Citizen Review Boards treat only the symptoms, not the disease.
Police misconduct needs to be confronted from a normative frame and institutionally.
Police in the cities of New York. Philadelphia, New Orleans and Los Angeles, serve as
proof that police misconduct is an institutional problem as opposed to a series of isolated
incidents. (In all o f these cities, citizen review boards have been formed and reformed.)
After every major misconduct incident new boards are formed until the next scandal
surfaces.
Police reform must be aimed at examining the entire agency, not just individual
episodes of misconduct. Class One Citizen Review Boards are designed to look at
individual cases. By doing this, underlying problems do not surface.
Matza states that the major contribution of sociology to the understanding of
deviance consists o f two fundamental insights: ‘ First, persistent deviance typically
is not a solitary enterprise: rather it best flourishes when it receives group support.
Second, deviance typically is not an individual or group innovation, rather it has a
history in particular locales.' In many police departments one finds two factors:
group support for certain deviant practices and long histories of corrupt activities.
Many patterns o f police deviance, including certain forms o f corruption, are
examples o f what Schur terms " forms o f approved deviance" in organizational
settings, i.e.. deviant behavior which does not reflect unfavorably on the
individual's overall identity. These forms of "approved deviance " are supported by
the group in the sense that they are not defined as deviant and actors who engage in
them run little risk o f exposure and sanction. (Barker 52)
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Dealing with police misconduct requires an examination o f the organizational
culture. What factors allow misconduct to go undetected in the agency? Are "whistle
blowers” punished? Is the work environment healthy, allowing citizens and employees to
report misconduct without fear o f reprisal? Is ethical behavior rewarded within the
department? Is misconduct treated seriously when discovered? Are all employees being
treated fairly in disciplinary proceeding?
If we are serious about police reform, all employees need to be held accountable.
Top management, mid-level managers, supervisors and officers should all be examined.
To remove any level from the review process destroys any chance o f true success. As
seen in Chapter Two of this thesis, the police culture can be detrimental to reform efforts.
The rotten apple theory won't work any longer. Corrupt police officers are
not natural bom criminals, nor morally wicked men. constitutionally different from
their honest colleagues. The task of corruption control is to examine the barrel, not
just the apples - the organization, not just the individuals in it. because corrupt
police are made, not bom. (Barker 46)
Class One Citizen Review Boards are not designed to look at the whole barrel.
They are designed to make the public feel better, at least in the short term. These boards
are not the panaceas, which some would have us to believe. A process that holds all levels
o f the department accountable needs to be the main objective of reform efforts.
Law enforcement needs to deal with misconduct from the top down. Individual
incidents are symptoms of larger problems within agencies that need to be addressed.
Police executives cannot wait until after an incident occurs to take action. They need to
have safeguards in place to ensure organizational integrity.
Class One Review Boards are not conducive to police reform. What is needed is
a process holding all police supervisors accountable for the actions o f their officers. The
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next section will examine citizen review boards from two different levels of policy
analysis, verification and social choice.-'’

Verification
Verification analysis measures these boards by examining empirical data versus
stated objectives. In evaluating the performance of Class One Citizen Review Boards two
benchmarks will be used. Since it is alleged that traditional internal processes white
wash’ police misconduct, we would expect Class One Citizen Review Boards to be more
harsh on officers.
Another measure would be a reduction of police misconduct in a city utilizing a
Class One Citizen Review Board. This can be measured in the number of complaints filed
and a reduction in the severity of the misconduct committed. If it can be proven that Class
One Citizen Review Boards reduce incidents of misconduct and lessens the severity of
misconduct, then they have been successful.
The City of New York has had the most experience with Class One Citizen
Review Boards. In 1993 (after the Mollen Commission), the New York City Civilian
Review Board was formed. This is a Class One Citizen Review Board which appears to
be on its way to being dismantled. Only a very small percentage o f cases are sustained by
this board. In the first half of 1996, 159 substantiated cases were referred to the
department, and charges were filed in only one case. In 1991. before the CCRB, the
department’s internal process substantiated 113 of 3.379 complaints and 50 officers were
foimd guilty. (McLaughlin 4)
-‘Frank Fischer, Evaluating Public Policv. (Chicago: Nelson-Hall
Publishers, 1995) p .27-155.
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A major reason for the creation of Class One Review Boards is the assumption
that internal affair bureaus coverup misconduct. However, statistics show that internal
affair bureaus sustain complaints at a higher rate than review boards. The argument can
be made that Class One Review Boards serve to "whitewash" misconduct by not
sustaining cases.
The cities o f New York and Philadelphia had Class One Citizen Review Boards
dating back over 50 years. Both these cities have been plagued by misconduct, and have
had many review boards come and go. As seen in Chapter One of this thesis, the New
York City Police Department suffered a major scandal in the 1960's which resulted in
the formation o f the Knapp Commission. Officers were convicted of many felonies as a
result of corruption. Again in the 1990’s. the NYPD suffered another major scandal
resulting in a new commission (Mollen) being formed. This commission discovered that
the problems within the NYPD had only escalated since the Knapp Commission.
The Philadelphia Police Department has also been plagued with misconduct
scandals.
This year, its six police officers pleaded guilty to framing and beating suspects
and lying under oath and more officers under investigation. 1,400 criminal cases
under review, civil lawsuits moimting.
Six years ago, it was an elite narcotics squad accepting bribes from drug
dealers.
Four years before that, it was a bimgled MOVE siege that burned to the
ground a whole neighborhood. A year before that it was attack on citizens by
vicious police dogs.
That year, 1984, was also when 30 officers -- including a deputy
commissioner —were caught running protection rackets for brothels and illegal
gambling machines. And three years earlier, it was a theatrical squad o f officers
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who dressed as mugging victims and arrested innocent people to inflate their
overtime pay in court.
As a 1987 task force study put it. 'In short, the historical reputation o f the
Philadelphia Police Department has been unenviable."
All big-city police departments have scandals, but few seem to match
Philadelphia s repeated swan dives into disgrace. Why?-’
In the cities of New York and Philadelphia, these review boards have not
reduced police misconduct, nor lessen the severity of incidents. In evaluating Class One
Review Boards from a verification frame they have not been successful.

Social Choice
When evaluating Class One Citizen Review Boards from a social choice frame,
two questions need to be addressed. Do these boards provide for an equitable resolution
of police misconduct? Is there another method to handle police misconduct which better
serves society? Citizens must be confident that processes used to adjudicate complaints of
police misconduct are ethically sound. When evaluating Class One Citizen Review
Boards from a philosophical frame, we must view these boards from both their
organizational impact and their ability to contribute to police reform. When police engage
in misconduct, they damage public trust. This trust is essential if the police are to fulfill
their mission. As we have described in Chapter Two of" this thesis, police have a unique
organizational culture. The impact these boards have on individuals within this culture
(police officers), needs to be considered.

-^Mark Fazlollah, Daniel Rubin and Mark Bowden, "Repeated Efforts at Reform
Have Gone Little Beyond Paper,” Philadelphia Inquirer, p.23 November 1995, p.l.
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In studying the works of Aristotle, it is seen that virtue can best be described as
"hitting the median” between extremes. Virtue is viewed as being of two types, moral and
intellectual. Moral virtues are developed by habitually performing acts of virtue.
Intellectual virtue comes from teaching, thus it requires experience to develop. Virtue is
not something we are bom with. Virtue is something we strive for on a continuous basis.
Aristotle taught that virtuous actions require repetition to become entrenched in
a person. Any person can perform a virtuous act, however that action does not make
him/her a virtuous person. To be virtuous, a person actions need to be consistently good.
To attain this status requires practice.
The virtues, on the other hand, we acquire by first having put them in action,
and the same is also true of the arts. For the things which we have to learn before
we can do them we learn by doing: men become builders by building houses, and
harpists by playing the harp. Similarly, we become just by the practice of just
actions, self-controlled by exercising self-control, and courageous by performing
acts of courage.-*
Bringing these words into policing, we see the importance of training and
leadership. A new officer cannot be expected to be a good policeman/policewoman until
he/she gains experience through training and leadership. As he/she gains experience,
he/she practices the virtues attributed to being a good cop.' The converse is also true.
They may also learn how to engage in misconduct. This is why the organizational culture
plays a major role in the development of an officer's career.
Hence it is no small matter whether one habit or another is inculcated in us
from early childhood; on the contrary, it makes a considerable difference, or, rather,
all the difference. (NEl 103b22-24)

-*Aristode translated by Martin Ostwald, Nicomachean Ethics. (New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 1962) Book II, (NEl 103A30-1103B02). Subsequent references to this
work will be cited in the text parenthetically e.g., (NEl 103A30-1103B02)
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The conduct of people in an organization is dictated by the culture within the
organization. When an officer learns that although profanity is a violation of departmental
policy, if it is accepted at his/her command, he/she is likely to engage in this behavior.
The converse is also the case.
An argument can be made that to be consistent with Aristotlean Ethics, police
departments must ensure that good conduct permeates the organization. Because, if good
conduct is not indoctrinated in employees, the opposite will become the norm. Having an
ethically sound process for handling police misconduct is consistent with Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics.
Aristotle taught much concerning the subject of human behavior. We need to
examine why people behave in a certain way if we are to set up a process to improve
conduct within an organization. People seek to enjoy life and will avoid unnecessary
pain.
Aristotle used the pain and pleasure test to explain virtue. People act in certain
ways to increase pleasure and avoid pain. Virtue requires us to act in a manner which
does not always give the greatest pleasure and avoid pain. Actions need to be viewed
from the frame of moral soundness. A man who throws himself in the path of an
oncoming train and dies can be used to illustrate this test. If the man did this act for no
reason, we would say his death was the result of recklessness. If the man pulled a child
off the tracks, then his death would be virtuous. While in both examples, the man suffered
the same fate (death), only in the second did he do so out of virtue. One would be seen as
a reckless death, while the other would be heroic.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

73

The end result, be it pleasure or pain, cannot be the determining factor in
measuring moral soundness. Aristotle realized peoples actions are based on pleasure and
pain. For this reason, police departments need to have systems in place which rewards
good behavior and sanctions misconduct. As seen in the history of American policing,
this system has been lacking. American policing has failed to address misconduct
consistent with Aristotelean ethics.
For moral excellence is concerned with pleasure and pain; it is pleasure that
makes us do base actions and pain that prevents us from doing noble actions. For
that reason, as Plato says, men must be brought up from childhood to feel pleasure
and pain at the proper things; for this is correct education.(NEl 104b09-13)
An officer must be confident that when he/she engages in misconduct, they will
be disciplined. If the department turns a blind eye.' the officer will be more likely to
participate in misdeeds. This can be seen in all police scandals. New York, New Orleans,
Philadelphia, Los Angeles and other police departments serve as evidence that
misconduct, left unattended, will escalate.
In evaluating the social significance of Class One Review Boards, we must
determine if they are morally soimd. To answer this from a philosophical position, we
need to discuss justice and equity.
Now, in situations though, where it is necessary to speak in universal terms
but impossible to do so correctly, the law takes the majority o f the cases, fully
realizing in what respect it misses the mark. The law itself is nonetheless correct.
For the mistake lies neither in the law nor in the lawgiver, but in the nature of the
case. For such is the material for which actions are made. So in a situation in which
the law speaks imiversally, but the case at issue happens to fall outside the universal
formula, it is correct to rectify the shortcoming, in other words, the omission and
mistake of the lawgiver due to the generality o f his statement. Such a rectification
corresponds to what the lawgiver himself would have said if he were present, and
what he would have enacted if he had known (of this particular case). That is why
the equitable is both just and also better than the just in one sense. It is not better
than the just in general, but better than the mistake due to the generality (of the
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law). And this is the very nature of the equitable, a rectification of law where law
falls short by reason of its universality. This is also the reason why not all things
are determined by law. There are some things about which it is impossible to enact
a law. so a special decree is required. For where a thing is indefinite, as is, for
example, the leaden rule used in Lesbian construction work. Just as a rule is not
rigid, but shifts with the contour of the stone, so a decree is adapted to a given
situation. Thus it is clear what the equitable is. that it is just, and better than just in
one sense o f the term. We see from this. too. what an equitable man is. A man is
equitable who chooses and performs acts of this sort, who is no stickler for justice
in a bad sense, but is satisfied with less than his share even though the law is on his
side. Such a characteristic is equity; it is a kind of justice and not a characteristic
different from justice. (NEl 137bl2-l 138a03)
Equity requires that since situations are unique they must be evaluated
differently. As in the Leaden rule, decisions cannot be rigid, but must adjust to the case at
hand. Cases handled by Class One Citizen Review Boards lack individual evaluation.
How can the citizens serving on the board possess all the knowledge of the individual
officers? In addition, they will not know all the facts of each case due to lack of
experience.
Cases require deliberation to render an equitable decision that is just. We need to
examine all the mitigating factors to make the right decision. All disciplinary cases
cannot be treated in the same manner claiming we are being just. Information such as the
officer’s work history, severity of the incident and prior offenses, all need to be weighed
as part of the process. Thus, equity is the better rule’, and that requires direct knowledge
o f each case. Class One Citizen Review Boards are not able to fill this rule because they
lack the experience and time necessary to ensure equitable decisions.
The following example of a misconduct case will clarify this point: Two
officers (officer A and officer B) each receive a complaint o f excessive force, for slapping
a handcuffed prisoner. Both officers hit the complainant one time, each with an open
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hand. It would be just that both officers receive the same discipline, however, it would
not be equitable.
Officer A is a ten-year veteran with five prior sustained cases this past year.
Officer A slapped the complainant (a slender female) because she was arguing with him.
When questioned about the incident. Officer A said "I slapped her because the bitch has a
big mouth."
Officer B has just graduated from field training and has never been charged with
any violations. Officer B slapped the complainant (a notorious gang member) because he
attempted to bite another officer. When questioned about the incident. Officer B said
"I’m very sorry, but I felt 1 had to do something."
An equitable decision would be to give Officer A more severe discipline than
Officer B. Even though the violations are the same, the situations are not. Officer B
would benefit from training, and most likely would not repeat his mistake. Officer A
obviously did not learn from his prior offenses and more severe discipline is needed to
change his behavior.
Thus we may conclude that, since it is a mark of men o f practical wisdom to
have deliberated well, excellence in deliberation will be correctness in assessing
what is conducive to that end, concerning which practical wisdom gives a true
conviction. (NEl l42b33-35)
In the interest of equity, cases need to be decided by using all information
possible. The police department is in the position to have all the needed information, so
as to make the most equitable disciplinary decision. Class One Citizen Review Boards
will not be able to render equitable decisions.
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Conclusion
This chapter examined a contemporary topic impacting law enforcement
nationwide. Due to public outrage Class One Civilian Review Boards are being formed in
many cities across our country. My central argument in this chapter has been that these
boards hamper reform efforts. These boards move disciplinary decisions away from
police leadership, shifting these decisions to a panel of citizens. These citizens lack the
skill, necessary time and training to adjudicate complaints in an equitable way. Moving
disciplinary decisions to an external body allows police supervisors to ‘hide their heads in
the sand.'
These boards are designed to address individual incidents of police misconduct,
omitting any underlying systemic causes. Historically, these boards have been shown to
be ineffective at reducing police misconduct. To understand this subject, this chapter
began by separating the four classifications of citizen review boards.
Civilian review boards are separated into four classifications, depending upon
the level o f citizen involvement in the decision making process. Class Two Citizen
Review Boards are designed to have the police conduct internal investigations and
present their findings to a panel including both citizens and commissioned personnel. The
panel considers all the facts and determines what (if any) corrective action should be
taken. Their recommendation is forwarded to the police chief. This form of review allows
for police and citizens to work as a team in rendering their decisions.
Class Three Citizen Review Boards serve only as a review process for citizens.
After the police complete their investigation and impose discipline, the citizen may
request that the police reevaluate their finding. This is the weakest type o f citizen review.
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Class Four Citizen Review Boards serve as a audit process. These boards
monitor the quality o f dispositions and complaint processes of the police departments.
When deficiencies are discovered, they report to the chief. The Board works with the
chief to remedy any problems.
Class One Citizen Review Boards, unlike the other three classes, removes the
police agency from the decision making process. These boards do not include any police
members. Cases are reviewed and a panel of citizens determines the action to be
administered. Recently, the number of these type of boards have skyrocketed. Tltese have
all been formed in response to public outrage over incidents o f police misconduct.
Successful strides will only be made when police administrators, managers and
supervisors are held accountable for misconduct under their command. Misconduct needs
to be seen from an institutional level, as opposed to a series of individual acts. Class One
Citizen Review Boards serve to accomplish just the opposite. In dealing with individual
cases and lessening supervisor accountability, they are contrary to reform efforts.
Class One Citizen Review boards have been in existence since the 1940s. In
New York City these boards have been abolished several times, due to inefficiency.
However, after a major scandal surfaces, they are put back into place. Because of tlie
political popularity these boards possess, they often mean political survival for the chief
or mayor. Any positive results which comes from these boards is short lived since they
fail to address systemic problems. These boards are often viewed as quick and easy fixes,
which usually result in positive media coverage.
These boards are designed to regain public trust, as opposed to changing
organizational culture. The distinction between the four classes of citizen review are not
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commonly known, thus it often becomes "an all or nothing argument.’ To regain public
trust, the organizational culture needs to become healthy, and Class One Citizen Review
Boards are not conducive to this goal.
Nationally, police unions have become very powerful. In many states (including
Nevada) police officers are protected by a bill of rights. This provides many safeguards,
including legal representation when officers are accused of misconduct. Internal
investigators need to be extremely knowledgeable of these increased protections.
Investigators also need to be excellent interviewers, weighers of evidence and possess
other skills, which are only gained with experience and training.
Since Class One Citizen Review Board members lack training and experience,
the quality o f investigations suffer. This results in many cases being overturned during
the appeal process. The lack of time they can spend on an investigation, is another
shortcoming. In Washington, D.C., cases often take over four years before a decision is
reached.
This lack of quality in investigations results in allowing dangerous officers to
stay on the streets. Nationally. Class One Citizen Review Boards have been more lenient
on wayward officers than traditional internal processes.
Moving the complaint investigation process to an external body results in
eliminating responsibility from police leadership. Supervisors, managers and
administrators can easily 'turn a blind eye’ toward misconduct. As seen in Chapter Two,
the code o f silence’ thrives on this behavior. When problems arise, police administrators
can blame the board, as opposed to taking responsibility.
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In Chapter One. we learned that all the commissions formed in the aftermath of
police scandals have cited lack o f supervisor accountability as a major contributing
factor. All commissions also have listed the need to examine organizational problems, as
opposed to the individual act of misconduct. How can any mechanism which diminishes
supervisor accountability be thought of as a positive reform initiative? Also. Class One
Citizen Review Boards are not designed to examine the organization. They have a limited
focus. Again, How can any process that does not investigate institutional problems be
beneficial for law enforcement?
The final section of this chapter is an evaluation of Class One Citizen Review
Boards from a verification and social choice frame. In the verification frame, we will
utilize empirical data from New York City and Philadelphia, both cities have a long
history with Class One Citizen Review Boards. Two questions were presented to evaluate
the success of these boards. The first question, “Are the number o f sustained cases higher
using Class One Citizen Review Boards than lAB?” Secondly, “Did these boards reduce
the level o f reported misconduct complaints?” The answer to both these questions is
“NO!”
In the social choice area, we utilized the works of Aristotle. The subject of
virtuous conduct was the first area discussed. Aristotle stated that virtuous conduct is
“hitting the median” and to be a person o f virtue requires repeated practice. This seems to
support the importance o f leadership and training. Aristotle used the “pleasure versus
pain test” to explain human behavior. People want to enjoy pleasure and avoid pain. The
importance of organizations to have a morally sound process to recognize good conduct
and sanction misconduct is consistent with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The subject
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üf justice and equity mean was also discussed by Aristotle. Equity requires all facts be
weighed in the adjudication of a complaint. Since. Class One Citizen Review Boards do
not complete investigations in an equitable way. they are not consistent with Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics.

Summary
Thus far. in this thesis, we discussed many problems. In Chapter One. we looked
at the shady history o f American policing. Numerous scandals were discussed, and the
fact that police misconduct is nothing a new was gleaned from this chapter. Reform
strategies have not significantly changed since the 1930s. This leads to the conclusion
that, what has been used in the past to address police misconduct, "just doesn't work.”
In Chapter Two, we examined the organizational culture present in most police
departments. This culture encourages social isolation and conformity. This culture is
contradictory to both the “code o f ethics' and the “oath of office,' police officers are
sworn to uphold. The code of silence' existing among police officers can be seen as a
symptom o f the existing culture. The argument was made that police management
encourages this culture as a form of political survival.
In Chapter Three, Class One Citizen Review Boards were examined. The fact
that these boards have not been successful has often been overshadowed by their political
appeal. These boards are now the norm in most major cities. These boards serve to
damage an already broken organizational culture, by removing supervisory
accoimtability. These boards are certainly not a step in the right direction. In fact, they
have hampered reform efforts.
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In Chapter Four, we will be looking at ethical solutions. These proposed changes
are not quick fixes, they are aimed at changing the organizational culture. Only by
addressing the entire organization will progress be made. In this final chapter we serve to
improve the organizational culture present in American policing by addressing
institutional problems from an ethical way. Only then will we experience a reduction in
police misconduct.
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CHAPTER 4

STEPPING STONES FOR IMPROVEMENT
This thesis has identified many problems facing police leaders. In Chapter One.
we observed that misconduct is deeply rooted in American policing. In fact, it has always
challenged American law enforcement. Historically, reformers have failed in their
attempts to reduce police misconduct. The majority of initiatives were rebuffed by an
organizational culture resistant to change. Also, local politics have always influenced the
level of police misconduct.
In Chapter Two. the code of silence, so pervasive in American policing, was
examined. The existing organizational culture is playing a major role enabling the code of
silence to flourish. This unwritten code is powerful at all levels of police organizations.
Despite reform efforts, this code has only strengthened in recent years. This code often
serves to cover up or minimize institutional problems.
Police administrators must ensure that the virtues of justice, truthfulness and
good loyalty are paramount in their departments. Only by taking a ‘zero tolerance' policy
against lying will the code of silence be reduced. Administrators need to ensure that the
virtues of truthfulness, duty and good loyalty are indoctrinated in the hearts of their
officers.

82
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The existing police organizational culture needs to be changed before long term
positive improvement will occur. Conformity and isolationism are valued characteristics
within police organizational culture. These two qualities can be detrimental to the moral
soundness of an organization. They encourage officers to lie in order to protect fellow
officers out o f a sense of misguided loyalty.
In Chapter Three, citizen review boards were explored. The difference among
the four levels o f citizen review boards is important to understand. Class Two. Three and
Four Citizen Review Boards utilize both civilian and commissioned officers in the
disciplinary process. Class One Citizen Review Boards are composed entirely of
civilians, taking the disciplinary process away from the police. Class One Citizen Review
Boards have become a popular response to police misconduct nationwide. However, my
position is that these boards are dangerous for the future o f American policing.
Class One Boards are established without concern for moral soundness or long
term quality control. They have not been successful at reducing police misconduct. These
boards remove managerial accountability and lack the expertise required to conduct
internal investigations. Class One Citizen Review Boards fail to confront underlying
systemic problems which are at the base of police misconduct.
In Chapter Four, we will map out a path for improvement which is based upon
moral soimdness. Simply put, past reform efforts have failed because they have aimed at
the wrong target.' They have had their sights set solely on the legal frame as opposed to
moral soundness. Positive long term results will occur when sights are positioned on
moral soundness. This thesis not only identifies problems but also gives
recommendations to improve the quality of American policing.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

84
This path to improvement is directed at the organizational problems which have
been identified in the preceding three chapters. While all six steps' of Chapter Four, can
be easily implemented, radical Improvements will not be seen overnight. Just as the
problem o f police misconduct has had a long history, positive results will not be
immediate. Long term positive change will occur when the organizational culture
improves.
Two premises are needed to serve as maxims for police reform efforts. First,
police misconduct needs to be viewed from a normative (organizational) viewpoint as
opposed to a series of individual acts. The entire organization must be examined, not just
the individual officer or incident. Secondly, positive change must be morally soimd in
order to provide long term improvement. 1 will use the analogy of a hiker stepping on
stones while crossing a lake. Without stepping over all six stones a person will not reach
the shore. All six steps are important to improve organizational culture.
Step One: Ensures all officers receive ethics training throughout their careers.
All officers have taken an oath of office and swear to abide by a code of ethics. Most,
however, cannot remember either. Officers need to be taught about the important role
police perform in our society, the trust placed in them, and the way democracies delegate
authority to police officers. This training needs to be ongoing throughout an officer's
career. Only when officers understand what "proper conduct’ is, can they be held
accountable. As we have seen in Chapter Three, training is essential to virtuous conduct.
Step Two: Requires leaders to be pro-active in preventing police misconduct. As
observed in Chapter One certain situations have historically resulted in high levels of
police misconduct. Covert assignments (Vice and Narcotic Bureaus) have been breeding

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

85

grounds for large scale police scandals. In the majority of corruption scandals, suspect
officer(s) had a long history o f misconduct complaints which were never properly
adjudicated. Low income areas are typically the locations where the majority of
misconduct incidents occur. These are only some of the predictability factors police
leaders should closely monitor. (See Chapter One)
In Chapter Two it was observed that weak supervision is a factor in cases of
police misconduct. When supervisors are not held accountable for the conduct of their
subordinates we are dancing with disaster. Also, when safeguards are not put into place in
high risks assignments (Vice, Narcotics, Intelligence), there is a high likelihood police
misconduct will transpire. Special attention must be taken in low income areas ensuring
all misconduct complaints are throughly investigated.
Step Three: Requires organizations to formally acknowledge virtuous conduct.
Since officers should be disciplined for imethical behavior, the converse must also be the
case. A process rewarding virtuous conduct needs to be established within the
organization. This needs to be incorporated into the promotional process, thereby
ensuring that people with a reputation for virtuous conduct are promoted into supervisory
positions. This change would send a message to all officers that virtuous conduct is an
important attribute of a leader.
Conduct both on and off duty should be considered for recognition. Officers
who demonstrate outstanding citizenship serve to benefit their departments. Good
citizenship reduces police isolationism and improves the organizational culture. In
Chapter Two it was shown that isolationism is a major factor in the code o f silence.
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Step Four: Calls for leaders to take "a zero tolerance policy’ toward
untruthfulness. By meting out light discipline when officers are caught lying, supervisors
are condoning this behavior. As seen in Chapter Two of this thesis, lying is the lifeline of
the code o f silence. Progress will be seen when police executives ensure that strong
disciplinary action is given to liars. A lack of public trust was identified as the major
reason for the increasing number of Class One Citizen Review Boards. Demanding
honesty from all officers will increase public trust.
Step Five: Recommends that Chief Executive Officers (CEO) empower their
Internal Affairs Bureaus (lAB). This Bureau needs to be pro-active in dealing with police
misconduct. Investigators assigned to lAB need to have the support of the Chief
Executive Officer (CEO). lAB should report directly to the CEO. Intermediary levels
separating the CEO and lAB reduces the quality of lAB investigations. Information
becomes distorted when levels separate the CEO from lAB.
In some departments lAB reports to a Deputy Chief as an intermediary level.
Deputy Chiefs typically oversee several bureaus. A Deputy Chief who oversees lAB and
the Detective Biueau. is put into an uncomfortable position when a complaint is filed
against a detective. The Deputy Chief is tom between loyalty to the detective and the
virtues o f truthfulness and duty. This conflict dramatically impacts the quality of
investigations. Information which needs to be kept confidential during the investigation
may be leaked out, in an effort to lessen its negative impact.
A Deputy Chief is evaluated by his superiors on their ability to manage different
bureaus. Since misconduct occurring within the Detective Bureau will negatively impact
the Deputy C hiefs evaluation and reputation, they are not a disinterested party to internal
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investigations. How zealous will a Deputy Chief be investigating misconduct within their
own division?
The quality o f lAB depends to a great extent upon the objectivity of its
investigations. The CEO is in a better position to remain objective than intermediaiy
levels. This is why lAB needs to report directly to the CEO.
It is also recommended that lAB be responsible for all misconduct complaints,
both administrative and criminal. This will increase the quality o f investigations, ensure
confidentiality and reduce the likelihood of coverups.
lAB needs to be open with citizens concerning misconduct investigations.
Creating a citizen group, reflective of the community, which meets with lAB on a
regular basis, could improve public trust. This committee would serve as a Class Four
Citizen Review Board, working with police to improve the process and open lines of
communication. When citizens become involved in the process, they will have
confidence in lAB.
Step Six: Suggests the use of a disciplinary matrix’ when deciding corrective
actions. This will ensure equity and improve consistency in decisions throughout the
department. By the CEO setting parameters for these decisions, he or she has more
control over the process. When officers know the consequences of their actions
beforehand, they will be more careful to abstain from the conduct to avoid punishment.
The Minneapolis Police Department began utilizing a disciplinary matrix in 1996. People
need to know ethical conduct will be rewarded and the converse is also true. This is
consistent with Aristotle’s Nicomachaen Ethics, and will greatly benefit the organization.
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These stepping stones will serve to empower leadership, improve organizational
culture and make police departments' more responsive to their communities. It is my
belief tliat these steps are both legally and morally sound, and will improve the quality of
American policing.

First Step (Ethics Training)
Ethics training's importance in maintaining organizational ethical soundness can
be compared to that of an exercise routine in maintaining physical fitness. A fifty year old
cannot be expected to run a marathon if he has not exercised since high school. The
chances o f him or her finishing the race, without being in an ambulance, are almost
nonexistent. If the fifty year old is an avid runner, his or her likelihood of completing the
race is very probable. Maintaining a level of physical fitness is a prerequisite in meeting
the challenge o f completing a marathon. An officer cannot be expected to remain
ethically sound if ethics training is insufficient. Ethics training is a prerequisite in
maintaining an ethically sound police department.
Ethics training is the first step, because without it we are destined to fail.
Typically police officers receive little, if any. training on ethics during their careers.
Officers take an oath of office and agree to abide by a code of ethics, however few
officers can recall the meaning o f these profound documents. The important fimction
police fulfill in our society must be imprinted in the minds of all officers. Only by
learning from the mistakes of the past can we improve the future. Training must include a
review o f American policing with emphasis placed on misconduct scandals.
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The challenge is to ensure ethics training is pragmatic for officers. This can be
accomplished by discussing current situations from an ethical frame. This requires police
leaders to seek contemporary issues to discuss with their people. Ideal issues can be
gleaned from examining challenges facing officers in their present assignments. These
discussions can last from five minutes to several hours. The following example could be
discussed with officers concerning ethical ramifications.

A Case History
Officer Jones receives information during briefing that a black male adult had
raped a lady in the alleyway behind the Sahara Hotel. The description is very limited,
however detectives believe the suspect is possibly a homeless man. due to the location
and time o f occurrence. No other information is given at this time.
Officer Jones is a hardworking policeman and is familiar with many of the
homeless people living near the Sahara. He talks to several homeless men and receives
information that the suspect is presently hiding out near the railroad tracks. Officer Jones
also learns a detailed description of the suspect and his moniker (street name).
Officer Jones is presently number one on the list for the Detective Bureau, and
realizes that this arrest will be his ticket into becoming a detective. Rather than sharing
this information with other officers he decides to keep it to himself, hoping he will make
the arrest himself. Despite his best efforts he was imsuccessftil in apprehending the
suspect during his shift, he secures (ends his shift), hoping that he’ll catch the suspect
tomorrow.
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The next morning in briefing. Officer Jones learns that this suspect has
committed another rape. Unfortunately, last night the victim was murdered after she tried
to resist. Officer Jones now fears he will be severely disciplined after all the facts are
uncovered.
Questions for squad members
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Should Officer Jones remain silent about the information, hoping it doesn’t surface?
Was he being honest by withholding information about the suspect?
Is concealing information ever morally j ustifled?
Should Officer Jones be disciplined?
Is it true that sharing his information would have diminished its value toward
becoming a detective?
Scenarios can easily be discussed in squad briefings. The briefing room is ideal

for this type of training. This setting allows for supervisors to train officers in a short
amount of time in a comfortable environment. These type of discussions serve to
improve relationships among squad members. The supervisor can also reinforce
departmental values among his/her officers during this time. Realistic scenarios serve to
stimulate officers into thinking about the ethical challenges they face.
Different scenarios can be given each month. Officers, supervisors and the
bureau commander should be involved in selecting scenarios. This will result in current
challenges being discussed within an ethical frame. Encouraging officers to think of
issues within an ethical frame is a large step in the right direction. Important topics to be
included would be justice: truthfulness, moral courage, whistle-blowing, isolationism,
excessive force, individual accoimtability and maintaining public trust. These training
sessions will translate into better performance on the streets.
In addition to briefing room training, officers should attend an annual eight-hour
class in ethics. This class would include a review of the oath of office, code o f ethics and
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a discussion of the police role in our democracy. This training needs to be mandatory for
all ranks. Contemporary challenges facing the department (e.g.. budget cuts, diversity
issues, internal scandals) should be discussed during this training. This training will serve
to improve the work culture and improve service to the community. As seen in Chapter
Two o f this thesis, officers survive in an organizational culture that often undermines
moral soundness. Training will reduce this negative undercurrent by augmenting officers'
characters.
Officers need to maintain high ethical standards throughout their careers. Ethical
knowledge needs to be imparted to officers on a regular basis if they are to remain
morally sound. This will also serve to improve the existing organizational culture.
Executives striving to improve their departments will ensure the ethical training is of high
quality and continuous.
By reviewing case studies, officers will see how other officers have tarnished
their badges, thus being better able to avoid similar situations. New York City Police
Commissioner Howard Safir has recently begun such an initiative within his department.
“An untapped resource for promoting integrity is having cops who did get into trouble
recount their experiences and what they learned to other cops.”-"^
Ensuring that officers receive ethics training throughout their careers will be
sending a clear message, “ethical conduct is demanded from all members of this
department.” Ethical soundness needs to be included in decision making at all levels of
the organization. By acknowledging such issues as corruption, brutality, the code o f
'^Stephen J. Gaffigan, Police Integrity. Public Service With Honor. U.S.
Department of Justice, (quotation firom NYPD Commissioner Howard Safir),
January 1997, p28.
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silence and accepting gratuities, officers will be knowledgeable of these challenges and
better prepared to deal with them.

Second Step (Misconduct Prevention)
Moreover, we must watch the errors which have the greatest attraction for us
personally. For the natural inclination o f one man differs from that of another, and
we each come to recognize our own by observing the pleasure and pain produced in
us (by the different extremes). We must draw ourselves away in the opposite
direction, for by pulling away from error we shall reach the middle, as men do
when they straighten warped timber.^"
Crime prevention is an important factor in reducing crime. Most people commit
crimes because they have both the predisposition and the opportunity to act. This is the
reason why citizens are told to lock their doors, walk on well lite streets and not leave
their vehicles unattended while the engine is running. The same logic needs to be applied
in the area of police misconduct. By reducing opportunity we are likely to have a lower
level o f police misconduct. The converse will also be true.
Preventative measures need to be in place to reduce misconduct. In Chapter One
it was noted that throughout the history of American policing, certain factors have been
present in localities where misconduct is high. Whether it be in New York, Philadelphia.
New Orleans or Los Angeles, certain warning signs existed prior to major scandals. My
argument is that police executives can reduce misconduct by being preventative.
Leaders can reduce misconduct by following these recommendations:
1.

Ensure thorough background checks are conducted on all police candidates. This is
an important process and should never be compromised. Background investigators
need to be thoroughly trained and carry manageable caseloads so they can be

^“Martin Ostwald, Nicomachean Ethics, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1962, Book II
(NE1109b2-6).
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effective. History has shown that when background checks are not properly done,
misconduct is inevitable. The infamous ‘Miami River Cops* were hired due to
shoddy background checks. This is an area where quality should never take a
backseat to cost savings.
2.

An appeal process needs to be in place to address conflicts. This provides a
mechanism allowing officers to have their case presented before an objective party.
This process should not turn into ‘let’s make a deal,’ where discipline is reduced
similar to plea bargaining in a criminal case. If officers view this process as a
method to reduce discipline, as opposed to an unbiased hearing, frivolous appeals
will be tiled.

3.

Drug testing should be mandatory throughout the department. This testing should
include pre-employment, random and reasonable suspicion. Pre-employment should
take place before a position is offered to a candidate. The test must be given without
prior notice to the candidate, during the background check. Random testing should
occur on at least a monthly basis. Names can be randomly selected and the employee
is notified they have to submit to a test. The employee should report to the testing
facility within 24 hours o f notification. Reasonable suspicion testing is when an
employee’s behavior is consistent with a person who is under the influence of a
controlled substance. These tests should be given when the facts known to the
investigator or supervisor would lead a prudent person to believe the employee is
under the influence.

4.

Ensure safeguards will exist in covert assignments (Vice, Narcotics and
Intelligence). Working undercover requires an officer to act like a criminal in the
furtherance of a criminal investigation. This role has a major impact on the offlcer.
whether or not the officer is aware of it. These assignments should ensure officers
are rotated at least every two years. The argument against this is that the unit will
suffer due to a lack o f experience. This can be remedied by allowing officers to
return after a six-month assignment back in Patrol. Officers should be cleared by a
psychologist prior to being transferred back into a covert assignment. These units
can stagger the transfers o f seasoned officers, so that a certain number remain. The
minor disruption in productivity of the unit, is far outweighed by the benefit to
individual officers. Allowing officers to remain in covert assignments indefinitely is
detrimental to both the officers and the department.

5.

Supervisory accountability is the main factor influencing police misconduct.
Holding all supervisors accoimtable for the actions o f their subordinates is essential
in reducing police misconduct. Records can be maintained on the number and type
o f all complaints filed. These can be tracked under division, bureau, shift and squad.
When a squad receives a high number of complaints, the supervisor needs to be held
accountable. Computer software is available that could generate reports which
produce this valuable information. Only when supervisors are held accountable can
we expect misconduct to be reduced.
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6.

History has shown officers who engage in severe misconduct typically have a
lengthy record of complaints. In the majority of these cases, past complaints were
not adjudicated properly. All complaints must be adjudicated thoroughly. In cases
where investigations were 'swept imder the carpet,' the investigator needs to be held
accoimtable for his/he actions.

7.

An early warning system needs to be developed alerting supervisors o f officers
having performance problems. This system needs to track all complaints filed
against an officer and inform their chain of command after a certain number of
complaints are logged. Ideally, this system will monitor entire squads, measuring
the quality of supervision. This system can be used to improve the performance of
the identified officer. This system should be non-punitive. serving only to put the
officer on notice.

8.

An Employees Assistance Program needs to be available. This program is designed
to have peer and professional counseling available to all officers. Since police work
is a stressful profession, it is imperative that these resources are available.
Employees utilizing this resource need to remain confidential, unless they are a
threat to themselves or others.

9.

Integrity tests should be conducted on a routine basis, particularly in low income
areas. All these tests are conducted imder a controlled environment. These tests can
be as simple as having an officer respond to a found wallet call. The wallet contains
a few hundred dollars in cash. After the wallet is impounded all the cash must be
included. If the money is not impounded, the officer is a thief.
Other forms of these tests can be acclimated toward the most common

complaints received in an area. If minorities are complaining about having their rights
violated at a certain location, an integrity test can be useful. An undercover officer that is
a member of the minority, can go to the location and see what type treatment he or she
receives. Opponents o f integrity testing argue, “it is setting up fellow officers.” This is
not valid, because honest officers have nothing to fear.
Integrity tests are comparable to conducting a vice sting operation. Many 'Johns’
allege entrapment during their trials. Courts have held in the majority o f cases this is not
entrapment. These operations only allow the act to occur, they do not entice the suspect to
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commit the crime. The same is true of these tests, the officer is. or is not. predisposed to
commit the violation. To assert integrity tests are entrapping officers is invalid. Integrity
tests can be a valuable tool in combating police misconduct.

Third Step (Rewarding Virtuous Conduct)
Police leadership has a responsibility to not only monitor and address
misconduct, they also must be vigilant on commending virtuous behavior. This is
consistent with Aristotle's pleasure/pain test (reference Chapter Three of this thesis).
Employees need to know virtuous conduct is valued by their agency. It is very common
to see an officer receive a special award for arresting an armed suspect. I will argue that
virtuous conduct also needs to be commended.
As we observed in Chapter Two. police organizational culture encourages
isolationism and conformity. These two qualities can be minimized by rewarding virtuous
conduct. Both on and off duty conduct should be considered when acknowledging
conduct. These awards can be linked directly into the promotional process. This will have
the dual benefit of acknowledging virtuous conduct and promoting employees that mirror
departmental values.
The following serves as an illustration of this reward system in action. Officer
Smith is a seven-year officer and is assigned as a Commimity Oriented Policing Officer
in a low income neighborhood. Through contact with residents in his area he learns of
several high school students who cannot afford to go to college because of financial
reasons. Smith coordinates with a large company in the area, and facilitates the youths
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getting weekend jobs along with scholarships to a local college. Command officers learn
o f his actions from civic leaders who are impressed with Smith’s initiative.
Smith should be officially recognized by his department. This award needs to
become part of his personnel file which will be viewed by the promotional board. The
Personnel Bureau should include a certain percentage of the score for community
involvement. If 10% of the total score were set aside for this area. Officer Smith would
have an advantage in the promotional process. By identifying 'communit>' involvement’
as part of the promotional criteria the department will reduce isolationism. Another
benefit o f this would be promoting officers who have a record of virtuous conduct.
Other areas o f community involvement that should be recognized would include
coaching, tutoring, serving on town boards and other types of volunteering. These
activities are actually functions o f good citizenship. My position is that good citizenship
is a prerequisite to being a good officer.
Conformity is another trait highly valued in the police culture. In addressing
this, officers need to be recognized for developing their own initiatives. An officer who
enrolls in computer classes, Spanish classes or other subjects that will improve his or her
value to the department should be recognized. The department should pay for these
classes, and ensure his or her initiative is documented in their personnel file. This file is
viewed by the promotional board and will improve chances of the individual being
promoted.
The emerging economy is based on knowledge, imagination, curiosity and
talent. What if we could leam to tap the wonderful, rich differences among people?
Wouldn’t a corporation that could exploit the uniqueness o f each o f its 1,100
employees (or 10 or 10,000) be that phenomenally powerful? Put negatively, isn’t a
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corporation that doesn’t figure out how to use the special curiosities of its people
headed for trouble?^'
True leadership goes a long way in reducing conformity. When a leader talks
with an officer about expanding his or her horizons (college classes, specialized training
or temporary assignments), officers are greatly influenced. Leaders have a responsibility
to look for officers who possess attributes that can improve their departments. This is one
of the cornerstones of community policing. Such a policy of recognition encourages
officers to fill roles that requires them to exceed normal expectations.
Police leaders must also be aware, as we learned in Chapter Two, ‘whistle
blowing' often serves to destroy the career of the ‘whistle blower.’ Any discussion of
virtuous conduct would be incomplete without considering this subject. The personal
trauma that the officer goes through needs to be addressed.
Typically, during an internal investigation several personal conflicts are taking
place. The targeted officer is ‘imder the gun,’ however, he or she has support. The union,
fellow officers and friends rally to assist them during this time. The investigating officer
does not enjoy conducting the investigation, although he or she is just doing their job.
The most difficult position in the process is being the wimess officer. He or She has to
give testimony against a fiiend, and will be labeled as a snitch’ by other officers. He or
She does not have the support of their union or fellow officers. As seen in Chapter Two,
many officers are not courageous enough and lie.
Supervisors can guide witness officers through this period by focusing on the
virtues o f justice, good loyalty and truthfulness. Leaders must be supportive to officers

^'Tom Morris, If Aristotle Ran General Motors. New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1998, (quotation from Tom Peters) p i86.
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facing this internal conflict. Witness officers need to be reassured by superiors that
telling the truth is most important. It is up to their super\dsor to ensure other officers are
not being disruptive in the work environment (making comments, not backing the officer
up). The superior should also consider having the witness officer contact the Employee's
Assistance Program during this difficult time.

Fourth Step (Zero Tolerance For Untruthftilness)
Administrators need to take a zero tolerance' approach to lying. This statement
may seem simple enough. However it will have a major impact on the entire department.
As was discussed in Chapter Two. the code of silence is synonymous with lying. To
handle misconduct in an ethical way, this mandate must be communicated to all officers Lying will not be tolerated.
This communication has to be more than mere lip service, it must become
reality. A policy needs to be written in stating this fact. An example of such a policy is as
follows:
“Truthfulness is required by all members o f this Department. All sustained
complaints o f 'untruthfulness’ will result in at least a 40-hour suspension without pay"
As shown in Chapter Two. discipline for this violation presently ranges from an
oral warning to termination. This policy would demonstrate to all officers that
administrators take this violation seriously. Having a serious punishment will serve as a
deterrent to officers who are contemplating being untruthful. This would also put the
union in the unique position of advising witness officers to be honest as opposed to
sticking with the story.
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A policy also needs to be written to inform all officers that observing
misconduct and failing to intervene and report the incident will result in disciplinary
action. Again, by mandating these activities into policy, the administration is taking a
solid step in the right direction. Such a policy might read:
“All Officers have the duty to report misconduct to their Bureau Commander
prior to securing their shift. Officers also have a duty to intervene in incidents of
misconduct and immediately notify the on-duty Lieutenant. Violation of this policy will
result in disciplinary action.”
This policy will demonstrate to all officers that code of silence will not be
tolerated. By addressing the virtues of truthfulness and duty, a perennial message will be
sent to all employees; Lying will not be tolerated!
Changing the organizational culture will encourage officers to think about
situations from an ethical frame. Good supervisors and peers will support officers who
are involved in difficult situations. Officers will see that honesty is important within the
organizational culture.

Fifth Step (Empower The Internal Affairs Bureau)
An important element in any reform strategy needs to include the empowerment
o f the Internal Affairs Bureau (lAB). This Bureau needs to have the support and resources
necessary to accomplish their mission. lABs missions may vary slightly, depending upon
jurisdiction. In most agencies, however lAB is responsible for investigating and
monitoring misconduct complaints.
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lAB needs to report directly to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of tlie agency.
Obviously, in large departments, daily operations need to be supervised by a lesser rank,
but they must have the ability to report directly to the CEO. This allows for the CEO to
know immediately the status of on-going internal investigations. This also reduces the
chance o f facts being altered, in an effort to put the best spin on cases.
lAB Investigators need to be selected by the CEO. These selections must to be
based on past performance and outstanding integrity. All investigators should be at least
the rank o f Sergeant, due to the fact most investigations concern police officers. These
investigators should be highly respected throughout the department and have experience
as an investigator prior to consideration.
As mentioned in Chapter Three, to be effective in lAB, investigators must
possess certain skills. lAB investigators should receive the best training available to assist
them. When an lAB investigator is selected, they should be notified their conduct, both
on and off duty must be above reproach. Any misconduct will result in a transfer out of
lAB. Investigators who have successfully served in this assignment should be assisted in
the promotional process.
lAB needs to investigate all complaints of misconduct, both administrative and
criminal. Opponents to this argue, “Since as explained in Chapter Two. employees are
required under Garrity to give statements to lAB investigators, criminal prosecutions will
be tainted." This position is invalid, since when conducting a criminal investigation.
Garrity is not given. In fact, investigators make it clear to the suspect employee what
type o f investigation is being conducted. The mere presence o f an lAB investigator does
not mean the investigation is only administrative.
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When criminal cases involving employees are assigned to other bureaus, much is
lost. Regular detectives tend to have a heavy caseload, which results in lengthy delays.
Also the facts o f the case need to go through additional levels of command, resulting in
distortions. Sending investigations outside lAB results in delays, coverups and a lack of
quality.
When a criminal case requires specialized expertise (e.g. Forgery. Sexual
Assault. Homicide), investigators from the concerned detail can assist. However lAB
needs to be responsible for the outcome. By allowing lAB to be responsible for all
investigations both the quality and the integrity will be of a higher standard. This reduces
the chance of a coverup.

Sixth Step (Disciplinary Matrix)
The most subjective phase of the disciplinary process is the decision. What is
the proper penalty?’ This step examines the process utilized in deciding appropriate
corrective action. The present system utilized when making these decisions is a
consideration of several factors. The most common considerations are the severity of the
complaint, the prior history o f the concerned employee and whether the violation was due
to a lack of training. In 1996. the Minneapolis Police Department implemented a
disciplinary matrix to be used when making disciplinary decisions. The use o f a
disciplinary matrix has outstanding benefits for law enforcement and is consistent with
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.
This current process lacks any formalized procedure. In reality, for most
supervisors it is on-the-job training. This step will advocate the use of a disciplinary

R e p r o d u c e d w ith p e r m issio n o f th e co p y rig h t o w n er . F u rth er rep ro d u ctio n p roh ib ited w ith o u t p e r m issio n .

102
matrix in making these decisions. Supervisors can be educated on proper utilization of
this matrix with minimal training. The matrix also includes a supervisory check list,
ensuring all factors are reviewed.
This matrix is designed to ensure corrective actions are equitable and consistent
throughout the department. One of the most common complaints about the discipline
process is 'It’s not a matter of what you did. it's a matter of who you work for.' In large
departments it is very difficult for top administrators to be knowledgeable of all
misconduct complaints. With this fact in mind, ensuring corrective actions are equitable
is extremely difficult. This responsibility is typically delegated down to a Sergeant or
Lieutenant. This results in a wide variance of discipline imposed imder similar
circumstances, depending upon the Bureau making the decision.
Many factors are important to consider while making these decisions. As we
learned in Chapter Three, equity requires us to weigh the facts of the particular case
during the deliberation process. This matrix requires the supervisor to examine all the
mitigating circumstances concerning the particular case. By using weighting factors' the
supervisor will be able to determine appropriate discipline (within the range) to reach an
equitable decision.
This matrix is not designed to remove supervisory discretion from the
disciplinary process. It is best described as a method for grouping similar offenses into a
range o f corrective actions. The supervisor must weigh other factors (weighting factors),
and arrive at an appropriate decision. Utilizing this matrix will also increase consistency
in disciplinary decisions throughout police departments. The use of this matrix will also
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serve to ensure supervisors are conducting quality deliberations when facing these
difficult decisions.
When making decisions concerning discipline a certain amount of subjectivity is
involved. This is a factor in many cases being modified or completely overturned during
the Appeal Process. An example of this would be a veteran officer who receives a
sustained complaint for using profanity while interviewing an elderly lady during a traffic
stop. His Sergeant, who is a good friend, believes the discipline should be an oral
warning. His Lieutenant believes the officer should be suspended. Both (Sergeant and
Lieutenant) can present strong arguments supporting their position. Either decision may
be the correct one in this situation; typically a compromise would be reached. Using this
matrix will allow these decisions to be more objective.
In using this matrix, supervisors will still have a range of disciplinary actions
(within the category) to select from. By completing the checklist, supervisors will be able
to make better quality decisions. The supervisor will document his/her decision in a
report which explains their deliberation. This report will serve as an e.xcellent training
tool and facilitates the appeal process.
Making disciplinary decisions is a difficult process. Using this matrix will
establish a formalized process which ensures all-important factors are considered before a
final decision is made. While this process will not make these decisions effortless, it will
provide a road-map for supervisors to follow, thus reducirig much confusion.
Since the goal o f this matrix is to improve the organizational culture, honesty
and communication are essential dining this change process. To best implement this
matrix, all department employees need to be trained on the matrix. Employees should be
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given the reasons for this change (equity in disciplinary decisions, consistency) and the
importance o f it. Having informed employees will result in less opposition during the
change process. Nothing contained in this matrix should be kept a secret In fact, openness
is essential.
This matrix also provides a deterrent benefit. When officers know the range of
discipline beforehand, they will be less likely to engage in the violation. In Step Four, we
used the same logic concerning 'untruthfulness.' Officers need to know that an action
(misconduct) will result in certain consequences (discipline).

Bureau Commander's Role Using the Disciplinary Matrix
After an internal investigation is completed, a notification is sent to the
employee’s bureau commander. The bureau commander will review the completed
Investigative Report and meet with the investigator. A decision will than be made by the
bureau commander as to which 'Category' the sustained violation falls under.
The category in which a violation is placed will dictate which range of corrective
action the employee will receive. The bureau commander will document his or her
classification in a report which will be included in the complaint package. Copies of this
package are given to the employee and their supervisor.
The decision as to which category is selected must be objective. The bureau
commander needs to focus solely on the facts o f the investigation during this process.
Factors such as the personnel history of the employee, number of prior violations, and
commendations are weighing factors which should not be considered during this phase.
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The following are definitions of each category, followed by examples of
justifications. These justifications are not all inclusive and can overlap between
categories.

Category "A” Violation
Category “A” violations will result in either an oral or written reprimand.
1. The incident resulted in minor injury or damage to property.
2. The incident was the result of a lack o f training, as opposed to an intentional
disregard o f policy or law.
3.

The incident happened so quickly, the employee had no time to seek advice.
Category “B” Violation

Category “B” violations will result in discipline stronger than a written, not to exceed a
suspension o f more than 40 hours.
1.

The incident resulted in moderate injury or damage to property.

2.

The employee had time to seek advice before acting (time was not a factor).

3.

The act was not the result of a lack of training.

4.

The act was an intentional disregard o f policy or law.
Category “C” Violation

Category “C” violations will result in a suspension over 40 hours, but not to exceed 120
hours.
1.

The incident resulted in serious injury or damage to property.

2.

The employee’s actions violated the code of ethics, oath of office or department
values.

3.

The employee’s actions jeopardized the status o f a criminal investigation.

4.

The act was a deliberate violation of policy or law.
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Category "D” Violation
Category “D” violations will result in suspensions over 120 hours, demotion, termination
or criminal charges.
1. The employee committed a criminal act.
2. The conduct was so outrageous that attempts to correct performance would be
fruitless.
3.

The employee's actions violated the code of ethics, oath of office or department
values.

4.

The act was a deliberate violation o f policy or law.

5.

The employee's actions jeopardized the status o f a criminal investigation.

6.

The conduct demonstrated a lack o f integrity.
Consistency and wisdom in the bureau commander’s decision as to which

category to use is imperative to the success of this matrix. Commimicating with the
investigator and thoroughly reviewing the case file is crucial. After a decision concerning
the categor>' is reached, the employee’s personnel file must be researched. In cases where
the employee had a previous sustained complaint for the same violation, the category may
be moved up.
An example would be if a decision were made to categorize an excessive force
complaint as an “A ” and the officer’s file contains a previous force complaint which
occurred 6 months before, the category could be changed to a “B ” for the new complaint.
The reason for not reviewing the file until after a decision has been made is to increase
objectivity. This change must also be documented in the report submitted by the bureau
commander.
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Supervisor’s Role Using Disciplinary Matrix
When a supervisor receives a complaint package from his/her bureau
commander, he or she must review the matrix to determine the appropriate range of
corrective action. Based upon which classification the violation is assigned, the
supervisor now has a range of actions to take. This decision requires the supervisor to
weigh many factors.
Weighing factors are additional points that need to be considered when
determining equitable discipline, excluding the violation itself. Where the bureau
commander based his or her decision on the act itself, the supervisor focuses primarily on
the actor (employee). Again, it is important that these decisions remain objective.
The following are examples of negative weighing factors. These will increase
the level of discipline (within the range):
1.

Employee has a poor work history, substantiated by negative evaluations and critical
incidents.

2.

Employee is not remorseful about the incident.

3.

Employee refuses to take responsibility, instead makes excuses.

4.

Employee is not receptive toward training.
The following are examples of positive weighing factors. These would justify

minimal discipline (within the range):
1.

Employee has good work history. Substantiated by positive evaluations and
commendable actions.

2.

Employee takes responsibility and is remorseful.

3.

Employee is receptive toward training.
To assist supervisors in this process a checklist is provided. This checklist needs
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to be completed by supervisors and will be included in the complaint package. This
checklist would include these below steps:
1. Utilize matrix to determine range of corrective action
2. Review Investigative Report
3. Reviewed employee's personnel file
4.

Interview employee concerning incident

5. List all positive and negative weighing factors
6.

Make a determination concerning appropriate discipline

7.

Attain approval from intermediate level of supervision and inform employee

8.

Completes all reports, ensuring weighing factors are given to justify discipline

9.

Serves discipline on employee, ensuring a copy of complaint package is given to
employee

10. Advises employee of appeal process
When the supervisor determines the weighing factors, it is essential that he or
she dociunents their decision in a report which will be included in the complaint package.
This report, coupled with the bureau commander’s, will serve to justify why a certain
corrective action was taken. The employee can review the decision making process and
will better imderstand why the action was taken.
While this matrix is certainly not offered as being a panacea, it is a major step in
the right direction!

Conclusion
This final chapter focused on positive steps which can be taken to improve
police organizations. These improvements are aimed at an organizational culture, in dire
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need o f reform. This culture plays a pivotal role influencing the level of misconduct
within the organization. By improving this culture we will make positive reform in the
disciplinary process and improve quality of police service. As cautioned in the beginning
of this chapter, “positive change will not occur overnight.' While all six of these steps
impact police misconduct, they will also serve to improve the entire organization.
The first three steps serve as global organizational changes. Step One calls for
ethics training to be continuous throughout all officers’ careers. Step Two requires
leaders to be preventive in reducing misconduct. This step is compared to crime
prevention, in that limiting the opportunity will reduce misconduct. Step Three is simply
for the department to recognize virtuous conduct. This recognition includes acts both on
and off duty. This will show officers that being a good citizen is an essential element in
being a good officer.
The last three steps focus on police misconduct. Step Four is for leaders to take a
zero tolerance' toward lying. Officers caught lying need to be strongly disciplined. Two
policy recommendations are included to memorialize this paradigm shift. This step will
weaken the code o f silence and improve organizational culture. Step Five is to ensure the
Internal Affairs Bureau (LAB) has support from the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). lAB
needs to report directly to the CEO. They also must be responsible for all misconduct
complaints both criminal and administrative. This will improve quality and reduce the
chances o f a coverup.
Step Six calls for the use o f a disciplinary matrix when deciding corrective
actions. This matrix will allow the CEO to establish ranges of corrective actions for all
violations into four categories. When a complaint is sustained, the employee’s bureau
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commander decides which category Is most appropriate. This decision is based on
reviewing the complaint file, interviewing the Investigator and focusing on the act itself.
After his/her decision, a report is included in the complaint package and it is sent down to
the employee's supervisor. This report will document how the bureau commander arrived
at his or her decisions as to which category is appropriate.
The supervisor will use weighing factors to determine the discipline to be meted
out. These weighing factors will focus on the actor, as opposed to the act. Things such as
work history, attitude o f employee and experience, are examples o f weighing factors.
After the supervisor completes his/her deliberation they will complete a report, listing all
the weighing factors used in their decision. This report will also be included in the
complaint package. This matrix will serve to make discipline more equitable and
consistent throughout the department.
Since, at the present time there is no formalized process used when making
disciplinary decisions, the matrix will provide additional benefits. Supervisors will have a
checklist to use. which will serve as a road map when making these difficult decisions.
With the bureau commander and supervisor's reports in the complaint package the
employee should realize the decision was equitable. These reports will also be valuable
during any appeal process. This matrix will also serve as a deterrent to employees by
knowing the penalties assigned to certain violations.

Summary
Cities will have no respite from evil, my dear Glaucon, nor will the human
race. I think, unless philosophers rule as kings in the cities, or those whom we now
call kings and rulers genuinely and adequately study philosophy, until, that is.
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political power and philosophy coalesce, and the various natures o f those who now
pursue one to the exclusion of tlie other are forcibly debarred from doing so/While the first three chapters of this thesis brought up many challenges. Chapter
Four serves to lay out a path for improvement. By examining challenges from a
normative frame, we have utilized philosophy to reveal this path. The obstacles we
encoimtered during this journey were cleverly disguised as being formidable. In reality,
they were simple.
In Chapter One we explored the history of American policing. Due to corrupt
local politicians desiring to increase power, the early years of policing in America were
riddled with misconduct. Policing was reflective of the corrupt local political machinery
o f the day. Despite the best efforts of police reformers little progress was made until the
1930s.
During the 1930s (Scientific Management Period) much o f the political
involvement was removed. Police became thought of as crime fighters' instead of
political bullies.' Replacing political oversight was the creation o f civil service boards.
These boards are still in existence today.
From 1940 through the 1960s. the police were not open to the public. The
thinking was that since the police were the only experts on fighting crime, citizen
involvement was not necessary. During this period, despite much police misconduct, the
police were a "closed society.'
Beginning in the 1960s the media played a large part in exposing police
misconduct. Numerous acts o f unrestrained police misconduct were broadcasted on

^-Tom Morris, If Aristotle Ran General Motors. New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1998, (Socrates, according to Plato), p i75.
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television sets across the country. Incidents liked the Democratic National Convention in
1968, racial confrontations and Vietnam protests showed police response as being greatly
flawed. The public was realizing that police misconduct was a serious problem. The
movie based on Frank Serpico, showed that the largest police department in the United
States had systemic corruption and a very powerful code of silence.
In the 1970s and 80s, the police welcomed community involvement. The image
o f the police greatly improved during these decades, in large part due to the television and
movie industries. Programs such as D.A.R.E and Neighborhood Watch were created
during this period. In the 80s, Community Oriented Policing (COP) began. COP is a
parmership between the police and citizens living in the community to work together to
solve problems. With COP, public trust reached an all time high. The subject o f police
misconduct was not seen as a serious problem during this period of time.
On March 3,1991. the video taped arrest of Rodney King resulted in destroying
much o f the public trust nationwide. During the 90s. police misconduct has been at the
forefront o f much academic discourse. Numerous police scandals surfaced nationwide.
The code of silence is still alive and strong in American policing.
In Chapter Two the code of silence was examined. This code may be best
described as officers lying to protect fellow officers engaged in misconduct. We noted
that the police organizational culture serves to perpetuate this code. Isolationism and
conformity are highly valued in this culture. Both of these traits serve as a catalyst to the
spread o f the code of silence.
The organizational culture encourages isolationism, conformity and misguided
loyalty. It is contrary to the code of ethics and oath of office, which all officers swear to
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uphold. Before the code of silence can be reduced, the organizational culture needs to be
modified. As explained in Chapter Two. if departments ensure the virtues of truth, justice
and good loyalty are paramount in their agencies, positive change will result.
Police Executives often use the "rotten apple' idea to minimize police
misconduct. This is detrimental to the agency because it serves to hide the underlying
systemic problems. The code o f silence conceals the existence of wide spread
organizational problems. For this reason, executives have been hesitant to admit its
existence, or minimize its negative impact.
Since the code of silence is synonymous with lying, reform efforts need to be
directed at the virtue o f truthfulness. Meting out light discipline to officers who are
caught lying is condoning untruthfulness.
In Chapter Three citizen review boards were examined. Citizen review boards
are differentiated into four classifications, depending upon the extent of citizen control.
Class two, three and four Citizen Review Boards, include both citizen and commissioned
officers. These boards are design to improve the quality o f complaint processes, by
having citizens and officers work together or solutions.
Class One Citizen Review Boards are composed entirely o f citizens. These
boards have skyrocketed across America during the past decade. Most of these boards
have been established in response to public outrage over an act of police misconduct.
These boards remove police leadership from the disciplinary process, and are designed to
investigate individual acts, not organizational ills. Removing police management from
these important decisions is dangerous.
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Class One Citizen Review Boards have been ineffective in reducing the level or
severity of police misconduct. New York City and Philadelphia both have a long history
with Class One Citizen Review Boards. They were created and terminated due to their
ineffectiveness. New boards are created in both these cities after a new scandal surfaces.
Class One Citizen Review Boards do not have the time, resources or expertise to
conduct these investigations. Historically, they have not reduced misconduct. They are
more lenient on suspect officers than traditional Internal Affairs Bureaus. Class One
Citizen Review Boards are dangerous because they look only at individual incidents and
they remove management responsibility. These boards are not consistent with Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics, since they lack the expertise to adjudicate complaints equitably.
In Chapter Four, six steps are laid out to improve police departments. These
steps are aimed at advancing the organizational cultm-e. It is believed that by improving
this organizational culture, quality of police service will improve. These steps are not
highly technical, nor do they create a great fiscal burden. .All that is required is a
commitment from leadership to deal with police misconduct in an ethical way.
Step One is to provide ethics training to all officers throughout their careers. The
majority of this training consists of discussing challenges facing officers from an ethical
frame. Having officers talking about the ethical challenges they face will pay dividends,
improving the organizational culture. Mandatory armual ethics training will ensure
officers are knowledgeable of the important role they play in our society.
Step Two is for leaders to ensure they are practicing misconduct prevention.
This is the same logic behind crime prevention. By removing the most common
opportunities for police misconduct, we will reduce misconduct. Several generalities have
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been noted in the majority o f police scandals: Problem employees who have not been
addressed, weak supervision and officers serving in lengthy assignments in covert
assignments are only some o f the most common elements in most scandals. Leaders must
leam from the mistakes of others. Ensuring all misconduct complaints are properly
adjudicated, holding supervisors accountable and rotating officers from covert
assignments, will reduce the likelihood for misconduct.
In Step Three we recognize officers who consistently exhibit virtuous conduct.
This is consistent with Aristotle's Pleasure Pain Test (e.xplained in Chapter Three).
People prefer to engage in behavior which brings pleasure. Conduct, both on and off
duty, needs to be considered. Officers need to realize being a good citizen is an essential
element in being a good officer. This also needs to be incorporated into the promotional
process.
Step Four calls for a zero tolerance approach' when it comes to untruthfulness.
.As we learned throughout this thesis, the code of silence is synonymous with lying. Two
policies are recommended for leaders wanting to reduce the code of silence. Officers
caught lying need to receive strong discipline. Also, wimess officers have a duty to
intervene and report misconduct, or face discipline. The virtues of justice, truthfulness
and good loyalty must be the goal of all officers.
Step Five is the empowerment of the Internal Affairs Bureau (lAB).
Investigators assigned to lAB need to report directly to the Chief Executive Officer
(CEO). They need to be people of high integrity, with proven investigative skills. lAB
should investigate all police misconduct complaints, both administrative and criminal.
This will increase the quality of these investigations and reduce the chance o f coverups.
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lAB also needs to work with a citizens committee to ensure good communications. This
will assist in maintaining a high level of public trust.
The final recommendation. Step Six advises police leaders to utilize a
disciplinary matrix when making disciplinary decisions. This matrix will formalize the
disciplinary process, providing a checklist for supervisors to follow. Utilizing this matrix
will result in these difficult decisions being equitable. Serving to make this process more
objective, and consistent will improve the work enviroment.
This matrix will provide a deterrent value. Officers knowing the range of
discipline for violations will be less likely to engage in misconduct. This matrix is
consistent with Aristotle’s view of equity. By allowing weighing factors we are
evaluating all the facts of a case.
Besides being legally and morally sound, this matrix is very simple to
implement. The following is offered to illustrate its simplicity. The matrix, like the other
five steps, does not require a large expense nor is it highly technical. A conunitment to do
'the right thing’ is all that is needed.

DISCIPLINARYMATRIX
CLASS
:A B
2/108.03

Harmony and Cooperation Within the Department

2/108.04 Voiding Citations
1/301.05 Neglect o f Duty
1/301.06 Incompetence
2/108.03 Harmony and Cooperation Within the Department
2/108.04 Voiding Citations
2/110.02 Constitutional Requirements During Criminal Investigations
2/114.00 Political Activities Policy
2/120.00 Affirmative Action/equal Employment Opportunity Plan
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DISCIPLINARY MATRIX
VIOLATION

CLASS
A B C D

Civil Service Rules
510

Standards o f Conduct

620

Attendance

670

Sick Leave

960

Unsatisfactory Service

965
970

Mental or Physical Disability
Misconduct

975

Abandonment o f Post
Regulations

4/100.00 Conformity to Rules and Regulations
4/100.01

Violation of Rules and Regulations

4/101.01

Disorderly Conduct

4/101.02 Consorting with Persons of 111 Repute
4/101.03

Fraternization Prohibited

4/101.04 Accepting Gifts from Suspects
4/101.05 Soliciting Special Privileges
4/101.06 Neighborhood Disputes/Personal Arrests
4/101.09 Incurring Debts Within the Department
4/101.10 Acting as Bailor
4/101.11

Interfering with Lawful Private Business

4/101.12 Seeking Personal Preferment Through Outside Influence
4/101.13

Membership in Unions

4/101.14 Refusal to Testify
4/101.16 Release of Employee Information
4/101.18 Cheating on Employment/promotional Exams
4/102.02 Specific Duties
4/102.03

Performance of Duty

4/102.05

Protection o f Crime Scenes

4/102.06 Giving Assistance to Suspects
4/102.08 Work Attendance
4/102.09 Reporting for Duty
4/102.10 Being Available While on Duty
4/102.11

Neglect o f Duty

4/102.12 Courtesy
4/102.13 Detention Facility Security
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DISCIPLINARYMATRIX
VIOLATON

CLASS
A B C D

4/102.14 Care of Prisoners
4/102.15

Interviewing In-custody Prisoners

4/103.01

Conduct on Department Premises

4/103.02 Reading Newspapers on Duty
4/103.03

Smoking on Duty

4/103.04 Gambling on Duty
4/103.05

Shopping on Duty

4/103.06 Loitering
4/103.07 Sickness, Malingering
4/103.08

Sleeping on Duty

4/103.09 Use of Alcohol
4/103.11

Use of Narcotics and Controlled Substances

4/103.12 Display of Weapon
4/103.14 Public Statements about Controversial Subjects
4/103.15

Interviews with Non-department Persons

4/103.16 Political Activities
4/103.17 Public Statements about Private Businesses, Citizens or
Organizations
4/103.18 Traffic Arrests by Off Duty Officers
4/103.19 Giving Testimonials. Seeking Publicity
4/103.20

Subversive Acts Against the Department

4/103.22 Unauthorized Weapons and Ammunition
4/104.01

Reporting Disobedience

4/104.04 Obedience
4/104.05 Criticism of Official Acts
4/104.06 Criticism of Lawful Orders
4/104.08 Maintaining Manuals
4/104.09 Keeping Informed on Police Matters
4/105.03

False Report

4/105.04 False Information in Reports
Withholding Evidence
4/105.06 Duty to Report All Crimes, Vice. Incidents and Hazards
4/105.05

4/105.07 Completing Official Reports
4/105.08

Police Business Confidential

4/105.09 Removal of Official Records
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DISCIPLINARY MATRIX
CLASS

VIOLAHON

A B C D
4/105.10 Secret Witness Reference in Reports
Conduct Concerning Officers of Other Jurisdictions
4/106.02 Aiding and Protecting Fellow Officers
4/106.03 Supporting Fellow Officers
4/106.01

4/106.04 Interfering with Other Officers
4/106.06 Protection of Identities of Complainants and Sources of
Information
4/106.07 Protection of Identity of Undercover Operatives
4/106.08 Forum “Judge” Shopping
4/107.01

Personal Appearance

4/108.01

Court Attendance and Conduct

4/108.02 Court Cases
4/108.03 Recommending Attorneys or Bondsmen
4/108.04 Testifying for Defendant
4/108.05 Truthfulness Required at All Times
4/108.06 Assisting in Civil Cases to Be in Line of Duty
4/108.07 Testifying in Civil Cases to Be under Subpoena
4/108.08 Instituting Civil Action
4/108.09 Seeking or Accepting Compensation for Damages
4/108.10 Use of Position in Civil Cases Where Personally Involved
4/108.12 Defense Attorney Contacts
4/109.01

Operation of Department Vehicles

4/109.02 Operation and Occupancy of Vehicle by Unauthorized Person
4/109.03 Use of Department Vehicle to Move Another
4/109.07 Unauthorized Use Department Property, Facilities or Address
4/109.08 Misappropriation o f Property
4/109.09

Use of Privately Owned Vehicles on Police Business

4/109.10 Care of Property and Equipment
4/110.01 Maintaining Communications (Vehicle Stops)
4/110.02 Improper Communications
4/110.03 Radio Communications in Field Operations
4/110.05 Release of 9-1-1 Telephone Number and Address Information
5/101.24 Harassment and/or Discrimination; Prevention and Complaint
Process
5/101.52 Criminal Violations by Employees
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DISCIPLINARY MATRIX
VIOLATION
5/101.53

CLASS
A B C D

Domestic Abuse and DUI Violations by Employees

5/103.01 Soliciting or Accepting Donations
5/103.28 Reporting Damage to Department Property and Equipment
5/103.29 Reporting Department Vehicle Accidents
5/105.08 Signing In Loco Parentis
5/105.18 Dissemination of Criminal History Information (CHI)
5/105.22 Release of Investigative Reports
5/107.01

Sign Language Interpreters for Handicapped Persons

5/107.10 Traffic Enforcement
5/107.17 Stranded Motorist Assistance
5/108.06 In-Service Training Program
5/108.14 Firearms Training
5/108.16 Defensive Tactics
5/108.18

Drivers Training

5/109.01

Use o f Force

5/110.26 Department Drug Testing Program
5/110.28 Accident Review Board
5/200.02 Searches and Pat Downs of Persons
5/200.04 Motor Vehicle Searches
5/201.10 Executing Warrants o f Arrest
5/201.14 Arrest Without a Warrant for Domestic Violence
5/201.15 Orders for Protection (Restraining Orders)
5/201.20 Warrantless Entry into Private Premises
5/202.01 Transporting Prisoners
5/202.02 Arrest Procedures and Declaration of Arrest
5/202.04 Misdemeanor Citation And/or Arrest
5/202.08 Arrests Ex-felon Failure to Register/Ex-felon Failure Change
Address
5/202.17 In-custody Low Risk Misdemeanor Incidents
5/202.20 Disposition o f Arrested Subject’s Vehicle
5/202.21 Drawing o f Blood/obtaining Urine from Arrestees
5/203.02 Photographing/fingerprinting of Juveniles
5/203.06 Juvenile Citations and Reports
5/203.08 Juvenile Traffic Citations
5/203.10 Release o f Juvenile Information
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DISCIPLINARY MATRIX
VIOLATION

CLASS
A B C D

5/203.12 Juvenile Bookings
5/204.04 Taking or Making Crime Reports
5/204.06 Vehicle Impoimds, Releases, and Theft Reports
5/204.20 Missing Persons
5/205.01 Booking and Custody Processing of Prisoners
5/205.20 Prisoner Release
5/207.08

Department Take-home Vehicles

5/208.02 Authorized Firearms & Associated Equipment
5/208.04 Low Lethality Shotgims
5/208.22 Use o f the Department Armory
5/208.24 Special Weapons and Munitions
5/208.26 Use of Optional Rifles on Duty
5/208.28

Use o f Optional Shotguns on Duty

5/209.14 Voice Radio Communications
5/210.01

Preliminary Field Narcotic Test for Controlled Substances

5/210.02 Impoimding and Disposing of Recovered/found Bicycles
5/210.04 Booking Evidence and Property
5/210.05

Impounding and Disposing o f Evidence at Resident Officer Locations

5/210.08 Impounding and Disposing of Found or Safekeeping Property
5/210.09 Impounding and Releasing Money
5/210.10 Impounding and Releasing of Handguns
5/210.12 Handling o f Confiscated License Plates and Drivers’ Licenses
5/211.06 Tactical Operations Plans
5/213.05 Emergency Mobilization Plan
5/213.06 Major Incident Plan
5/213.08 Detention Facility Hostage Plan
5/213.10 Department Hostage Plan/barricaded Subject Plan
6/002.00 Use of Force
6/004.00 Transporting Prisoners
6/006.00 Arrest Procedures and Declaration of Arrest
6/010.00 Crime Scene Investigations
6/012.00 Code “3” Driving
6/014.00 Vehicular Pursuit
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OATH OF OFFICE

I, 1, do solemnly swear that I will support, protect, and defend the constitution and
government of the United States, and the constitution and government of the State of
Nevada, against all enemies, whether domestic or foreign, and that I will bear true
faith, allegiance, and loyalty to the same, any ordinance, resolution, or law of any
state notwithstanding, and that I will well and faithfully perform all the duties of the
office of
POLICE OFFICER on which I am about to enter; so help me God.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of December, 1999.
by:
Notary Public

Wimess

Witness
Remmed to/cc:

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
Personnel Bureau
Bank of America Center
101 Convention Center Drive, 2nd Floor
Las Vegas, NY 89109
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On my honor,
I will never betray my badge,
my integrity, my character
or the public trust.
I will always have
the courage to hold myself
and others accountable for our actions.
/ will always uphold the
laws established in the Constitution
of the United States, and
within the community I serve.

MEMBERS OF THE GRADUATING CLASS
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LAS VEQAS METROPOUTAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

GARRITY WARNING
I wish to advise you that you are being questioned a s part of an official
investigation by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. You will be
asked questions specifically directed and narrowly related to the performance
of your official duties or fitness for office. You are entitled to all the rights and
privileges guaranteed by the laws and Constitution of this State, and the
Constitution of the United States, including the right not to be compelled to
incriminate yourself.

I further wish to advise you that if you refuse to testify or to answer
questions relating to the performance of your official duties or fitness for duty,
you will be subject to Departmental charges, which could result in your
dismissal from the Police Department. If you do answer, neither your state
ments nor any information or evidence which is gained by reason of such
statements can b e used against you in any subsequent criminal proceeding.
However, th ese statem ents may be used against you in relation to subsequent
Departmental charges.

OMqw' s SignaiiM

WiMMir SignauM

Dw

w m trS ig n M M
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CHAPTER 289
PEACE OFFICERS
CROSS REFERENCES
Actions against peace officers for acts and omissions, MRS 41.0336
Actions by peace officers for personal injuries, NRS 41.139
Arrest, powers, NRS 171.124
Certification and training, NRS 432B.61G, 432B.620, 481.053, 481.054
Choke holds, conditions for use, NRS 481.0545
Constables, NRS ch. 258
Metropolitan police depanmenu, NRS ch. 280
Nevada highway patrol. NRS 481.130-481.180
Sheriffs, NRS ch. 248
Sovereign immunity waived, NRS 41.0305-41.039
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PEACE OFFICERS

289.040

GENERAL PROVISIONS
NRS 289.010 Definitions. As used in this chapter, unless the context oth
erwise requires;
1. "Peace officer" means any person upon whom some or all of the powers of
a peace officer are conferred pursuant to NRS 289. ISO to 289.360, inclusive.
2. "Punitive action” means any action which may lead to dismissal, demotion,
suspension, reduction in salary, written reprimand or transfer of a peace officer for
purposes of punishment.
(Added to NRS by 1983, 2096; A 1989, 1582; 1993, 2525)

RIGHTS OF PEACE OFFICERS
NRS 289.020 Punitive action: Prohibited for exercise of rights under
internal procedure; opportunity for hearing; refusal to cooperate in criminal
investigation punishable as insubordination.
1. A law enforcement agency shall not use punitive action against a peace
officer if he chooses to exercise his rights under any internal administrative griev
ance procedure.
2. If a peace officer is denied a promotion on grounds other than merit or
other punitive action is used against him, a law enforcement agency shall provide
the officer with an opportunity for a hearing.
3. If a peace officer refuses to comply with a request by a superior officer to
cooperate with his own or any other law enforcement agency in a criminal investi
gation, the agency may charge the officer with insubordination.
(Added to NRS by 1983, 2098)
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Officers and Public Employees « = 69.13.

WESTLAW Topic No. 283.
C.J.S. Officers and Public Employees H 98.
135.

NRS 289.030 Limitation on requiring disclosure of llnanciai Information.
A law enforcement agency shall not require any peace officer to disclose his assets,
debts, sources of income or other financial information or make such a disclosure a
condition precedent to a promotion, job assignment or other personnel action unless
that information is necessary to:
1. Determine his credentials for transfer to a specialized unit;
2. Prevent any conflict o f interest which may result in any new assignment; or
3. Determine whether he is engaged in unlawful activity.
(Added to NRS by 1983, 2096)
WEST PIÆ USHING CO.
Officers and Public Employees c=> 27.28.

WESTLAW Topic No. 283.
C J.S . Officers and Public Employees §§ IS.
16, 34. 35. 204.

NRS 289.040 Limitation on placing unfavorable comment or document in
officer's file; right to respond; provision of copy of comment or document.
1.
No law enforcement agency may place any unfavorable comment or docu
ment in the file o f a peace officer unless:
(a) The officer has read and initialed the comment o r document; or
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289.050

PEACE OFFICERS

(b)
If the officer refuses to initial the comment or document, a notation to that
effect is noted on or attached to the comment or document.
2. If the peace officer submits to the law enforcement agency a written re
sponse within 30 days after he is asked to initial the comment or document, his
response must be attached to and accompany the comment or document.
3. A peace officer must be given a copy o f any comment or document that is
placed in lus personnel file.
(Added to NRS by 1983, 2097; A 1991, 2213)
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Officers and Public Employees c=> 91.

WESTLAW Topic No. 283.
C J.S . Officers and Public Employees { 218.

NRS 289.050 Consequences o f refusal to submit to polygraphic examina
tion. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 289.070:
1. If a peace officer refuses to submit to a polygpphic examination:
(a) No law enforcement agency may take any disciplinary action against such
officer; and
(b) No investigator may make a notation of such refusal in his report, absent
independent evidence of unlawful conduct by the peace officer.
2. Evidence of any refusal by a peace officer to submit to a polygraphic
examination is not admissible if introduced by any governmental body or agency
in this state at any subsequent hearing, trial or other judicial or administrative
proceeding.
(Added to NRS by 1983, 2097)
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Officers and Public Employees <= 69.12.
69.13.

WESTLAW Topic No. 283.
C J.S . Officers and Public Employees M 98.
109. I I I . 112. 135.

NRS 289.060 Notillcation and interrogation of officer if investigation
could lead to punitive action.
1. The agency shall, within a reasonable time before any interrogation or
hearing is held relating to an investigation o f the activities of a peace officer which
may result in punitive action, provitk written notice to the officer if practical under
the circumstances.
2. The notice must include:
(a) A description o f the nanire of the investigation;
(b) A summary o f alleged misconduct o f the peace officer;
(c) The date, time and place of the interrogation or hearing;
(d) The name and rank of the officer in charge of the investigation and the
officers who will conduct any interrogation;
(e) The name o f any other person who will be present at any interrogation or
hearing; and
(0 A statement setting forth the provisions of subsection I of NRS 289.080.
3. The agency shall:
(a) Interrogate the officer during his regular working hours, if reasonably
practicable, or compensate him for that time based on 1& regular wages if no
charges arise from the interrogation.
(b) Limit the scope o f the questions during the interrogation or hearing to the
alleged misconduct o f the officer.
(c) Allow the officer to explain an answer or refute a negative implication
which results from questioning during an interrogation or hearing.
(Added to NRS by 1983, 2097; A 1993, 2379)
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WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Officers and Public Employees &= 72.12.

289.080

WESTLAW Topic No. 283.
C J.S. Officers and Public Employees {§ 91,
111. 148. 149. 151. 153. 154.

NRS 289.070 Investigation of allegation of misconduct; when officer may
be required to take polygraphic examination; procedure and requirements for
examination.
1. An investigation o f a peace officer may be conducted in response to an
allegation that an officer has engaged in activities which could result in punitive
action.
2. If a person who makes such an allegation against an officer submits to a
polygraphic examination and the results o f that examination indicate that the person
examined is telling the truth about the purported activities, the officer gainst
whom the allegation is made must submit to a polygraphic examination concerning
such activities.
3. If a polygraphic examination is given to an officer pursuam to this section,
a sound or video recording must be made o f the examination, the preliminary in
terview and the post-examination interview. Before the opinion o f the examiner
regarding the officer’s veraci^ may be considered in a disciplmary action, all rec
ords, documents and recordings resulting from tte examination must be made
available for review by one or more examiners licensed or qualified to be licensed
in this state who are acceptable to the law enforcement agency and the officer. If
the opinion of the reviewing examiners does not agree with the initial examiner’s
opinion, the officer must be allowed to be reexaminicd by an examiner of his choice
who is licensed or qualified to be licensed in this state.
4. The opinion o f the examiner regarding the officer’s veracity may not be
considered in a disciplinary action unless the examination was conducted in a man
ner which complies with the provisions of chapter 648 o f NRS. In any event, the
law enforcement agency shall not use the examiner’s opinion regarding the veracity
of the officer as the sole basis for disciplinary action against the officer.
5. If the officer refuses to submit to a polygraphic examination required by
this section:
(a) A law enforcement agency may take disciplinary action against that officer;
and
(b) An investigator may make a notation of the refusal in his report.
6. Evidence of any refusal by a peace officer to submit to a polygraphic ex
amination required by this section is admissible if introduced by any governmental
body or agency in this state at any subsequent hearing, trial or other judicial or
administrative proceeding.
(Added to NRS by 1983, 2097; A 1989, 1582)
WEST PinLISH IN G CO.
Officers and Putdic Employees « = 72.10.

WESTLAW Topic No. 283
C J.S . Officers and Puldic Employees |§ 91.
I l l , 147.

NRS 289.080 Right to presence o f attorney o r other representative; con
fidential Inlbrmatlon; disclosure; punitive action hy law enforcement agency
prohibited; record o f Interrogation o r hearing.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, a peace officer may upon
request have a lawyer or other representative o f his choiosii% present with the pràce
officer during any phase o f an interrogation or hearing.
2. The representative must not otherwise be connected to, or the subject of,
the same investigation.
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3. Any information that the representative obtains from the peace officer
concerning the investigation is confidential and must not be disclosed except upon
the:
(a) Request o f the peace officer; or
(b) Lawhil order of a court o f competent jurisdiction.
A law enforcement agency shall not take punitive action against the representative
for his failure or refusal to disclose such itdbrmation.
4. The peace officer or the law enforcement agency may make a stenographic
or magnetic record of the interrogation or hearing. If the agency records the pro
ceedings, the agency shall at the officer's request and expense provide a copy of
the:
(a) Stenogtaphic transcript o f the proceedings; or
(b) Recording on the magnetic tape.
(Added to NRS by 1983, 2098; A 1991, 647; 1993, 2380)
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Officers and Public Employees «= 72.16.

WESTLAW Topic No. 283.
C J.S . Officers and Public Employees }{ 91.
111. 14810 164.

NRS 289.090 Investigation concerning alleged criminal activities. The
provisions o f NRS 289.060, 289.070 and 289.080 do not apply lo any investigation
which concerns alleged criminal activities.
(Added to NRS by 1983, 2098)
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Officers and Public Employees « = 72.10.

WESTLAW Topic No. 283.
C J.S . Officers and Aiblic Employees }§ 91,
111. 147.

NRS 289.100 Limitations on application of chapter.
1. This chapter does not prohibit any agreements for cooperation between the
law enforcement agency and agencies in other jurisdictions.
2. This chapter does not affect any procedures which have been adopted by
the law enforcement agency if those procedures provide the same or greater rights
than provided for in this chapter.
(Added to NRS by 1983, 2098)

NRS 289.110 Report concerning Improper governmental action; investi
gation of report; reprisal by employer prohibited.
1. A pwce officer may disclose information regarding improper governmental
action by filing a report with:
(a) The district attorney o f the county in which the improper governmental
action occurred; or
(b) The attorney general if the district attorney referred to in paragraph (a) is
involved in the improper governmental action.
2. Upon the filing o f a report pursuant to subsection 1, the district anomey or
attorney general may investigate the report and determine whether improper govemmeiual action did occur. Upon the completion o f the investigation the district
attorney or attorney general:
(a) If he determines that improper governmental action did occur, may prose
cute the violation. The attorney general may prosecute such a violation if the dis
trict attorney fails or refuses so to act.
(b) Shall notify the peace officer who filed the report of the results o f the in
vestigation.
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3. The employer o f a peace officer shall not take any reprisal or retaliatory
action against a peace officer who in good faith files a report pursuant to sub
section 1.
4. Nothing in this section authorizes a person to disclose information if disclo
sure is otherwise prohibited by law.
5. This section does not apply to a peace officer who is employed by the state.
6. As used in this section, "im p ro ^ r governmental action" means any action
taken by an officer or employee of a law enforcement agency, while in the per
formance o f his official duties which is in violation of any state law or regulation.
(Added to NRS by 1991, 2212)
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Officers ind Putilic Employees
69.12. 69.13.

69.7,

WESTLAW Topic No. 283.
C J.S . Officers and Public Employees fS 98.
106 to 112.132 to 136.

NRS 289.120 Judicial relief available for aggrieved p w e officer. Any
peace officer aggrieved by an action o f his employer in violation o f this chapter
may, after exhausting any applicable internal grievance procedures, grievance
procedures negotiated pursuant to chapter 288 o f NRS and other adinmistrative
remedies, apply to the district court for judicial relief. If the court determines that
the employer has violated a provision o f this chapter, tte court shall order appro
priate injunctive or other extraordinary relief to prevent the further occurrence o f
the violation and the taking of any reprisal or retaliatory action by the employer
against the peace officer.
(Added to NRS by 1991, 2213)
WEST Pim USHING CO.
Officers and Public Employees c=> 72.41.
72.42.

WESTLAW Topic No. 283.
C J.S . Officers and Public Employees H 91.
113. 169.

PERSONS POSSESSING POWERS
OF PEACE OmCERS
NRS CROSS REFERENCES.
Humane society members, agents and officen, NRS 574.040

NRS 289.150 Sheriffs, thclr deputies and correctional officers; city and
town marshals, policemen and correctional officers; court baiUffh; constables
and their deputies. The following persons have the powers of a peace officer;
1. Sheriffs of counties and o f metropolitan police departments, their deputies
and correctional officers.
2. Marshals, policemen and correctional officers o f cities and towns.
3. The bailiff o f the supreme court.
4. The bailiffs o f the district courts, justices’ courts and municipal courts
whose duties require them to carry weapons and make arrests.
5. Constables and their deputies whose official duties require them to carry
weapons and make arrests.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2S20)—(Substimied in revision for NRS 281.0311)
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Amsst « = 62,63.2.

WESTLAW Topic No. 35.
C J.S . Arrest |{ 10.17.

289-9

(1997)

R e p r o d u c e d w ith p e r m is s io n o f th e co p y r ig h t o w n e r . F u rth er r ep ro d u ctio n p roh ib ited w ith o u t p e r m issio n .

135

289.160

PEACE OFFICERS

NRS 289.160 Security officers and other persons employed or appointed
by local governments under certain circumstances.
1. A security officer employed:
(a) Pursuant to NRS 244.167 by a board o f county commissioners; or
(b) Pursuant to NRS 266.323 by the governing b ^ y o f a city,
has the powers of a peace officer when he is carrying out duties prescribed by
ordinance.
2. A person appointed pursuant to subsection I of NRS 269.235 by a town
board or board of county commissioners has the powers o f a peace officer.
3. Policemen and special policemen appointed pursuant to subsection 5 of
NRS 269.240 have, within the limits o f the unincoiyiratcd town, the powers of
making arrests which are exercised by a peace officer according to the laws of this
state.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2520)—(Substituted in revision for NRS 281.0313)
NRS 289.170 Special Investigators employed by attorney general; Investi
gators employed by district attorney. Special investigators employed by the
attorney general and investigators employed by a district attorney have the powers
of a peace officer.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2520)—(Substituted in revision for NRS 281.0315)
NRS 289.180 Parole and probation officers; chief and assistant alterna
tive sentencing officers of departm ent o f alternative sentencing; director of
juvenile services; chief and parole officers o f youth parole bureau; director o f
departm ent o f family, youth and Juvenile services.
1. The following persons have the powers o f a peace officer;
(a) The chief parole and probation officer appointed pursuant to NRS
213.1092;
(b) Assistant parole and probation officers appointed pursuant to NRS
213.1095;
(c) The chief o f a department o f alternative sentencing established pursuant to
NRS211A.080; and
(d) Assistant alternative sentencing officers of a department of alternative
sentencing.
2. A juvenile probation officer or assistant juvenile probation officer whose
official duties require him to enforce court ordkrs on juvenile offenders and make
arrests has the same powers as a peace officer when performing duties pursuant to
NRS 213.220 to 213.290, inclusive, or chapter 62 or 432B of NRS, including the
power to arrest an adult criminal offender encounierKl while in the performance of
those duties.
3. A director of juvenile services has the powers o f a peace officer in his
judicial district when performing duties pursuant to NRS 213.220 to 213.290, in
clusive, or chapter 62 or 432B o f NRS, including the power to arrest an adult
criminal offender encountered while in the performance of those duties.
4. The chief o f the youth parole bureau o f the division o f child and family
services in the department of human resources and the parole officers of the bureau
have the powers o f a peace officer in carrying out the functions o f the bureau.
5. A director of a department o f family, youth and juvenile services estab
lished pursuant to NRS 62.1264 has the powers o f a peace officer in the county
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when carrying out duties pursuant to chapter 62 o f NRS, NRS 213.220 to 213.290,
inclusive, or chapter 432B o f NRS, including the power to arrest an adult criminal
offender encountered while carrying out those duties.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2520; A 1995, 703, 873; 1997, 1480)
NRS 289.190 School police officers; other officers and employees of
school district.
1. A person employed or appointed to serve as a school police officer pursu
ant to subsection 4 o f NRS 391.1(M has the powers of a peace officer.
2. A person appointed pursuant to NRS 393.0718 by the board of trustees of
any school district has the powers of a peace officer to carry out the intents and
purposes o f NRS 393.071 to 393.0719, inclusive.
3. Members of every board of trustees of a school district, superintendents of
schools, principals and teachers have concurrent power with peace officers for the
protection o f children in school and on the way to and from school, and for the
enforcement of order and discipline among such children, including children who
attend school within one school district but reside in an adjoining school district or
adjoining state, pursuant to the provisions of chapter 392 of NRS. This subsKtion
must not be construed so as to make it the duty o f superintendents of schools, prin
cipals and teachers to supervise the conduct o f children while not on the scIk m I
property.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2521)—(Substimted in revision for NRS 281.0319)
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Anest c=> 62.63.2.
WESTLAW Topic No. 33.
C J.S . Arrest |§ 10. 17.
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OPINIONS.
Jurlsdlctloa over ckdtlrcfl posses firom
porcnts to school oulhorMcs durtng school
hours. When children enter school, jurisdicnon
during school hours passes from parents to school
authorities. Dual jurisdicnon would mean destrucnon of school discipline. (See NRS 289.190,
391.270 and 392.467.) AGO 79 (11-22-1921).
cited. AGO 684 (10-4-1948)

no power lo require pupils lo serve in sudem
parrots to protect younger pupils at dangerous
street intersections on tteir wav to and ftom
school. (See NRS 289.190 and 6I6A.I70.) AGO
‘ 12-16-1940)
Schools n oy rcgulolc cooduct of pupils
Itoth oo oud off school property when directly
rdoled lo maintenance of order for school
functioas. Under former provisions of NRS
392.030 (cf. NRS 392.467) and former NRS
392.460 (cf. NRS 289.190). schools may promutgate and enforce rules and regulanons concerning
ctmduct of pupils both on and off school property.

NRS 289.200 OfTkers and em ployca o f Nevada youth training center and
Callente youth center. Officers and employees o f the:
1. Nevada youth training center have the powers of a peace officer so far as
necessary to arrest inmates who have escaped from that center.
2. Caliente youth center have the powers o f a peace officer so far as necessary
to arrest inmates who have escaped from that center.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2521)—(Substimted in revision for NRS 281.0321)
NRS 289.210 Legislative police. A legislative police officer o f the State of
Nevada has the powers o f a peace officer when carrying out duties prescribed by
the legislative commission.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2521; A 1995, 703, 23Q6)-(Substimted in revision
for NRS 281.0323)
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WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Arrest e = 62. 63.2.

WESTLAW Topic No. 35.
C J.S . Arrest f i 10. 17.

NRS 289.220 Director, oflkers and designated employees of department
of prisons; certain employees of detention facilities of metropolitan polke
department.
1. The director of the department of prisons, and any officer or employee of
the department so designated by the director, have the powers of a peace officer
when performing duties prescribed by the director. For the purposes of this sub
section, the duties which may be prescribed by the director include, but are not
limited to, pursuit and return of escaped offenders, transportation and escort of
offenders and the general exercise of control over offenders within or outside the
confines of the institutions and facilities o f the department.
2. A person ^pointed pursuant to NRS 211.1 IS to administer detention fa
cilities or a jail, and his subordinate jailers, corrections officers and other employ
ees whose duties involve law enforcement have die powers o f a peace officer.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2521)-(Substimted in revision for NRS 281.0325)

NRS 289.230 Califbmlm correctional oflker. When, pursuant to Califor
nia law, a California correctional officer has in his custody in Nevada a prisoner of
the State of California, the correctional officer may maintain custody o f the pris
oner in Nevada and retake the prisoner if he should escape in Nevada, to the same
extent as if the correctional officer were a peace officer appointed under Nevada
law and the prisoner had been committed to his custody in proceedings under
Nevada law.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2522)—(Substimted in revision for NRS 281.0327)
NRS 289.240 Employees of mental hygiene and mental retardation divi
sion of department of human resources. Forensic technicians and correctional
officers employed by the mental hygiene and mental retardation division of the
department o f human resources at facilities for mentally disordered offenders have
the powers o f peace officers when performing duties prescribed by the administra
tor of the division.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 843)—(Substimted in revision for NRS 281.0329)

NRS 289.250 State fire marshal and his employees; foresters and fire
wardens; arson Investigators.
1. The state fire marshal, his assistant and his deputies have the powers o f a
peace officer.
2. The following persons have only those powers of a peace officer necessary
to enforce the provisions o f the laws o f this state respecting forest and watershed
management or the protection o f forests and other lands from fire:
(a) Paid foresters and firewardens appointed pursuam to paragraph (a) of sub
section 2 o f NRS 472.040.
(b) Citizen-wardens appointed pursuam to paragraph (b) o f subsection 2 of
NRS 472.040.
(c) Voluntary firewardens appointed pursuam to paragraph (c) o f subsection 2
o f NRS 472.040.
3. A paid forester or firewarden appointed as an arson investigator pursuam to
paragraph (d) of subsection 2 of NRS 472.040 has the powers of a peace officer.
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4. An arson investigator designated as a peace officer pursuant to:
(a) Paragraph (c) o f subsection 1 of NRS 244.2961; or
(b) Subsection 3 of NRS 266.310,
has the powers o f a peace officer.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2522)-(Substituted in revision for NRS 281.0331)
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Arrest c = 62. 63.2.

WESTLAW Topic No. 35.
C J.S . Arrest $$ 10, 17.

NRS 289.260 Rangers and employees of division of state parks.
1. Rangers and employees of the division o f state parks o f the state depart
ment of conservation and natural resources have, at the discretion o f the adminis
trator of the division, the same power to make arrests as any other peace officer for
violations of law committed inside the boundaries of state parks or real property
controlled or administered by the division.
2. An employee o f the division of state parks o f the state department of con
servation and n a t i ^ resources appointed o r designated pursuant to subsection 2 of
NRS 407.065 has the powers of a peace officer.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2522)-(Substimted in revision for NRS 281.0333)
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Arrest «=» 62. 63.2.
WESTLAW Topic No. 35.
C J.S. Arrest H 10. 17.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINIONS.

ices within boundaries of state parks by division
of state parks is within discrétion of adininistrator
of division. Adininistrator may provide law
enforcement services but has no satutory duty to
” •^
meBopolitM police deparaera.

NRS 289.270 Director and employees of department of motor vehicles
and public safety; Nevada highway patrol; state dimster identification team.
1. The following persons have the powers o f a peace officer:
(a) The director of the department o f motor vehicles and public safety.
(b) The chiefs of the divisions o f the department of motor vehicles aixi public
safety.
(c) The deputy directors o f the department o f motor vehicles and public safety
employed pim uant to subsection 2 o f NRS 481.035.
(d) The investigators and agents o f the investigation division o f the department
of motor vehicles and public safety and any other officer or employee of that divi
sion whose principal duty is to enforce one or more laws of this state, and any
person promoted from such a duty to a supervisor position related to such a duty.
(e) The personnel o f the capitol police division o f the department o f motor
vehicles and public safety appointed pursuant to subsection 2 of NRS 331.140.
2. The ^rsonnel o f the Nevada highway patrol appointed pursuant to subsec
tion 2 o f NRS 481.150 have the powers o f a peace officer specified in NRS
481.150 and 481.180.
3. Administrators and investigators o f the bureau o f enforcement o f the regis
tration division o f the department o f motor vehicles and public safety have the
powers o f a peace officer to enforce any law o f the State o f Nevada in carrying out
their duties under NRS 481.048.
4. Officers and investigators of the section for the control o f emissions from
vehicles o f the registration division o f the department o f motor vehicles and public

289-13

(1997)

R e p r o d u c e d w ith p e r m issio n o f th e co p y r ig h t o w n er . F u rth er rep ro d u ctio n p roh ib ited w ith o u t p e r m issio n .

139

289.280

PEACE OFFICERS

safety, appointed pursuant to NRS 481.0481, have the powers of peace officers in
carrying out their duties under that section.
5.
Members o f the state disaster identification team o f the division of emer
gency management o f the department o f motor vehicles and public safety who are,
pursuant to NRS 414.270, activated by the chief of the division during a state of
emergency proclaimed pursuant to NRS 414.070 to perform the duties o f the state
disaster identification team, have the powers of peace officers in carrying out those
duties.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2522; A 1995. 2306; 1997, 3263)

NRS 289.280 Game wardens. A person designated as a game warden
pursuant to NRS SOI .349 is a peace officer for the purposes of;
1. T k service o f such legal process, including warrants and subpoenas, as
may be required in the enforcement of Title 45 o f NRS and chapter 488 o f NRS.
2. The enforcement of all laws o f the State of Nevada while they are p e r 
forming their duties pursuant to Title 45 o f NRS and chapter 488 of NRS.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2523)—(Substituted in revision for NRS 281.0337)
WECT PUBLISHING C O .
Arrest c = 62. 63.2.
Game c = 6.

WESTLAW Topic Nos. 35. 187.
C J.S . Arrest H 10. 17.
C J.S . Game § 9.

NRS 289.290 Field agents and inspectors for division of agriculture; in
spector of state board of sheep commissioners and his deputies; officer ap
pointed by Nevada junior livestock show board.
1. A person designated by the administrator of the division of agriculmre of
the department o f business and industry as a field agent o r an inspector pursuant to
subsection 2 of NRS 561.225 has the powers o f peace officers to make investiga
tions and arrests and to execute warrants of search and seizure, and may temporar
ily stop the movement of livestock and carcasses for purposes of inspection.
2. An inspector of the state board o f sheep commissioners u d his deputies
have the powers of a peace officer.
3. An officer appointed by the Nevada junior livestock show board pursuant to
NRS 563.120 has the powers o f a peace officer for the preservation of order and
peace on the grounds and in the buildings and the approaches thereto o f the live
stock shows and exhibitions that the board conducts.
4. In carrying out the provisions of chapter 565 of NRS, an inspector of the
division of agriculture has the powers o f a peace officer to make investigations and
arrests and to execute warrants o f search and seizure. This subsection does not
authorize any inspector to retire under the public employees’ retirement system
before having attained the minimum service age o f 60 years.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2523; A 1995, 703)—(Substituted in revision for NRS
281.0339)

NRS 289J00 iBvcstigBtor of private investigator’s licensing board. A
person employed as an investigator by the private investigator’s licensing board
pursuant to NRS 648.1X25 has the powers o f a peace officer.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2523; A 1995, 304)—(Substituted in revision for NRS
281.0341)
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Arrest c = 62.63.2.
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NRS 289.310 Commissioner of insurance and his chief deputy. The
commissioner o f insurance and his chief deputy are peace officers for the limited
purposes o f obtaining and exchanging information on applicants and licensees under
Title 57 o f NRS.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2523)—(Substituted in revision for NRS 281.0343)
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Arresr c = 62. 63.2.

WESTLAW Topic No. 35.
C J.S . .Arrea }§ 10. 19.

NRS 289.320 Certain designated employees of transportation services
authority. An employee of the transportation services authority whom it desig
nates as an inspector or as manager o f transportation is a peace officer and has
police power for the enforcement o f the provisions of:
1. Chapters 706 and 712of NRS and all regulations of the transportation
services authority or the departmentof motor vehicles and public safety pertaining
thereto; and
2. Chapter 482 of NRS and NRS 483.230, 483.350 and 483.530 to 483.620,
inclusive, for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of chapter 706 of NRS.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2523; A 1997, 1987)
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Arrest
62. 63.2.

WESTLAW Topic No. 35.
C J.S . Arrest f { 10.19.

NRS 289.330 Railroad police. A person conunissioned and appointed to
serve as a railroad policeman pursuant to subsection 1 o f NRS 705.220 has the
powers of a peace officer upon the premises or property owned or operated by the
railroad company which employs him.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2523)—(Substimted in revision for NRS 281.0347)
NRS 289.340 Taxicab field Investigator or airport control officer desig
nated by taxicab admimbtrator. An employee designated by the taxicab admin
istrator as:
1. A taxicab field investigator is a peace officer.
2. An airport control officer is a peace officer only when on duty at the
airport.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2524)—(Substimted in revision for NRS 281.0349)
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Arrest «=> 62.63.2.
Automobiles «=> 63.

WESTLAW Topic Nos. 35. 48A.
C J.S . Arrest S i 10. 17.
C J.S . Motor Vehicles § 45.

NRS 289.350 Members of police department
Community College System of Nevada.

of University and

1.
A person employed and compensated as a member o f the police department
of the University and Community College System of Nevada, when appointed
pursuant to subsection 1 o f NRS 396.325 and duly sworn, is a peace officer, but
may exercise his power or authority only:
(a)
Upon the campuses of the University and Community College System
o f Nevada, including that area to the center line o f public streets adjacent to a
campus;
0)) When in hot pursuit of a violator leaving such a campus or area:
(c)
In o r about other grounds or properties o f the University and Community
College System o f Nevada; or
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(d)
Except as limited by subsection 2, in accordance with interlocal agreements
entered into with other law enforcement agencies.
2.
An interlocal agreement between the police department for the University
and Community College System o f Nevada and other law enforcement agencies
may allow a peace officer of the police department of the University and Commu
nity College System of Nevada to exercise his power or authority:
(a) On any public street that is adjacent to property owned by the University
and Community College System o f Nevada.
(b) On any property that is consistently used by an organization whose recogni
tion by the Universi^ and Community College System of Nevada is a necessary
condition for its continued operation.
(c) On any property that is rented or leased by the University and Community
College System of Nevada for an event that is approved by the University and
CommuniQ' College System o f Nevada.
(d) For munial assistance specifically agreed upon with the other law enforce
ment agencies that are parties to the interlot^ agreement.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2524)—(Substituted in revision for NRS 281.0351)
WEST Pim U SH IN G CO.
Arrest
62. 63J .
Colleges anil Uoiversines «=>8(1).

WESTLAW Topic Nos. 35.81.
C.J.S. Arrest iS 10. 17.
C J.S . Colleges anil Universities { 20.

NRS 289.360 Members and agents of state gaming control board; mem
bers of Nevada gaming commission.
1. For the purpose of the administration and enforcement of the provisions of
chapter 205 of NRS involving a crime against the property of a gaming licensee, or
chapter 462, 463, 463B, 464 or 465 of NRS, the members of the state gaming
control board and the Nevada gaming commission and those agents of the board
whose duties include the enforcement, or the investigation of suspected violations,
of stanites or regulations, have the powers of a peace officer.
2. An agent o f the state gaming control board whose duties include the en
forcement. or the investigation o f suspected violations, of stanites or regulations,
and who has been certified by the peace officers' standards and training committee,
also has (he powers of a peace officer when, during the performance of those
duties:
(a) A felony, gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor is committed or attempted in
his presence; or
(b) He is given reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed a fel
ony or gross misdemeanor outside o f his presence.
3. For the purpose of protecting members o f the state gaming control board
and of the Nevada gaming commission and their families and property, and pro
viding security at meetings of the board and o f the commission, an agent of the
board whose duties include the enforcement o f statutes or regulations has the pow
ers o f a peace officer.
(Added to NRS by 1993, 2524)—(Substituted in revision for NRS 281.0353)

ADVISORY REVIEW BOARDS
NRS 289.380 Creatioo by governing body of city or county; number,
appointment and qualifications or members.
1.
Except as otherwise provided in NRS 289.383, the governing body o f a
city or county may create a review board by ordinance to advise the governing

(1997)
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body on issues concerning peace officers, school police officers, constables and
deputies of constables within the city or county.
2. A review board created pursuant to subsection I must consist of:
(a) In a city or county whose population is 100,000 or more, 25 members; and
(b) In a city or county whose population is less than 100,000, 12 members.
3. Such a review board must be appointed by the governing body from a list
of names submitted by interested persons. If an insufficient number of names of
interested persons are submitted, the governing body shall appoint the remaining
members in the manner it deems appropriate.
4. A person appointed to the review board must:
(a) Be a resident o f the city or county for which the review board was created,
except no member o f the review board may be currently employed as a peace offi
cer, school police officer, constable or deputy of a constable.
(b) Complete training relating to law enforcement before serving as a member
of the review board, including, without limitation, training in the policies and pro
cedures of law enforcement agencies, police of school districts and offices of con
stables, the provisions o f NRS 289.010 to 289.120, inclusive, and the employment
contracts of the peace officers, school police officers, constables or deputies of
constables.
(Added to NRS by 1997, 2515)

NRS 289.383 Creation by political subdivisions upon request from metro
politan police department; number, appointment and qualifications of
members.
1. If a metropolitan police department has been formed pursuant to NRS
280.110, the metropolitan police committee on fiscal affairs may request the par
ticipating political subdivisions to create a review board to advise the committee on
issues concerning peace officers employed by the metropolitan police department.
The participating subdivisions may jointly create such a review board by mutual
ordinances.
2. A review board created pursuant to subsection 1 must consist o f 25 mem
bers, appointed from a list o f names submined by interested persons. The members
of the metropolitan police committee on fiscal affairs who are representatives of the
county shall appoint 13 members of the review board, and the members of the
metropolitan police committee on fiscal affairs who are representatives of each
participating city within the county shall appoint an equal number of the remaining
12 members. If an insufficient number of names o f interested persons are submit
ted, the members o f the metropolitan police committee on fiscal affairs shall ap
point the remaining members in the manner they deem appropriate.
3. A person appointed to the review board must:
(a) Be a resident within the jurisdiction o f the participating subdivisions for
which the review board was created, except no member of the review board may
be currently employed as a peace officer.
(b) Complete training relating to law enforcement before serving as a member
of the review board, including, without limitation, training in the policies and pro
cedures of law enforcement agencies, the provisions of NRS 289.010 to 289.120,
inclusive, and tlie employment contracts o f the peace officers.
(Added to NRS by 1997, 2516)
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NRS 289.385 Limitation on jurisdiction; abridgement of contractual or
statutory rights of peace olYker prohibited. A review board created pursuant to
NRS 289.380 or 289.383;
1. Does not have jurisdiction over any matter in which it is alleged that a
crime has been committed.
2. Shall not abridge the rights of a peace officer, school police officer, con
stable or deputy of a constable that are granted pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement, a contract or any federal or state statute or regulation.
(Added to NRS by 1997, 2516)

NRS 289.387 Panel of board: Selection of members; powers and duties;
proceedings; rights of officer Investigated.
1. A review board that is created pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection 2 of
NRS 289.380 or pursuant to NRS 289.383 must meet in panels of five members to
.a n y out its duties.
2. A review board that is created pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection 2 of
NRS 289.380 must meet in panels of three members to carry out its duties.
3. Members must be selected randomly to serve on a panel, and the panel
shall select one of its members to serve as chairman of the panel.
4. A panel of a review board created pursuant to NRS 289.380 or 289.383
may:
(a) Refer a complaint against a peace officer, school police officer, constable
or deputy of a consuble to the employer o f the peace officer, school police officer,
constable or deputy of a constable.
(b) Review an internal investigation o f a peace officer, school police officer,
constable or deputy o f a constable within the jurisdiction of the governing body that
created the review board and make recommendations regarding any disciplinary
action against the peace officer, school police officer, constable or deputy of a
constable that is recommended by his employer, including, without limitation:
(1) Increasing or decreasing the recommended level of discipline; and
(2) Exonerating the peace officer, school police officer, constable or deputy
of a constable who has been the subject of the internal investigation.
5. The employer of a peace officer, school police officer, constable or deputy
of a constable shall make available to a panel o f the review board any personnel
file or other material necessa^ for the paiiel to conduct a review.
6. When reviewing an internal investigation of a peace officer, school police
officer, constable or deputy o f a constable pursuant to subsection 4, the panel shall
provide the peace officer, school police ofncer, constable or deputy of a constable
with notice and an opportunity to be heard. The peace officer, school police offi
cer, constable or deputy o f a constable may represent himself at the hearing before
the panel or be represented by an attorney or other person o f his own choosing.
The review board, governing body and employer of the peace officer, school police
officer, constable or deputy o f a constable are not responsible for providing such
representation.
7. The chairman o f a panel of a review board shall report the findings and
recommendation of the panel regarding disciplinary action to the employer o f the
peace officer, school police officer, constable o r deputy of a constable.
8. A police officer, school police officer, constable or deputy o f a constable
may appeal a recommendation made by a panel o f the review board. The ordinance
pursuant to which the review board is created must specify the manner for con
ducting appeals, and may provide for, if both parties agree, without limitation,
mediation, conciliation or review by another panel of randomly selected members
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of the review board. If the appeal is heard by another panel of the review board,
the determination made by the panel hearing the appeal is final and binding and is
not subject to judicial review.
9. The findings and recommendation of a panel of the review board are public
records unless otherwise declared confidential by state or federal law.
10. A proceeding of a panel of such a review board is closed to the public.
(Added to NRS by 1997, 2516)

NRS 289.390 Panel of board: Oaths; subpoenas.
I. A panel of a review board that is created pursuant to NRS 289.380 or
289.383 may:
(a) Administer oaths:
(b) Take testimony;
(c) Within the scope o f its jurisdiction, issue subpoenas to compel the atten
dance o f witnesses to testify before the panel;
(d) Require the production o f books, papers and documents; and
(e) Issue commissions to take testimony.
1.
If a witness refuses to attend or testify or produce books, papers or
documents as required by the subpoena, the panel may petition the district court
to order the witness to appear or testify or produce the requested books, papers
or documents.
(Added to NRS by 1997, 2517)

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
NRS 289.400 Reimbursement for cost to repair or replace uniform, ac
cessories or safety equipment damped or destroyed In performance of duties.
In addition to the compensation required by NRS 281.121, a state agency that em
ploys a person:
1. Upon whom some or all of the powers o f a peace officer are conferred
pursuant to subsection 1 of NRS 289.180, subsection 1 of NRS 289.220 or subsec
tion 2 or 5 o f NRS 289.270; and
2. Who is required to purchase and wear his own uniform or other clothing,
accessories or safety equipment while performing his duties for the state as a peace
officer,
may, after first obtaining the written approval o f the director of the department of
administration, reimburse that person for the cost to repair or replace his required
uniform or other clothing, accessories or safety equipment if it is damaged or de
stroyed, by means other than ordinary wear and tear, while he is performing his
duties for the state as a peace officer.
(Added to NRS by 1995, 2744; A 1997, 3263)

NRS 289.410 Peace officer prohibited from using choke hold; exceptions;
agencies required to adopt regulations.
1. A peace officer shall not use a choke hold on any other person unless:
(a) The agency employing the peace officer authorizes the use of the choke
hold by its peace officers in the course o f their duties; and
(b) The peace officer has successfully completed training in the proper use of
the choke hold and holds current certification for its use by the agency which em
ploys him.
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2. If a law enforcement agency finds that a peace officer has violated the
provisions of subsection 1, the peace officer is subject to such disciplinary action as
is provided for such an offense by the agency.
3. Each agency in this state which employs a peace officer shall adopt regula
tions which govern whether the use of a choke hold by its ofEcers during the
course o f their duties is autliorized. If an agency authorizes such a use o f a choke
hold, the agency shall also adopt regulations which specifically address:
(a) The manner in which a peace officer, certified for use o f a choke hold, is
authorized to use the hold in the course of his duties;
(b) The manner in which records of training, certification and recertification
will be maintained to ensure compliance with any applicable stanitory or other
related requirements; and
(c) The consequences o f unauthorized or uncertiHed use o f a choke hold.
4. As used in this section, "choke hold” means the holding of a person's neck
in a manner specifically intended to restrict the flow o f oxygen or blood to the
person’s lungs or brain. The term includes the arm-bar restraint, carotid restraint
and lateral vascular neck restraint.
(Added to NRS by 1991, 982; A 1993, 2525; 1997, 508)
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Arrest c = 62. 63.5. 68(2).
Municipal Corporations e= 180(1). 353(1).
353(8).
Officers and Public Employees c= 116.

(1997)

WESTLAW Topic Nos. 35. 268. 283.
C.J S. Arrest §§ 10. 17. 49.
C.3.S. Municipal Corporations {§ 563et seq.
C.J.S. Officers and Public Employees H 206
to 208.
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